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Cornelius Castoriadis’ life can be characterized as one of engaged dissent.  As a 
founding member of the Socialisme ou Barbarie group in France, Castoriadis maintained 
a consistent position as an opponent of both Western capitalism and Soviet totalitarianism 
during the Cold War.  This position also placed Castoriadis in opposition to the 
mainstream French left, particularly Jean-Paul Sartre, who supported the French 
Communist Party and defended the Soviet Union.  After the dissolution of the group, 
Castoriadis continued to assert the possibility of constructing participatory democratic 
institutions in opposition to the existing bureaucratic capitalist institutional structure in 
the Western world.   
The bureaucratic-capitalist institutional apparatus of the late modern era 
perpetuates a system where the individual is increasingly excluded from the democratic 
political process and isolated within the private sphere.  However, the private sphere is 
not a refuge from the intrusion of the bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary, which 
consistently seeks to subject the whole of society to rational planning.  Each individual is 
shaped by his relationship to the bureaucracy; on the one hand, his relationships with 
other become subjected to an instrumental calculus, while at the same time, the individual 
seeks to find some meaning for the world around him by turning to the private sphere.  
Furthermore, a crisis of meaning pervades late modern societies, where institutions are 
incapable of providing answers to the questions posed to them by individuals living in 
these societies.  As a result, when individuals are able to participate in the democratic 
process, they tend to carry political ideas constructed in the private world into the public 
sphere, often to the detriment of the democratic process itself.   
Castoriadis seeks to reconcile liberty and broad public participation through the 
inclusion of the imaginary in democratic theory.  He contends that it is possible to 
construct an autonomous society that emphasizes the creativity of the individual and the 
collective in the construction of the institutions that govern it.  However, democratic 
theory conceived in this fashion must construct limits to political participation in order to 
insure that the democratic process itself is not destroyed by the emergence of political 
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Introduction: Why Castoriadis 
 
 When communism began its final collapse with the revolutions of 1989, many in 
the West proclaimed that socialism, as a political and economic theory was dead.  Marx’s 
predictions that the capitalist system would inevitably lead to economic crisis and self-
destruction were apparently refuted.  Theorists such as Francis Fukuyama argued that 
liberal democracy and free market capitalism represented the highest point of human 
social development and it was only a matter of time before the rest of the world would 
adopt Western political and economic systems.  However, instead of a general acceptance 
of liberal democracy, the recent history of the post-Cold War era illustrates that new 
challenges have emerged that reject the liberal democratic tradition.  The resurgence of 
ethnonationalism, the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism, and the serious problems 
with instituting a democratic government in Iraq apparently refute the triumphal rhetoric 
of post-Cold War liberals.  Experiments in building democracies in non-democratic states 
have been problematic at best and failures at worst, demonstrating the fact that liberal 
democracy has not been embraced as readily as those who support it had predicted.  
Furthermore, the spread of free-market capitalism has not “lifted all boats” as liberal 
economists and proponents of capitalist globalization predicted.  In fact, relative poverty 
has increased throughout the world and the gap between the rich and the poor has 
widened tremendously, even in the industrialized West.   
Instead of reaching the end of history, the world has become a more unstable and 
uncertain place.  Existing democratic institutions in the West face a political and 
philosophical crisis.  Politically, the most serious development in the post-Cold War 




democratic, radical Islamic fundamentalism in the form of al-Qaeda.  Even as Western 
democracies confront this external threat, the political crisis of democracy cannot be 
reduced to this conflict.  The political crisis of democracy also emerges within 
democratic countries in the form of chauvinistic nationalism, the encroachment on 
democratic liberties by states in the name of security, and a general apathy towards 
politics through much of the industrialized world, especially in the United States.  This 
internal political crisis is linked to a broader philosophical crisis that pervades modern 
societies.  Liberal capitalist democracy is unable to generate an adequate of democratic 
institutions in the face of both external and internal challenges.  At their worst, liberals 
rely on an ideological justification, relying on the simple argument that there is no better 
system than democracy and capitalism.  The “there is no alternative” argument is a weak 
defense of democracy, and ultimately unable to address the problems facing these 
societies in the twenty-first century.  At its best, liberalism sacrifices the possibility of 
broad political participation in order to guarantee individuals’ protection from the state 
and from other individuals.  While the protection of individual rights is a crucial element 
of democracy, liberalism does not account for non-political forms of power and coercion 
that can erode the rights of the individual.  Democratic governance requires a political 
philosophy that can protect the rights of the individual and allow for broad participation 
by the citizenry, while at the same time constructing limits to participation in order to 
prevent the destruction of the democratic system itself.  The work of Cornelius 




Cornelius Castoriadis: Against the Current 
Throughout his life, Cornelius Castoriadis assumed the role of an engaged 
dissenter in French, and international, intellectual life, advancing an anti-authoritarian 
political philosophy that targeted both the Soviet and Western political systems.  This 
consistent criticism of the Soviet Union set Castoriadis apart from the mainstream French 
left, despite the fact that he also sought to enact revolutionary change in the Western 
capitalist world.  His later work, after much of the French left had abandoned the political 
possibilities of revolution, exhibited a commitment to political and social change through 
an assertion of the emancipatory possibilities of participatory democracy.   
Castoriadis was born in Greece in 1922, joining the Communist Party, which was 
illegal under the Metaxas dictatorship, at the age of fifteen.  During World War II, 
Castoriadis left the Communist Party, believing it was a bureaucratic organization not 
interested in revolution, and joined a radical Trotskyist faction in Greece.  After the war, 
his membership in this faction forced him to flee the country for France in 1945.1  His life 
was endangered both by the right-wing Greek government and by the Communist Party, 
which was under orders from Joseph Stalin to purge unorthodox elements from the Greek 
left.  In Paris he joined the Trotskyist Parti Communiste Internationale (PCI) and met 
Claude Lefort, a student of the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty.2  One of the 
key tenets of Trotskyism at the time stated that the USSR, having been corrupted by 
Stalinism, represented a degenerated workers’ state.  The Trotskyists further argued that 
Stalin’s policies had grafted a counter-revolutionary bureaucracy onto an otherwise 
revolutionary society.  According to the PCI, the Soviet situation could be corrected by a 




the original Russian revolution.3  Both Castoriadis and Lefort disagreed with this 
assessment, and, along with other like-minded Trotskyists, formed a new tendency, the 
Chalieu-Montal4 tendency, within the PCI.  Castoriadis and Lefort disputed the Trotskyist 
method of revolution, which, like the traditional Leninist position, stated that the seizure 
of state power by a vanguard of revolutionaries should be the primary task on the road to 
socialism.  Opposing this position, Castoriadis and Lefort argued that revolutionary 
tactics must be founded in workers’ self-management in the factory and collective self-
management in society as a whole.  This, according to Castoriadis and Lefort, was the 
only conceivable path to socialism.5  The development of the Chalieu-Montal tendency 
represents an important step in the development of Castoriadis’ thought.  Throughout his 
life, until his death in 1997, Castoriadis advocated the position that socialism could only 
be achieved through worker self-management.   
In 1948, the Chalieu-Montal tendency broke with the PCI after the latter argued 
for a United Front with Yugoslavia against the Soviet Union.  The PCI’s position was 
based solely on Tito’s rejection of Stalinism and his assertion of an alternative Yugoslav 
road to socialism.  Castoriadis and Lefort, however, saw no difference between the 
Stalinist and Yugoslav bureaucracies.6  To support Tito meant to support bureaucratic 
management, the central problem in existing socialist states.  As a result, the Chalieu-
Montal tendency could no longer associate with the position of the Trotskyists and broke 
with the PCI.  One year later, Castoriadis and Lefort founded the Socialisme ou Barbarie 
group, publishing a journal of the same name.7   
From its inception, Socialisme ou Barbarie presented itself as an explicitly 




class.  The role that the Socialisme ou Barbarie group played in France was, in one 
important respect, typical, in that the intellectuals involved were directly engaged in the 
political struggles of the day.  Historically, French intellectuals have played a more 
engaged role in politics and public life than their counterparts in the United States and 
other countries in Europe.  French thinkers have often rejected “ivory tower” 
intellectualism and scientific analysis in favor of a more direct intervention in public life.8  
In the post-war era, intellectuals with often radically diverse philosophies have 
participated in similar social movements.  For example, André Glucksmann, one of the 
“new philosophers” brought together Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond Aron to speak out in 
support of the Vietnamese boat people.9  Michel Foucault, who argued that individual 
transgressions were a more effective form of resistance than any organized social 
movement, marched for gay rights in the 1980's, and Pierre Bourdieu was active in leftist 
politics up until his death in 2001. 
What these examples illustrate is an attempt to connect theory to practical politics, 
rather than simply remaining within the realm of academic speculation.  “Criticism is 
most powerful...when it gives voice to the common complaints of the people or elucidates 
the values that underlie those complaints.”10  Any French political theorist would agree 
with this statement, but would go one step further, not content to simply give voice to the 
complaints of the average person.  The French intellectual would insist on, and then 
participate in, a practical program of action that could alleviate these complaints.  One 
could argue that there is an inconsistency between theory and practice in the French 
intellectual scene.  To some extent, this is true.  However, this apparent inconsistency 




issue of Les Temps Modernes, for example, Sartre accuses the nineteenth century writers 
Flaubert and Goncourt of complicity in the brutal repression of the Paris Commune in 
1871, arguing that neither of these authors wrote anything to prevent it.11  This example 
illustrates the modern French commitment to intellectual engagement.  According to 
Sartre, the intellectual has an obligation to participate in political life.  Furthermore, this 
emphasis on political engagement suggests a willingness on the part of French 
intellectuals to be less dogmatic in thought, less bound to ideology, and more fluid in 
their definition of the relationship between theory and practice.   
Like most intellectuals in France at the time, Castoriadis believed in the 
importance of political engagement.  However, Castoriadis argued that political 
engagement should drive theory.  The purpose of revolutionary theory, according to 
Castoriadis, is to connect the everyday struggles of the working class (or of those living 
in a society in general) to a broader, theoretical context.12  Unlike Marxist groups like the 
PCF, Socialisme ou Barbarie never positioned itself as a vanguard of the working class.  
The concept of the Leninist vanguard implies that it is possible for a group to separate 
itself from its society in order to evaluate the maturation of objective historical conditions 
and determine the most opportune moment to strike against the capitalist system.  
Castoriadis’ position is that the revolutionary (or the critic, or the philosopher) cannot 
extricate himself from the society in which he lives.  The philosopher must be a 
participant in the social-historical world, because he is inextricably tied to the institutions 
and social significations of his society.  Castoriadis’ vision of the engaged intellectual 
represents an explicit criticism of the typical Western view of the intellectual’s 




begins with the assumption that the philosopher is an observer of the world, in the sense 
that the philosopher can extract himself from the particular society in which he lives and 
examine the society and the world in a more or less objective manner.  If the philosopher 
claims the ability to view a society in its totality from a position of exteriority, he will 
conclude that it is also possible to develop an objective and complete explanation of the 
social phenomena in question.  The philosopher will further conclude that he has 
discovered some Truth about the world that can be employed as a foundation for social 
and political institutions.   
According to Castoriadis, no human being can stand outside the world and view it 
from an objective perspective.  The philosopher does not possess privileged knowledge 
and is unable to stand outside the world as an objective observer.  Every individual is a 
part of the society in which she lives in the sense that existing social institutions play a 
role in the production of each individual’s particular being.  She has been born into this 
particular world, socialized by particular institutions, and she has contributed and linked 
herself to this particular society through the construction of philosophical social 
imaginary significations.  As such, the philosopher is always in participant in the society 
in which she lives.  If she seeks to undertake an examination of her society, she must first 
reject the possibility of abstracting herself from the social context in which she lives.  She 
must recognize that her philosophical undertaking will be, in part, a reflection of the 
society into which she is born.  As such, the intellectual must formulate her critique from 
inside the society in which she lives, and must concern herself with the everyday life of 
the members of this community.  Thus, for example, engagement in the workers’ struggle 




worker should act, becomes the only means by which the revolutionary can effect 
political change. 
In addition to rejecting the possibility of philosophical objectivity, the philosopher 
must also reject the possibility of discovering objective and immutable Truths about the 
world and about the individual subject.  No philosopher discovers any Truths about the 
world, because such Truths do not exist.  The idea that it is possible to “possess” a whole 
and complete picture of the Truth is both absurd and reactionary.13  Philosophy is only 
possible because the world is not fully ordered.  If the world were fully ordered, there 
would be one final system of knowledge, applicable for all time, thus eliminating the 
need for further thought and exploration.14  According to Castoriadis, “theory in itself is a 
doing, the always uncertain attempt to realize the project of clarifying the world.”15  
Thus, philosophy exists alongside other ways of understanding the world, such as religion 
or mythology, and provides no more or less “objective” value or insight than these other 
forms of clarifying and making sense of the world.  All of these ways of understanding 
represent creative acts, whose purpose is to construct meaning for the world.  Each 
particular society will judge which method of understanding provides the best “picture” 
of the world and that society’s place within the world.  Therefore, the question is not 
which way of understanding advances the most objectively accurate view of the world, 
but rather which method is the most appropriate, given the particular social-historical 
conditions that are present in a particular society.   
Given the fact that the philosopher is presenting a particular way of understanding 
the world and the society’s place in that world, each philosopher bears a heavy 




influences the construction of the social institutions that will govern the philosopher’s 
particular society.  The responsibility of the intellectual is particularly relevant in modern 
societies, where the instituted-imaginary posits a more direct role for the individual in the 
material world.  The fundamental problem of the Western political tradition is that in 
seeking to provide a comprehensive, systematic set of answers for the questions a society 
raises, the philosophers of the Western tradition have neglected the role of imaginary in 
the social construction of institutions.  Positing a fully ordered world closes off the 
possibility of the political, leading to flawed, and often dangerous, political practice.  In 
general, the Western philosophical tradition plays a key role in granting legitimacy to 
heteronomous and alienated institutions.  This is a direct result of the fact that Western 
philosophers are primarily concerned with answering the questions each society raises in 
articulating itself.  The construction of the political cannot be achieved on the basis of a 
philosophy that seeks to answer such questions.  Rather, philosophy must be concerned 
with raising these questions vis-à-vis the existing social institutional structure.  The 
political requires a philosophy that does not purport to discover immutable Truths about 
the world, but rather creates a framework for the continuous and consistent critique of 
society and established institutions.  As such, a philosophy that opens the possibility for 
the instauration of the political must accept that there are certain aspects of the world that 
must remain unknown.  Furthermore, it must recognize the role the imaginary plays in 
humanity’s construction of the world in which it lives.     
Democracy and Late Modernity: Problems and Possibilities 
The greatest problem facing democratic societies in the late modern era is a crisis 




created in these societies, in the sense that everything “new” that emerges is only a 
recycled product of already existing ideas.  This dilapidation pervades all spheres of 
social life, from politics, to economics, to art, leading to a situation where new challenges 
are met with tired routines and ideologies.  In essence, the existing institutional structure 
cannot articulate any significant meaning for those living in that society.  As a result, the 
late modern instituted imaginary legitimizes itself based solely on what already exists, 
presenting this as the only feasible option for understanding the world.  Furthermore, the 
legitimacy of existing institutions in dilapidated societies relies completely on the 
alienation of those living in the particular society rather than on their democratic 
participation.  The only value in dilapidated capitalist societies is material consumption, 
which is incapable of providing a positive defense of democratic institutions.  Individuals 
living in late modern societies become increasingly deracinated, depoliticized, and 
atomized.  When material consumption is the predominant social value and political 
value, individuals retreat to the private realm, abandoning the ineffectual public 
institutions of liberal democracy.  In addition, individuals lose the ability to construct 
identities other than that of a consumer, leading to an erosion of liberal values, a 
weakening of democracy, and a degradation of community and solidarity.  The liberal 
defense of democracy exacerbates this situation through its failure to advance any 
substantive defense of democratic institutions. 
Castoriadis’s central concept is that the imaginary, defined most simply as the 
human capacity to create, is the means through which societies define themselves as 
societies, create an understanding of the world and the society’s place in that world, and 




introduces the possibility for the construction of a critical epistemological prism through 
which one can comprehend, to a degree, the origin of social institutions.  This 
epistemological prism attributes the construction of institutions to the creativity of the 
collective of individuals living in a particular society.  As a group, the individuals living 
in a society create institutions that define their relationships to one another and to the 
world around them.  The types of institutions that exist, and the justifications that are 
used to legitimize them, are linked inextricably to a particular social-historical context.  
In essence, the collective creates the institutions necessary for answering questions and 
meeting needs in a specific time and place in that society’s history.  Ultimately, therefore, 
the collective itself is responsible for the institutions that govern it. 
The fact that the collective constructs the institutions that govern it does not 
insure that social institutions remain open to the questioning and criticism of individuals 
living within that society.  Despite the fact that institutions are the product of the 
collective imaginary, the dominant trend in human history is the prevalence of 
heteronomous societies, where institutions are legitimized through reference to external, 
non-human agencies, such as God or a founding lawgiver.  Even in modern societies, 
which represent a decisive break with heteronomy, institutions become alienated from the 
making/doing of the collective.  Using the imaginary as an epistemological prism, 
Castoriadis seeks to examine the chasm that emerges between a collective’s instituting 
imaginary and the alienated institutions that govern the society.  Alienated institutions are 
able to endure and reproduce themselves primarily as a result of the influence an 
instituted imaginary exerts over the socialization process of every person born into that 




individual’s psyche, leading to a situation where individual’s will tend to support the 
existing institutional apparatus, even when those institutions are alienated.  Thus, the 
imaginary as an epistemological prism seeks, in part, to understand the role human beings 
themselves play in the dominance of heteronomy and alienation and why citizens accept 
institutions that are beyond their capacity to question or radically alter. 
Recognizing that individuals construct the social institutions that govern them 
leads Castoriadis to advance a second role for a philosophy that emphasizes the role of 
the imaginary: to serve as a starting point for a radical praxis.  “We term praxis that doing 
in which the other or others are intended as autonomous beings considered as the 
essential agents of the development of their own autonomy.”16  Praxis is a conscious, 
lucid, and public activity that results in both the clarification and the transformation of 
reality.  Castoriadis advocates the legitimation of social institutions through a public, 
democratic discourse among the citizenry, a process that requires recognizing the role the 
radical imaginary plays in the construction of institutions.  The fact that existing 
institutions are alienated does not mean the imaginary does not play a role in their 
construction.  The imaginary is always the source of social institutions and the society 
always creates such institutions through collective making/doing.  Furthermore, the 
collective radical imaginary always raises questions vis-à-vis the existing instituted 
imaginary, forcing established institutions to respond to the making/doing of the society.  
The real issue, therefore, is whether or not the role of the imaginary is recognized, both in 
philosophical and in political terms.  In Castoriadis’s estimation, the problem that exists 
in most societies is that the imaginary is not recognized as the source of social institutions 




imaginary into question.  The purpose of the imaginary as the starting for a political 
praxis is first to recognize that the relationship between the instituted and instituting 
imaginary continuously defines the society in question, as challenges are posed by the 
collective radical imaginary and answered by established institutions.  Since every 
society is characterized by this relationship between instituting and instituted imaginary, 
the possibility exists for the incorporation of the radical imaginary into a political process 
whereby citizens in a given society can openly and democratically question established 
institutions and alter or re-create them if necessary.  Thus, the imaginary as praxis calls 
for the inclusion of the radical imaginary into a political process wherein citizens actively 
and lucidly participate.   
A radical praxis that takes the imaginary as its starting point emphasizes the 
spontaneous creativity of those engaged in political action.  During his years as a member 
of the Socialisme ou Barbarie group, Castoriadis focused his attention on the possibilities 
of the workers’ movement in France and throughout the industrialized world.  The type 
of political action that Castoriadis envisions is not a programmatic, ideological assault on 
state institutions by an organized Leninist vanguard party, as Communist parties at the 
time advocated.  Rather, political action, according to Castoriadis, begins with the 
spontaneous organization of groups within a society that seek to confront the existing 
institutional structure.  From the spontaneous creativity of the citizens themselves, a 
possibility for the construction of a democratic, autonomous society emerges.  However, 
this possibility, which Castoriadis describes as the project of autonomy, has been covered 
over both politically and philosophically for the majority of history.  In this sense, the 




revolutionary tradition.”17 Historically, the project of autonomy has briefly surged forth 
during various modern revolutionary situations, such as the Paris Commune, the February 
revolution in Russia, and the Hungarian uprising in 1956.  “Each time they appeared, 
they sprang up as the spontaneous organs of the people, not only outside of all 
revolutionary parties, but entirely unexpected by them and their leaders.”18  These 
spontaneous organs of the people represent a surging forth of the creative potential of the 
radical imaginary.  Furthermore, while these explicitly revolutionary situations were 
short-lived, because of the relationship between the instituted and instituting imaginary, 
the possibility of creating autonomous institutions exists in every modern society.  
However, it is important to recognize that the imaginary as praxis is not a final, 
programmatic solution to the problems of late modern society, but rather the instauration 
of an open ended process of democratic participation, where existing institutions are 
always subject to questioning and criticism by the populace of a particular society and 
where such institutions can always be altered or replaced by new ones.  Attributing the 
creation of social institutions to the collective itself is crucial, because such recognition of 
the role of the imaginary allows for the instauration19 of the political.   
Any discussion of the imaginary as praxis requires the recognition of the crucial 
distinction that Castoriadis makes between politics (la politique) and the political (le 
politique).20  Related to this differentiation is the distinction between liberty and freedom.  
According to Castoriadis, politics is “a dimension of the institution of society pertaining 
to explicit power, that is, to the existence of instances capable of formulating explicitly 
sanctionable injunctions.”21  Every society can be characterized according to the existing 




the diversity between societies can be examined through the type of administrative 
politics that dominates within that society.  Furthermore, politics is primarily technical, in 
the sense that the major questions that are raised concern how to adapt existing 
institutions to changing conditions within a society, while at the same time assuming the 
established institutional framework is the best for addressing this task.  The legitimacy of 
existing institutions is not called into question.  As such, the project of autonomy, and the 
role of the radical imaginary in the creation and alteration of institutions, is covered over 
within the sphere of politics.  Furthermore, in the modern state, politics tends to intrude 
upon all other aspects of social life; politics is not restricted to domain of state power.  
Politics in every modern society is characterized by a bureaucratic state that seeks to 
expand its control beyond the boundaries of the political process.22  As a result, everyday 
life becomes politicized, such that the daily interactions of individuals with other 
individuals and between individuals and social institutions serve to reinforce the 
administrative power and capacity of the bureaucratic apparatus.  As the 
bureaucratization process occurs, individuals are further excluded from political 
participation, they retreat into the private sphere, and the possibilities for instaurating an 
autonomous society diminish.   
A society characterized by the dominance of the sphere of politics does not 
necessarily entail a coercive and overtly oppressive institutional apparatus.  It is fully 
possible for the individual to be “free” in a society where the role of the imaginary is 
covered over and excluded from the political process.  Given this fact, it is necessary to 
distinguish between liberty and freedom.  Liberty is negative and reactive, concerned 




liberty exists in societies where the individual is protected from the direct, coercive 
power of the state.  As such, liberty is linked to power, or, more specifically, the 
possibility that the individual can assert and demand some restriction or limitation on the 
power of the state.  Therefore, liberty is a negative reaction to the administrative power of 
an institutional apparatus within the realm of politics.  Liberty, however, is a limited set 
of rights, concerned primarily with protecting the individual from the overt abuse of 
power by the state acting within the sphere of politics.  As such, the rights afforded by a 
concept of liberty do not address non-state institutional forms of power.  This limitation 
is particularly relevant in modern societies, where bureaucracies exert an indirect form of 
power over other aspects of the individual’s life.  Thus, for example, the rights of the 
individual do not apply to bureaucratic power in the economic sphere.  For Castoriadis, 
these forms of power are more significant, particularly since they can coexist with 
apparently democratic models of decision-making.  The impact of bureaucratic power, 
however, exacerbates the crisis of meaning in late modern societies, leading to a situation 
where the rights of the individual become increasingly irrelevant in confronting these 
non-state forms of power.  As such, a praxis that takes the imaginary as its starting point 
must differentiate between liberty and freedom, in order to construct a model of the 
political as an independent sphere of democratic decision-making.   
 Freedom can be defined, in its most basic terms, according to the Kantian 
conception of autonomy.  Individuals are free when they obey the laws that they have 
legislated for themselves, and do not rely on an external source of authority to dictate the 
laws to them.  Freedom also requires the presence of others within a public sphere.  The 




social living with other individuals.  Thus, the freedom of all individuals living in a 
particular society reinforces the freedom of all other individuals.  Finally, freedom can 
only be exercised publicly.  Since freedom is tied to self-governance and the creation of 
laws autonomously, this can only take place within the public sphere.  Thus, the political 
as a separate domain of action, requires a conception of freedom, as the freedom requires 
the political to exist.  
The political represents an independent domain in which citizens are capable and 
free to explicitly put-into-question and alter the existing institution of society.23   “I 
intend by [the political] the collective, reflective, and lucid activity that arises from the 
moment the question of the de jure validity of institutions is raised.” 24  The political is 
concerned primarily with the asking of the question and the process through which such 
questions can be asked.  As such, the political is not a goal, a solution, or an answer; 
rather it is a process, a problem, and a question.  The political is a domain wherein the 
individual and collective autonomy of the citizens can be expressed and wherein citizens 
can freely create and alter the existing institutional structure of the society.  The political 
requires the lucid participation of a society’s citizens in order to be maintained.  Lucidity 
requires several things.  First, the members of a particular society recognize the role of 
the imaginary in the creation of institutions.  Second, the citizens participate in some 
manner in the process of political judgment about the question at hand.  Furthermore, 
lucidity requires the presence of persistent uncertainty about the future and further 
requires that the citizenry embrace this uncertainty.  The instauration of the political 
carries with it an acceptance of uncertainty and of the fact that there are no final solutions 




of an open, democratic discourse that begins with recognizing the role the imaginary 
plays in the construction of institutions. 
 It is here that one finds the real value of Castoriadis’s philosophy.  In contrast to 
the liberal argument concerning the inevitable spread of democracy, the theorist who 
takes the imaginary as his starting point positions himself as a consistent critic of existing 
institutions.  While liberals seek to construct durable and lasting institutions that can 
respond to any challenge, the imaginary represents the possibility of questioning and 
resisting established institutions through a participatory democratic process.  The 
imaginary serves as a weapon of critique, informed by Marx’s maxim that “The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to 
change it.”25  For Castoriadis, a criticism that takes the imaginary as its starting point 
must embody a consistent attack on established institutions, forever questioning and 
always emerging.  Since the imaginary is omnipresent in social life, the critic’s task is to 
construct a participatory theory of democracy, centered on the possibility of instaurating 
the political.  For example, during his years in the revolutionary group Socialisme ou 
Barbarie, Castoriadis took an uncompromising position in favor of worker participation 
in public life.  When marginalized and covered over, as has been the case throughout the 
majority of human history, the critic who roots his praxis in the imaginary can only take 
such a position.  He must be uncompromising in the face of bureaucratic theories, such as 
capitalism and Marxism, especially with regard to his demand for openness, democracy, 
and participation.  To do otherwise represents the victory of heteronomy over autonomy, 




Literature Review  
 The literature on Cornelius Castoriadis can be divided into two main subject 
areas.  The first area examines the impact of Castoriadis and the Socialisme ou Barbarie 
group on leftist politics in France during the Cold War.  The second area of literature 
deals with Castoriadis’s philosophy itself, focusing primarily on the imaginary.  The 
English language literature in this area is sparse, and no comprehensive examination of 
Castoriadis’s ideas has been published in English.  The majority of work on Castoriadis 
appears in journals such as Thesis Eleven, Telos, Constellations, and Praxis 
International.  French sources are more readily available, but are still sparse compared to 
other luminaries of the French left.  Examinations of Castoriadis’s work have appeared in 
a wide range of French publications.  Numerous articles have been printed in mainstream 
French newspapers such as Le Monde and weeklies such as La Nouvel Observateur. In 
addition, various left leaning journals such as Esprit, Les Temps Modernes, and Anti-
Mythes have published works on Castoriadis.  One particularly important source is a 1989 
issue of Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales that published a multilingual, 
multidisciplinary symposium on Castoriadis, encompassing fields such as philosophy, 
political theory, sociology, and psychology.  Contributors to this symposium included 
writers such as Edgar Morin26, Pierre Vidal-Naquet27, and Axel Honneth28, covering 
topics such as Castoriadis’s life29, his psychoanalytic theory30, and his political 
philosophy31.  The symposium concludes with a lengthy response by Castoriadis, 
addressing many of the issues presented during the conference.32
 The most complete treatment of Castoriadis’ work in English can be found in the 




Marxian Legacy.  In this work, Howard places Castoriadis within the Marxian tradition, 
which he differentiates from Marxism.  This distinction is significant in the case of 
writers such as Castoriadis, Claude Lefort, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  These writers, 
according to Howard, sought to use the theoretical insights of Karl Marx to criticize the 
degeneration of Marxist political theory and practice represented by the twentieth century 
Marxist movement in the wake of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union.  Castoriadis and 
Lefort took this to the furthest extreme, arguing that Marxism had to be rejected in order 
to maintain the revolutionary project itself.33  In his studies of the French Left, Howard 
emphasizes the previously ignored contributions of Castoriadis, and has critiqued the 
mainstream French Left from a Castoriadian perspective.34 Furthermore, much of 
Howard’s other work exhibits a strong Castoriadian influence, especially with regard to 
Howard’s emphasis on the imaginary and his concern with the restoration of the political.  
In works such as Defining the Political and Political Judgments, Howard has argued for 
“the political” as a sphere of public democratic action, where criticism can be leveled 
against existing social institutions and where the people democratically construct the 
institutions that govern them.  Howard’s call for the creation of the political parallels 
Castoriadis’ support for the project of autonomy, where the individuals living in a 
particular society govern themselves and explicitly posit and instaurate their own 
institutions.35  Howard, however, does not take the explicit revolutionary position that 
Castoriadis advocates.  For example, unlike Castoriadis, who advances a direct model of 
democracy, Howard asserts that representative democracy is a necessity in the modern 
world.  Despite these practical differences, however, Howard arguably represents the 




 References to Castoriadis’s theories also appear in the work of political theorists 
and sociologists such as Agnes Heller and Ferenc Feher.  Heller and Feher each devote a 
chapter to Castoriadis in The Grandeur and Twilight of Radical Universalism.  In their 
respective examinations of Castoriadis, both Heller and Feher emphasize Castoriadis’s 
reliance on the political traditions of the ancient Greeks, particularly Aristotle.  Heller 
argues that, along with Hannah Arendt and Alastair MacIntyre, Castoriadis falls into the 
Neo-Aristotelian tradition.  These authors are radical moderns; though they understand 
themselves as moderns, they “reject what they believe to be the self-deception of 
modernity: the creed of progression.”36  As such, Heller correctly argues, they are able to 
remain firm critics of liberalism as a political ideology, while remain liberal-minded 
themselves, concerned with certain liberal values such as the rights of the individual.  
Overall, in this work, and in several of her others where she addresses Castoriadis’s 
ideas, Heller is sympathetic.37  However, their main point of divergence is on the 
possibility of direct democracy.  Castoriadis argued throughout his writings that some 
form of direct democracy was possible.  Many of writings take the ancient Athenian polis 
as a starting point for the instauration of such a direct democracy.  Heller, on the other 
hand, rejects the possibility of direct democracy.  Furthermore, she argues that employing 
the Athenian polis as a model is dangerous and counterproductive.  Heller argues that 
ancient Athens represented a despotic democracy, where women were excluded and 
citizens were only able to exercise autonomy on the backs of their slaves.  As a result, in 
Heller’s estimation, Castoriadis is wrong to argue that slavery and the position of women 
does not present a powerful argument against the value of the Athenian polis.38  For 




great break with heteronomy and the instauration of an explicitly autonomous society, 
wherein citizens were responsible for the construction of their own institutions, and 
where the political system relied on the continuous questioning and criticism of already 
existing institutions.  On this issue, however, Heller is correct.  Though there is value in 
the Athenian polis, namely the fact that it was, for a short time, an autonomous society, 
the question that must arise is, “Can this be translated to the modern world?”  Given the 
status of women and the existence of slavery in ancient Athens, the answer is a clear 
“no”.  The direct democracy of Athens cannot be translated to the complex modern world 
of today, simply because the institutions upon which direct democracy in Athens were 
built, namely slavery, do not, and more importantly, should not exist today in any form.  
The task, therefore, must be to find another democratic method for the practice of 
autonomy, rather than a reliance on obsolete and unacceptable political institutions.   
 The second field of literature on Castoriadis concerns his role in the post-World 
War II French Left.  Phillipe Gottraux’s Socialisme ou Barbarie provides a 
comprehensive examination of the origins of the group, its rise, and its eventual collapse.  
Gottraux employs Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory to examine the role played by 
Socialisme ou Barbarie on the French Left.  He argues that the group initially concerned 
itself solely with the political field, acting as a traditional radical leftist revolutionary 
organization.  As such, the concerns of its members, as well as its philosophy, were 
driven primarily by an emphasis on direct political action.  As the group progressed, 
according to Gottraux, the inability of the members to have a significant impact on the 
left led many of its members to abandon politics and transfer themselves into the 




the first to take this path, which Castoriadis would eventually follow.39  However, 
Gottraux’s argument that the members of Socialisme ou Barbarie left the political field in 
favor of the intellectual is a simplistic and limited reading of the situation.  It assumes too 
stark a division between the political and the intellectual.  The writings of Castoriadis 
remained explicitly political throughout his life, even if he did not actively engage in 
revolutionary politics in any consistent, organized manner.  Furthermore, Castoriadis did 
in fact remain committed to the political field though his participation in various 
movements and through his role as a public intellectual.  For example, Castoriadis 
attacked the French “new philosophers” for their rejection of political action as inherently 
totalitarian.  Gottraux’s exhaustive historical research represents a more important 
contribution to the study of the group.  Gottraux meticulously describes the internal 
dynamics of Socialisme ou Barbarie, which were often contentious and would eventually 
cause the dissolution of the group.  In addition, he examines the often sectarian 
relationship between Socialisme ou Barbarie and other far left groups in France.  This 
reveals one of the primary reasons the PCF was able to dominate the intellectual scene.  
Because gauchiste groups were too busy fighting one another, they were unable to 
provide a coherent, unified criticism of the orthodox Marxism of the PCF.  As such, their 
voices were effectively diluted and drowned out by the better-known supporters of the 
PCF.    
Castoriadis’s role in the French Left after World War II is examined in various 
histories of the era, but in many of these works Socialisme ou Barbarie is relegated to a 
footnote or a few pages.40  Considering the time period these works examine, this is not 




France focus on the 1940's and the early 1950's, when the influence of Socialisme ou 
Barbarie was marginal.  Furthermore, the general arguments of both these books 
necessitate the exclusion of Socialisme ou Barbarie.  Poster focuses primarily on Sartre’s 
existentialism and his attempts to reconcile this philosophy with Marxism.  The 
Socialisme ou Barbarie group rejected existentialism, and only came into conflict with 
Sartre as a result of his publication of Les Communistes et la Paix.  In the case of Tony 
Judt, Socialisme ou Barbarie represents a counter-argument to his thesis that 
philosophers of the French Left were apologists for Stalinism.  Castoriadis and the rest of 
the group were active critics of Stalinism and the Soviet Union in general.  However, the 
marginality of Socialisme ou Barbarie bolsters Judt’s argument that the French 
intellectual scene was closed to dissenting voices.    
 Several other histories of the period provide more elaborate examinations of 
Castoriadis work and the role he played in Socialime ou Barbarie and on the French left.  
Michael Scott Christofferson’s work argues that the Socialisme ou Barbarie group played 
a far more influential role on the French left during the “monolithic” Stalinism of the 
1950’s, particularly with regard to laying the groundwork for the anti-totalitarian 
philosophy that would be adopted by much of the French left during the 1970’s.  
Christofferson’s advances the argument that the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag 
Archipelago did not lead to an “epiphany” on the French left, despite the claims that 
many French theorists made at the time.41  Groups such as Socialisme ou Barbarie, as 
consistent critics of Stalinism, were far more influential in the development of the French 
left and its eventually rejection of the Soviet model.  Furthermore, Christofferson argues 




directly attributed their intellectual development to the work of gauchiste groups such as 
Socialisme ou Barbarie, further illustrating the actual influence of the group during the 
1950’s.42    
Arthur Hirsh devotes a chapter to Castoriadis in his The French Left, examining 
his role in the development of the New Left in France.  He points out the strong influence 
of Castoriadis’ thought on the ideas of the student revolutionaries of 1968, especially 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit and the March 22nd Movement.  Hirsh is critical of Castoriadis, 
pointing out that Socialisme ou Barbarie was a failure as a revolutionary movement, 
primarily because of the problem the group faced concerning their own role as 
intellectuals in the proletarian revolution.  Furthermore, Hirsh argues that Castoriadis’ 
critique of Marxism is superficial, because Castoriadis identifies Marxism with the 
economism of Capital and the later use of these theories to justify the totalitarian ideas of 
Lenin and Stalin.43  This criticism, however, does not fully address the complexity of 
Castoriadis’ development as a Marxist theorist or the reasons for his eventually rejection 
of contemporary Marxism as a revolutionary philosophy.  Castoriadis did not reject 
Marxism solely because of its economism and the later revisions introduced by Lenin and 
Stalin.  First, he criticized Marx for the incommensurability of the libertarian views of the 
early Marx and the focus on economic laws of his later works.  Castoriadis did not 
perceive a shift in Marx’s thinking between these two periods, but rather, found the two 
strains present throughout the entire body of Marx’s writings.  Castoriadis argued that 
this formed an irreconcilable contradiction.44  On the one hand, Marx believed the 
proletariat had to play a role in its own emancipation, but on the other hand, it made no 




capitalism would inevitably collapse.  Second, Castoriadis criticized Marxism because it 
purported to have solved the riddle of history.  Castoriadis rejected any philosophical 
system that posited itself as true once and for all time, and was therefore closed to further 
examination.45  Third, Marx wrote in a specific social-historical time.  The fact that 
modern day Marxists espoused the same theories and consequent strategies as Marx, 
despite the evolution of the capitalist system over the ensuing century meant that modern 
Marxism was outdated and inappropriate for the conditions of the modern era.46  Finally, 
Castoriadis argued that the result of the Marxist project was little different from the end 
result of the capitalist imaginary.  He writes, “Au total, Marx représente le passage à la 
limite de significations imaginaires sociales du capitalisme: déterminisme, progrès, 
productivisme, économisme, et surtout, le phantasme social de l’expansion illimitée de la 
maîtrise ‘rationnelle’”47 It is precisely these elements, which exist both in Marxism and in 
capitalism, that Castoriadis was most concerned with confronting.  His work in 
Socialisme ou Barbarie as well as his later philosophical writings is an attempt to develop 
an alternative course for Western society, a course that would openly incorporate the 
radical imaginary into the construction of social institutions. 
 Historians who have studied the later period of the French Left, from the late 
1950's to the 1970's, concede to Castoriadis a more prominent role, consistent with the 
greater influence of Socialisme ou Barbarie.  After the 1956 repression of the Hungarian 
revolution precipitated a shift in French leftist attitudes towards the Soviet Union, 
Castoriadis’s anti-authoritarianism moved away from its marginal position in the 
intellectual scene and was embraced by many as a viable leftist alternative to Marxism-




formulating a radical critique of both Marxism and capitalism and the influence this 
would have in France in the late 1960's and early 1970's.48  For Sunil Khilnani, the 
importance of Socialisme ou Barbarie was in the leftist critique of totalitarianism, which 
was otherwise absent on the French Left.  Once French intellectuals became disillusioned 
with the Soviet Union, this critique became more significant.  In addition, Khilnani 
argues that the ongoing debate within Socialisme ou Barbarie over the role of the 
revolutionary organization influenced the post-1968 split in the intellectual community 
between Althusserian academics, who stressed the importance of the vanguard party and 
gauchistes, who rejected traditional forms of organization.49   
 Regardless of how Castoriadis’s contributions are characterized in the various 
works on the French left, the majority of the above authors agree on two things.  First, the 
impact of Socialisme ou Barbarie was lessened by the internal tensions within the group, 
first between Castoriadis and Lefort over the group’s relationship to the proletariat and 
later between Castoriadis and Jean-François Lyotard over Castoriadis’s rejection of 
Marxism.  By the time of the May 1968 revolution in Paris, which was inspired in part by 
the writings of Castoriadis, Socialisme ou Barbarie had disbanded.  Second, these 
historians have pointed out that the stance taken by Castoriadis was one that weathered 
the ideological shifts of the French Left.  While leftists such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 
were forced to undergo serious soul-searching as a result of the revelations concerning 
Stalin’s oppressive regime, Castoriadis maintained his anti-authoritarian perspectives, 
saying what the rest of the Left refused to admit, namely that the Soviet Union was a 




Outline of the Text 
During the 1950's and 1960's, Castoriadis was a political activist, participating in 
the radical leftist Socialisme ou Barbarie group.  The first chapter is concerned primarily 
with the history of the group and its impact on the development of Castoriadis’s thought 
in terms of the imaginary.  Socialisme ou Barbarie took a neither/nor position vis-à-vis 
the Cold War, situating itself against both the capitalist West and the Communist East.  In 
their estimation, both East and West represented dead ends, as both were bureaucratic, 
alienated social systems, unrepresentative of the needs of the majority of humanity.  Both 
systems, and the conflict between them, would inexorably lead to war, devastation and 
barbarism.  The alternative was a revolutionary socialism, but a revolution that came 
from the workers themselves, and which would create a free, autonomous society.  The 
importance of the Socialisme ou Barbarie group was that it was during these years that 
Castoriadis developed the concept of the imaginary, more through praxis than through 
theorizing.  Socialisme ou Barbarie came to represent in practice the type of movement 
Castoriadis believed could bring about an autonomous society.  The significance of 
Socialisme ou Barbarie is that it defined a praxis centered on the constant questioning of 
existing institutions and a continuous resistance to the instituted imaginary.  The group 
represented one possible manifestation of the radical instituting imaginary against the 
existing instituted imaginary.  For Castoriadis, only such a movement committed to 
continuous critique could begin to open the possibility for the instauration of the political.  
Although the Western philosophical tradition is a diverse and rich one, the general 
trend since the time of Plato has been to cover over the role of the imaginary in the 




the possibility of autonomy.  Though there are exceptions to this rule, namely the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, one of Castoriadis’s most important predecessors, the 
exclusion of the imaginary from philosophy leads to a situation where politics becomes 
the status quo and the possibility of the political is marginalized.  However, the imaginary 
lies at the heart of human life, manifested primarily in the institutions that govern 
political, economic, and social life, but also evident in every aspect of human existence.  
The world surrounding us is ultimately one of our own making, not one that has been 
given to us or created by some external being or force.  The failure, or refusal, to 
recognize the fact that the human world is one created by humans is a critical deficiency 
of the Western philosophical tradition.  The result of this deficiency is that most theorists 
of the Western tradition are confined to examining the problems of politics, closing off 
the possibility of the instauration of the political as a separate and distinct sphere of social 
making/doing.  The second chapter focuses on a critique of the Western philosophical 
tradition from an epistemological framework that takes the imaginary as its starting point.  
Several important trends are examined such as the question of Being, the relationship 
between subject and object, the role of the human subject as agent, and the origin of 
social institutions.  These questions are central to the manner in which institutions have 
been constructed throughout human history.  The exclusion of the imaginary has covered 
over the possibility autonomous society in favor of the heteronomous justification of 
institutions.  By constructing a critique of these important trends in the Western 
philosophical tradition, it is possible to construct a philosophical framework for the 
political, where the imaginary becomes a central focus rather than a marginalized or 




 With the advent of modernity, the social institutions in Europe underwent 
fundamental changes.  Castoriadis refers to modernity as the second great break with 
heteronomy.  Chapter three examines the advent of modernity and the possibility of 
liberation that the instauration of these new imaginary significations represented.  
Furthermore, this chapter will examine the tension between liberation and alienation 
inherent in the conflict between the modern and the instituted-modern, where the modern 
represents the magma of social imaginary significations underlying the modern world, 
and the instituted-modern, represents the institutional manifestation of particular 
elements of the modern imaginary.  The instituted-modern represents a particular 
instauration of social imaginary significations, encompassing only a fraction of the total 
set of imaginary significations that emerged, and continue to emerge, during the modern 
era.  From this examination, one can see that the modern era did not result in the 
construction of an autonomous society in Europe, but rather the modern individual 
became the most alienated being in human history.  The modern and the instituted-
modern, the emancipatory and repressive aspects of modernity, respectively, exist in a 
relationship with one another, where the modern posits the possibility of autonomy, while 
the instituted-modern stifles and covers over this possibility, while simultaneously 
justifying itself in terms derived from the liberation of human potential embodied in the 
modern imaginary.   
Late modern societies are characterized by the dominance of a bureaucratic-
capitalist institutional structure.  Chapter four will examine the consequences for late 
modern societies of the dominance of the instituted-modern institutional apparatus.  




capacity of the instituted-modern imaginary and the modern imaginary.  These 
institutions are founded and justified on the premise that they are the product of human 
making/doing, but at the same time they perpetuate themselves through their separation 
and alienation from the society, constructing individuals who believe they have a hand in 
the maintenance of such institutions, but, in practice, are excluded from the operation and 
legitimation of the institution itself.  As such, the possibility of the political continues to 
be covered over in instituted-modern society, despite the fact that the advent of modernity 
represents a significant break with previous heteronomous institutions.  The instituted-
modern emphasizes politics over the political and therefore represents a perpetuation of 
the alienation that has been the status quo for the majority of human history.  The 
consequences of this persistent alienation are the depoliticization and atomization of 
individuals in late modern society, the intrusion of bureaucratic power into all spheres of 
life, and a crisis of meaning in advanced capitalist societies, where institutions rely solely 
on the degradation of the public sphere for their legitimacy and where individuals are less 
capable of posing challenges to the dominant instituted-modern imaginary.  The ultimate 
danger of these social-historical circumstances is the totalitarian possibilities that lie 
within the logic of the instituted-modern imaginary.  Bureaucratic-capitalist societies are 
descending into barbarism, which requires a political philosophy that can assert the 
democratic possibilities of the modern imaginary against the established instituted-
modern institutional structure.   
  Democratic theory seeks to construct models of democracy that can respond to 
and limit the threat posed to democratic governance by the surging forth of destructive 




construction of such limits: John Rawls’ theory of the overlapping consensus and Jurgen 
Habermas’ vision of a public sphere bounded by discursively constructed rational limits.  
Castoriadis’ conception of the autonomous society is similar to Habermas’ public sphere, 
but with several critical differences.  Castoriadis argues that democratic institutions are 
ungrounded, and he makes no effort to provide a foundational justification for democratic 
governance.  The legitimacy of democracy is based solely on political judgment and the 
active participation of autonomous citizens.  As Castoriadis argues, “La politique ... n’est 
pas une affaire d’epistèmè mais de doxa - et cela est la seule justification non procédurale 
du principe majoritaire.”50  As a proponent of autonomy, Castoriadis believes that 
democracy, and more specifically, direct democracy, is the best institutional regime for 
instaurating the political and maintaining an autonomous society.  However, there is no 
theoretical or scientific justification for such a belief.  As he writes, it is simply a matter 
of doxa.  For Castoriadis, an autonomous society cannot be based on anything but doxa, 
as such a society requires the lucid participation of the citizenry and the recognition that 
the collective through the use of the radical imaginary creates institutions.  The moment 
the existing institutions of an autonomous society cease to be justified through the 
doxa of the collective, the institutions become heteronomous, relying on a source of 
legitimacy outside the judgment of the collective.  As an ungrounded form of 
government, Castoriadis argues that democracy must be conceived as a political, social, 
and economic regime, not simply a set of procedures for decision-making.  The potential 
threat posed by the destructive side of the radical imaginary to political institutions can be 
diffused through the construction of supporting economic and social institutions that 




rights of the individual with an expansive vision of political participation, where 
individual can be actively engaged in democratic governance, without imposing external 
limits on the decision-making process.  Castoriadis’ vision of the autonomous society, 
therefore, allows the autonomous citizen to express her creativity and spontaneity in the 
public sphere, while protecting the democratic system itself from the potentially 
destructive aspects that also emerge from the radical imaginary.     
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The Imaginary and Political Action 
The publication of Castoriadis’ The Imaginary Institution of Society in 1975 
presented the most complete formulation of the concept of the imaginary.  However, the 
concept of the imaginary evolved over time, first expressed in Castoriadis’ early political 
works when he was a member of the Socialisme ou Barbarie group.  The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a brief intellectual biography of Castoriadis with the intention of 
tracing the development of the concept of the imaginary through an examination of 
Castoriadis’s participation in the Socialisme ou Barbarie group in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  
During these years, the imaginary developed through Castoriadis’ critique of the 
mainstream French left’s relationship to the Parti Communiste Français (PCF), his 
examination of bureaucratic capitalism in both the West and the communist East, his 
eventual rejection of Marxism as a revolutionary theory in the name of workers’ self-
management as an alternative, and his rejection of the post-1968 turn towards 
postmodernism and away from political activity.  Each of these concerns played a 
significant role in the construction of the concept of the imaginary, leading to the more 
complete treatment of the subject in The Imaginary Institution of Society.   
Socialisme ou Barbarie was founded on the tenets of workers’ self-management, 
democratic socialism, and individual and social autonomy.  Neither the United States nor 
the Soviet Union embodied these principles, leading the Socialisme ou Barbarie group to 
refuse to support either side during the Cold War.1  The refusal to choose between an 
authoritarian East and a capitalist West, instead declaring that both systems represented 
the dominance of bureaucratic institutions, differentiated the Socialisme ou Barbarie 




the political margins, especially during the 1950’s when the PCF supporters dominated 
the French intellectual scene.  In addition, the Socialisme ou Barbarie group was founded 
as an explicitly revolutionary organization, committed to the advancement of its 
principles through political action.2  The political activities of the Socialisme ou Barbarie 
group, particularly Castoriadis’s theoretical contributions, focused primarily on an 
examination of the role workers themselves played in the continued functioning of the 
capitalist system.  From this perspective, Castoriadis concludes that since capitalism 
relies on the creativity of the worker on the factory floor, that same worker has the power 
to use this creativity to resist and change the system itself. This perspective informed the 
theoretical output of the Socialisme ou Barbarie group throughout its existence, 
weathering the shifts that occurred on the French left during the 1950’s and 1960’s, 
during which Castoriadis maintained a consistent position, backing the project of 
autonomy both against the PCF and its allies and, later, against the apolitical stance of 
many of the post-1968 movements.    
The French Communist Party 
For many left-wing intellectuals in France after World War II, political 
engagement required an alignment with the PCF, a party that explicitly claimed to 
narrowly represent the interests of the proletariat.3  As a result of this position, as well as 
its claim to be a Marxist revolutionary vanguard, the PCF eschewed wider political 
appeal in mainstream French politics, thus allowing the party to present itself as a 
consistent opponent of the bourgeoisie.  Such a declaration, with its implicit rejection of 
existing democratic politics, resulted in the PCF’s exclusion from government, which 




bourgeois French political system.4  The party’s “outsider” status was strengthened by the 
fact that since its founding in 1919, the PCF followed the ideological lead of the CPSU 
through the Comintern.  Unlike many other Western European Communist Parties that 
developed their own indigenous Communist traditions5, the PCF consistently maintained 
a pro-Moscow line until 1968, considering itself subordinate to the Soviet Communist 
Party (CPSU).  For example, from 1927 to 1933, the PCF maintained the Stalinist class 
against class position, asserting that social democracy was a more dangerous enemy than 
the rising fascist trend in Europe, altering this position, in line with CPSU, in 1933 when 
Hitler came to power.  Similarly, when the Nazi-Soviet pact was in effect, the PCF 
asserted that World War II was nothing more than a conflict between rival imperialist 
powers, changing this position once the Soviet Union was invaded and taking up arms in 
anti-fascist struggle.6  Throughout the Cold War, the PCF was the most stubbornly 
Stalinist party in Western Europe, resisting ideological reform even after Stalin’s death 
and Khruschev’s denunciation of Stalin during his “secret speech” at the 22nd Party 
Congress.7  While the rest of the Communist world was de-Stalinizing, the PCF 
completely ignored this movement, to the extent that, for example, Roger Garaudy, the 
primary theorist of the PCF, did not even mention the issue of Stalin or de-Stalinization 
in Perspectives de l’homme, which he published in 1959.8  Furthermore, the PCF 
consistently placed itself on the wrong side of history: the party supported the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary in 19569, tepidly criticized the crushing of Prague Spring in 196810, 
refused to support in any way the student uprising in Paris in May 1968.11  The hard-line 
positions taken by the PCF and its consistent subservience to Moscow would eventually 




the post-World War II era, the PCF would come to embody the worst aspects of a 
Leninist vanguard party, unable to adapt to the changing social-historical circumstances 
in France, and continuing to be hidebound by the ideological constraints of an Orthodox 
Marxism that had become completely incapable of addressing the real concerns of the 
working class.  In essence, the PCF is a party that was left behind by history.  Thus, it is 
not surprising that the party’s history in the second half of the twentieth century is a 
chronicle of increasing irrelevance to French politics and declining support among its 
proclaimed base, the French working class. 
Despite the PCF’s proclaimed role as a revolutionary party and its consistent and 
unabashed subservience to the CPSU, it emerged from World War II with a high level of 
prestige and credibility.  Communists throughout Europe became symbols of anti-fascism 
as a result of their resistance to the Nazis during the war.  Right-wing politics had been 
thoroughly discredited in France as a result of the collaboration of intellectuals like 
Charles Maurras with the Vichy regime and thus with Nazi Germany.  Furthermore, 
capitalism lost much of its legitimacy as a result of the cooperation of many prominent 
business owners with the program of the Vichy government.  Furthermore, while many 
mainstream political parties in France had collaborated with fascism, the PCF had 
suffered tremendous losses under the Nazi occupation.  Much of the PCF’s organizational 
capacity had been decimated as a result of the war.  These losses among both the 
leadership and the popular following earned the PCF the nickname the “parti des 75,000 
fusillés” (the party of 75,000 Resistance martyrs).12  As a result of these losses, the PCF 
was able to present itself both as an anti-fascist force that resisted the Nazi occupation 




contribute to the PCF’s prestige as an “outsider” party untainted by the Vichy regime, 
Marxists were consistently excluded from many public positions in the immediate 
postwar era.  For example, scientists who were members of the party were dismissed 
from their posts, the Sorbonne barred Marxist lectures and conferences, and Marxist 
publications were banned from schools, universities, public libraries, and in many 
bookshops and distributions chains.14  Despite these organizational setbacks, the PCF was 
able to parlay its prestige into significant electoral victories in 1945, winning the largest 
number of seats in the French parliament.  However, the PCF did not receive a majority 
of the seats, and entered an alliance with the Socialist Section Française de 
l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO).15  Membership in the party itself  also increased from a 
half million in June 1945 to 750,000 by the end of that year.16
Despite these early victories immediately after the war, the PCF quickly suffered 
political setbacks, leading to the party’s exclusion from power, but also cementing its 
status as the perennial outsider in French politics.  The intensification of the Cold War 
and a series of strikes in 1947 that were blamed on the PCF were the proximate causes 
for the PCF’s expulsion from the Socialist Ramadier government in May 1947.17  At that 
time, all the major political parties in France denounced the PCF as a totalitarian party, 
working to undermine French democracy in the service of the Soviet Union.18  In the 
municipal elections later that year, the SFIO broke its previous alliance with PCF, 
allowing the Gaullist Rassemblement du peuple français (RPF) to win thirty-eight percent 
of the votes.19  The PCF responded to the SFIO’s decision by returning to the Stalinist 
class against class rhetoric that had failed so miserably in Germany during the interwar 




therefore, the PCF was once again the outsider party, taking this opportunity to 
consistently condemn the French state. 
The prestige of the PCF after World War II also attracted many intellectuals, who 
viewed the party as the best hope for a significant change in France.  Intellectuals who 
sided with the PCF believed that they were allying themselves with a progressive force in 
world politics, defending (or, at the very least, refusing to condemn) the Soviet Union 
and the policies of Stalin in order to advance the cause of communist revolution in France 
and in the West.21  French intellectuals took this position despite the fact that since the 
1930's, evidence of Stalinist atrocities, including the gulags, the show trials, and the 
purges, was well publicized in Western Europe and continued to mount during the post-
war period.22  The denunciation of the PCF as a totalitarian party by the other major 
French political parties had little effect in intellectual circles, despite the efforts of 
Raymond Aron to introduce this concept into French thought.23  Whenever the issue of 
Stalin’s brutality or the totalitarian nature of the USSR arose, French allies of the PCF did 
not attempt to deny Stalin’s crimes, but rather argued these atrocities were justified by the 
fact that Communism was the best hope for human emancipation.  The use of violence in 
the Soviet Union was in the name of the progress of humanity, and therefore acceptable, 
while violence in the West was employed to maintain the capitalist status quo.24  This 
position illustrates the binary logic through which the left in France viewed the world.  
An intellectual could either take a progressive position on the side of the PCF, making 
him ally of the worker or one defended capitalism and was therefore a reactionary as bad 




country, it had to be ideologically defended against those in the West who sought to 
destroy it. 
The defense of the Soviet Union during the 1940's and 1950's was motivated by a 
number of factors.  First, capitalist industry had benefited under fascist rule, leading 
many on the left to equate capitalism with fascism.  After 1947, party militants and 
theorists equated Gaullism with fascism, and argued it was the obligation of the workers 
to resist this trend in France.25  Second, the French left believed that Communism 
represented the hope of humanity for progress beyond the capitalist present.26  Judt 
correctly argues that both anti-Americanism and anti-anti-communism factored into this 
equation.  Intellectuals were unwilling to condemn the Soviets out of fear that any 
criticism of the Soviet Union would serve as propaganda for the pro-American, anti-
Communist government in France.27  Judt argues that a certain amount of self-interest 
was involved as well.  In the United States, public intellectuals played a marginal role.  
French intellectuals believed that if America represented the future, they would be 
excluded from public life.28  Finally, in allying themselves with the Soviet Union, French 
intellectuals gave themselves a role to play in revolutionary politics.  As intellectuals, the 
militants of the PCF considered them bourgeois.  However, by defending the Soviet 
Union, they felt they were fulfilling Marx’s prediction that in the course of the proletarian 
struggle, many bourgeois intellectuals would abandon their class and join the cause of the 
workers.  Given all these factors, the mainstream intellectual French Left overlooked the 
atrocities being committed by the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union, continuing to 




became a reactionary defender of the political status quo, isolated from the real 
grievances of the working class in France. 
The mainstream French left’s alliance with the PCF soon proved to be a tenuous 
one.  Intellectuals were forced to choose between their critical independence and their 
support for the party.  The PCF had little use for independent thinkers who were 
unwilling to join the party or refused to adhere strictly to Marxist orthodoxy.  The 
CPSU’s domination of the PCF, and the Soviet intolerance of ideological deviation, 
reinforced the relative insignificance of independent fellow-travelers vis-à-vis the party 
leadership.29  Since the PCF was loyal to Moscow, its leaders demanded that its 
supporters be loyal as well.  Intellectuals who sought to reinterpret Marxism only served 
to undermine the political program of the party in France and its political masters in the 
Soviet Union.  Some intellectuals, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, did in fact join the 
party, but became quickly disillusioned, both with the PCF’s tactics and its subservience 
to Moscow.30  Tony Judt aptly compares the relationship of intellectuals who allied 
themselves with the PCF to battered wives who return to their husbands after being 
beaten.  As a result, Communism, like a violent husband, benefited from the faith of these 
individuals which was based on an initial infatuation.31  
The members of the Socialisme ou Barbarie group differentiated themselves from 
the mainstream French left by their refusal to defend the Soviet Union, instead taking a 
position that the PCF and its allies in the CPSU did not represent the interests of the 
working class in France.  According to the Socialisme ou Barbarie position, the PCF was 
solely concerned with advancing its own political interests, seeking to wrest state power 




Thus, the PCF’s self-proclaimed status as an “outsider” attacking the French political 
system was belied by the party’s actions while in power.  From 1945 to 1947, the CGT, 
the PCF’s allied labor union, impeded any and all industrial action by the French 
proletariat in the name of rebuilding France.  However, once the PCF was ousted from 
power, the party returned to its revolutionary rhetoric.  As Claude Lefort observed at the 
time, Communist parties in power become less interested in revolution when it threatens 
their position in the government.33  The lack of action by the PCF during the height of its 
political power illustrates the truth of this observation. 
More important than the actions of the PCF, according to Castoriadis, was the fact 
that the Communist party as an organization mirrored the total bureaucratic nature of the 
Soviet Union.  The structure of the Soviet system allowed the party bureaucracy to 
occupy a social position that generated its own interests antithetical to those of the 
working class.  The party bureaucracy in the Soviet Union and in Communist parties in 
general exercised power to advance narrow capitalistic interests.34  In France, the social 
base of the PCF was the labor aristocracy and the political and trade-union bureaucracy, 
denounced by Lenin as the social bases of reformism.35 Thus, the very nature of the PCF 
precluded any advancement of revolutionary goals.  Stalinist parties were interested only 
in seizing the bureaucratic apparatus of the capitalist state and employing the means of 
production to advance a totalitarian agenda.  In a later work, Castoriadis argued, “The 
PCF can declare that it advocates democracy, total anarchism, or Zen Buddhism; its 
totalitarian aim is inscribed in the structure of its organization and in the constantly 
reproduced relations domination on the part of the Summit.”36  As such, the conclusion of 




served counter-revolutionary goals.  The only means through which a socialist system 
could emerge is the spontaneous creativity of the working class itself and the 
development of self-management.  The task of the revolutionary must be to support this 
goal, not the political goals of a bureaucratic Communist party. 
Given the narrow political goals of the PCF, intellectuals who supported the party 
were, according to Castoriadis, being played for fools.  In the name of the progress of 
humankind, supporters of the PCF were instead aligning themselves with a bureaucratic 
political party taking orders from one of the most repressive, brutal regimes in existence.  
As such, the mainstream French left was betraying its purported commitment to political 
engagement.  According to Castoriadis, political engagement required direct participation 
in the workers’ struggles in France.37  It was not enough to simply claim to represent the 
interests of the proletariat. Furthermore, no revolutionary group could claim to speak on 
the behalf of the French working class.  The participation of intellectuals in the workers’ 
struggles could only be effective if the intellectual followed the lead of the workers 
themselves.38  Castoriadis and the Socialisme ou Barbarie members rejected the Leninist 
idea that the proletariat is only capable of achieving a trade union consciousness.  There 
is a great revolutionary potential in the working class as it exists; there is no need for a 
revolutionary organization to step in and transform the consciousness of the working 
class.  Castoriadis argues that he working class as it exists is fully capable of 
transforming the relations of production.39  The task of the revolutionary organization is 
to place the everyday life of the proletariat into a theoretical, revolutionary context 
whereby the worker can recognize his true role in the capitalist system and use this 




exhibited by the workers on the factory floor that allows the capitalist system to function 
is the same force that can be turned towards a revolutionary reconstruction of the 
relations of production. 
Jean-Paul Sartre and the French Left 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s participation in leftist politics is perhaps the best example of 
the emphasis on political engagement over theoretical speculation, as Sartre significantly 
altered his earlier philosophy to make it more appealing to the leaders of the PCF and to 
make it more relevant to contemporary political struggles.  However, in altering his 
earlier existentialist philosophy, Sartre compromised his philosophy of freedom in order 
to defend the authoritarian tactics of the PCF in France and the totalitarianism of the 
Stalinist Soviet Union.  In this regard, Sartre represented the mainstream of the French 
left at the time, which was too willing to embrace Marxist orthodoxy at the expense of its 
own integrity and, more importantly, at the expense of the possibility of effecting 
significant social change in France.  In the end, the PCF proved to be more concerned 
with amassing political power for itself rather than bringing about revolutionary change 
in France.  Throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s, the PCF turned its back on workers’ 
unrest, refusing to support spontaneous strikes, opting instead for well-orchestrated, 
controlled, but wholly ineffectual political gestures.  During the early 1950’s, Sartre 
defended these hollow political moves by the PCF as expressions of revolutionary 
activity on behalf of the working class.  By the time of the publication of the Communists 
and the Peace in 1952, Sartre had become one of the staunchest defenders of the PCF, 
thus completing his transformation from an existentialist criticized by the PCF to a 




The relationship between Sartre and the PCF was, as between all independent 
intellectuals and the party, a one-sided “love affair.”  While Sartre sought to advance the 
PCF’s goals and agitate for revolution, the PCF had very little use for Sartre’s heterodox 
conception of Marxist theory.  Orthodox Marxists roundly attacked Sartre’s early 
existentialist philosophy, primarily because in this early work Sartre rejects the idea of 
liberation through collective action on the part of a social class.40  Sartre’s existential 
philosophy emphasizes the concept of freedom, which he views as the core of human 
existence.  Freedom, for Sartre, requires an act of will on the part of the individual: each 
person has to make a conscious decision to be free.  This, however, is not an easy task, as 
Sartre argues that existential anxiety emerges from the realization by the individual that 
every moment is a creative one and requires a decision.41  Any refusal to make a choice 
when confronted by a situation that requires one is, according to Sartre, an act of bad 
faith, a flight from freedom.42  Furthermore, expressing one’s freedom becomes difficult 
given the fact that the individual is surrounded by others who similarly seek to exercise 
their own freedom.  Sartre argues that human existence consists of the interactions 
between monadic individuals, whose primary relationship to one another is defined by 
conflict.  Because each individual is potentially free, the assertion of this freedom by one 
threatens the freedom of others. For example, Sartre argues that love cannot be a positive 
affirmation of each lover’s freedom, but rather is always an attempt by one lover to strip 
the other of his or her freedom.43  When every individual exists in potential conflict with 
every other individual, the possibility of collective action diminishes.  However, Sartre 
does not argue that political action and social change are impossible.  The capitalist 




gains, reinforces bad faith among the individuals in the society in question.  When 
confronted with the easy path of self-interest and the more difficult one of asserting one’s 
will and creativity, especially when this conflicts with the dominant system, the 
individual will more often choose the former.  This is where, according to Sartre, the 
revolutionary potential of existentialism lies.  True freedom is by its nature a threat to the 
status quo.44  Sartre’s existentialist writings express a desire for the individual to choose 
freedom over bad faith.  Throughout his writings, it is clear that Sartre has a political 
program in mind.  Choosing freedom is preferable to fleeing from it, despite the 
existential anxiety the former decision may bring. 
Given Sartre’s implicit political program, it is no surprise that he eventually allied 
with the PCF.  Sartre was attracted to the prestige of the PCF and clearly agreed with the 
position that the party represented the only hope for significant social change in France.  
As Sartre became more involved in political activity, he sought to reconcile his early 
existentialist philosophy with the Marxism of the PCF, despite the apparent conflict 
between these two philosophical systems.  Sartre’s intent was to rectify Marxism’s lack 
of a coherent theory of liberation by combining it with the emancipatory aspects of 
existentialism.45  In adapting existentialism to Marxism, however, Sartre altered many of 
his key beliefs in order to harmonize the two philosophies.  He began to distance himself 
from his previous focus on the monadic individual, arguing instead that the possibilities 
for freedom were rooted in the historical situation, which determined limits and capacity 
for action at any given time.46  Furthermore, a worker’s freedom no longer depended 
solely on his own action, but rather the individual worker’s freedom was dependent on 




worker had to change the situation of his class.  Specifically, the working class had to 
overcome its atomization if it ever hoped to defeat the capitalist system, and only the 
Communist Party provided the opportunity to do this.47  This new emphasis on class 
liberation represents Sartre’s ultimate betrayal of his earlier existentialist philosophy.  In 
order to reconcile Marxism and existentialism, Sartre devalues the freedom of the 
individual member of the working class, subjecting the individual to the dictates of the 
PCF.  The individual worker is no longer capable of asserting his own freedom vis-à-vis 
the society in which he lives.  Rather, he must submit his will to the general will of the 
communist party.  Only through the collective action of his class, directed and dictated by 
the party, can the worker become free in a capitalist system.  In essence, Sartre abandons 
the concept of the worker as an individual will, opting instead for a desubjectivized 
working class, composed of workers who are no more than tools in the communist 
party’s struggle to engage in revolution.  Dick Howard accurately observes that in 
Sartre’s philosophical shift to the defense of Marxism, the existential a priori of freedom 
is replaced by the a priori of a progressive history whose sense or direction only the 
Communist Party or the Soviet Union knows.48
During the 1950’s, Sartre’s defense of the PCF was dogmatic.  Merleau-Ponty, for 
example, broke with Les Temps Modernes, convinced that Sartre would not allow the 
publication of dissenting opinions in the journal.49  In The Communists and the Peace, 
Sartre vehemently defends Marxism and the PCF, arguing that a revolution against the 
capitalist system is only possible through the party.  This work is directed primarily 
against anti-communist leftists and gauchiste splinter groups who Sartre blames for the 




systematic defense of Marxism at an inopportune time in the Party’s history.  At the time, 
the Party suffered declining support among the working class, apparently refuting 
Sartre’s claim that the proletariat needed the party to act as a conduit for its hostility 
towards capitalism.  While Sartre would claim that the lack of class consciousness was to 
blame for the PCF’s waning support, the real blame lay squarely on the shoulders of the 
Party. The chasm that emerged between the PCF leadership and the party’s mass base 
was a direct result of the Party’s pursuit of its political goals over the demands of the 
French proletariat.   
Since the end of World War II, the PCF had consistently ignored the grievances 
of the working class, especially while the PCF held political power.  In the years 
immediately following the war, the CGT attempted to restrain the working class, 
exhorting its members to work first for the economic reconstruction of France, promising 
that if the workers deferred their demands, the union would seek concessions from the 
government at a later date.50  The PCF was convinced that through the CGT, it would be 
able to exert control over the working class, and, for a time, this was true, as the 
proletariat obeyed the PCF’s directive to refrain from industrial actions.51  However, 
worker discontent quickly began to grow, as many workers believed they were not 
reaping the benefits of the growing economy they had helped to reconstruct after World 
War II.  Gauchiste elements in the French working class called strikes at the Renault 
Billancourt factory in 1947.  The PCF, still a member of the French government, 
denounced the strikes and demanded that the workers return to the factory.  At first, the 
strikes were limited, as the CGT, which dominated the plant, expressed hostility towards 




initiative, forcing the CGT to call its own strike while negotiating with management.  
Soon after, the limited action of the CGT spiraled out of the union’s control and became a 
full strike of all thirty thousand of Renault Billancourt’s workers.  The CGT finally 
supported the strike, but the negotiations with management fell far short of what the 
workers on the factory floor were demanding.52  
While the 1947 Renault Billancourt strike represented the first major break 
between the PCF and its proletarian base, the decline in PCF influence was more clearly 
evident in 1952 when the CGT called a series of strikes, all of which generated little 
response from the French proletariat.  By this time, the PCF was no longer a party in 
power and had returned to its revolutionary rhetoric, seeking to embarrass the 
government and assert its power within civil society.  The first strike called was against 
fascism and another strike was called to protest the visit of the American general 
Matthew Ridgway to France.  Neither of these actions received working class support and 
only PCF cadres turned up for them.53  The CGT also called for a strike at Renault 
Billancourt after Jacques Duclos was arrested in the “pigeon affair”.54  However, the 
workers at the Billancourt plant ignored the CGT’s call for a strike to protest the arrest.55  
In the end, the workers at Billancourt were forced to leave the plant after CGT activists 
shut off the power, preventing them from continuing work.56  The failure of these strikes 
can be attributed to the fact that they only served the political ends of the PCF.  Once 
excluded from power, the PCF sought to embarrass the government by mobilizing the 
workers against it.  However, none of these strikes addressed the actual economic 
grievances of the workers.  Despite these failures on the part of the CGT, intellectuals 




significant amount of its working class base.  Instead of critically examining these 
failures, mainstream leftist intellectuals generated excuses for the failure of the Party.   
The most prominent intellectual to defend the failure of the PCF was Jean-Paul 
Sartre, who wrote The Communists and the Peace partly in response to anti-communist 
groups who rejoiced over the apparent decline in PCF influence.  Throughout this work, 
Sartre denigrates the working class, arguing that the lack of support for the strikes was 
the fault of the workers and gauchiste groups who undermined the PCF and the cause of 
the revolution itself.  The PCF, according to Sartre, continued to represent the only 
organization through which the capitalist system could be confronted, and consequently 
the only hope for progressive change in France.  Furthermore, The Communists and the 
Peace is a shrill attack against anti-communist leftists as traitors to the cause of the 
revolution, referring to the far-left groups as “dirty rats” (rats visqueux)57, doing more to 
impede the revolution than any right-wing organization could hope to do.  According to 
Paul Berman, the Socialisme ou Barbarie group, which had a significant amount of 
influence among radical workers at Renault-Billancourt58, was one of Sartre’s primary 
targets.59  The Sartre-Lefort debate, printed in the pages of Les Temps Modernes reveals 
the hard-line position Sartre was willing to take to defend the PCF.  His Reply to Claude 
Lefort rarely addresses the criticisms that Lefort levels against him.  Rather, Sartre 
engages in a strident personal attack on Lefort, asserting that Lefort is unable to 
distinguish between the real and the ideal60, questioning his commitment to the political 
struggle against capitalism61 and, essentially accusing Lefort of being a fascist and trying 




an intellectual, arguing that Lefort, as an intellectual, cannot speak in the name of the 
proletariat or even about the proletariat.63  
Sartre’s harsh tone in attacking Lefort is unsurprising, given the intellectual 
climate permeating the mainstream Left at the time.  The tone of political discourse on 
the left was set early on in response to the Allies de-Nazification programs throughout 
Europe.  After the war, leftist intellectuals, many of who had suffered severely during the 
Occupation, became embittered by the fact that many former collaborators had escaped 
unpunished.  To rectify this situation, the Comité national des écrivains (CNE) created a 
blacklist of authors who had collaborated during the war, and attempting to pressure 
publishers not to publish these works.64  This purge sought to punish intellectuals not 
only for deeds that were judged collaborationist but for beliefs that contributed to a 
climate of collaborationism.65  The Committee punished intellectuals both for what they 
said and wrote before the war as well as during it, and it soon became clear that in many 
cases, the purge served as an excuse to settle personal and professional scores.66  Despite 
this purge, membership in the CNE increased after the war, as did the influence of the 
PCF over the organization.  The PCF directed many of the CNE’s activities, aligning the 
writers’ organization with the political goals of the PCF.  Throughout the 1950’s, the 
CNE advanced a one-sided defense of liberty, agitating for the rights of left-wing writers, 
but refusing to defend authors persecuted by communist regimes.67  One of the primary 
motivations for this purge was the accepted fact that the role of intellectual was a public 
one.  As such, responsibility becomes a central issue.  Because the French intellectuals 
believe in the primacy of political participation, one must accept the practical 




supporting the Fascist regime.   The purges set a tone for the intellectual climate in 
France, which can be best described as a binary view of the world.  This view dictated 
that either one was for revolution and on the side of progress or one was against it, and 
therefore a reactionary and against all those who had died during the war.68  These purges 
set the tone of discourse on the French left, clearly stating that disagreement with the PCF 
would not be tolerated.  Philosophers such as Raymond Aron were labeled “fascists” for 
refusing to adopt leftist positions.  On the left, gauchiste critics of the PCF were 
marginalized and considered negative influences on the proletariat.   
Given the intellectual climate on the left in 1952, it is not surprising that Sartre’s 
The Communists and the Peace represents more an attack on critics of the PCF than a 
coherent defense of Marxism.  Throughout the work, Sartre advances contradictory 
arguments in defense of the party, shows his pure contempt for the proletariat, and 
refuses to acknowledge the political realities of post-war France, ignoring the very real 
failures of the Communist Party and its affiliated union, the CGT.  In his defense of the 
PCF, Sartre invokes a return to Marx in order to legitimize the party as an organization 
and the actions of the party on “behalf” of the working class.  Sartre writes: 
I remind them of these words of Marx which they have read, reread, and 
commented on a hundred times: “The proletariat can act as a class only by 
shaping itself into a distinct political party,” and I ask them to come to their own 
conclusions: whatever they think of the “Stalinists”, even if they think the masses 
are mistaken or deluded, what maintained their cohesion, what assured the 
efficiency of their action, if not the Communist Party itself?  The “proletariat 




of the worker organized by the Communist Party?  If the working class wants to 
detach itself from the Party, it has only one means at its disposal: to crumble into 
dust.69   
Sartre exhibits the tendency of modern day Marxists to use the original writings 
of Marx to justify the ideology that the latter’s philosophy had become.  By quoting 
Marx, Sartre hopes to establish authority for the PCF.  However, in the above passage, 
there is a subtle distinction that reveals Sartre as an ideologist, rather than someone 
concerned about reviving the original Marx.  There is a tremendous difference between 
the working class “shaping itself into a distinct political party” and the proletariat 
“shaped into a distinct political party.”70  The former clearly states that the praxis of the 
proletariat itself is what will lead to its coherence as a distinct class.  The latter, by 
contrast, is a typically Leninist notion, namely that the proletariat is incapable of praxis, 
and a vanguard party must act on its behalf.  Sartre elaborates on his Leninist position by 
arguing that the masses on their own are only capable of spontaneous festivals, which, on 
the one hand, releases them from the painstaking work of organization, and on the other, 
proves its necessity.71  Trade-unionism alone is a limited means, whereby workers 
become satisfied with the compromises made by the capitalist system and take an implicit 
stand against revolutionary action.  As such, those who advocate trade-union solutions 
betray the working class, which is clearly incapable of understanding the limitations of 
this form of organization.72  The task of the Communist Party is to explain events to the 
masses and to channel their hostility toward the capitalist system in the proper direction.73  
Only through the Communist party, and, by corollary, its affiliated trade-union, the CGT, 




guided by the program of the Communist party in order to achieve the required 
organizational capacity for confronting capitalism and the necessary political 
consciousness that demands the overthrow of the capitalist system, rather than simply 
accepting the limited concessions capitalists will make to the proletariat.   
 Once Sartre establishes the necessity of the PCF, he defends the failure of the 
party in the 1950’s by arguing that the blame lies with the working class itself.  Sartre’s 
reaction to the 1952 strikes was to argue that workers who did not strike were acting as 
individuals, not as members of the working class.74  In Sartre’s mind, “The workers 
refused to fight because they were sure of defeat: they had lost confidence in the power of 
the working class; they felt that it lacked a grip on events and that history moved without 
it.”75  The PCF, therefore, was not to blame.  Sartre asserts that the workers had lost faith 
in the power of the working class as a force for change in French society.  The more 
likely explanation is that the workers lost faith in the PCF as a legitimate representative 
of their grievances.  Since the end of the war, the PCF had done little to advance the 
workers’ interests, telling them instead to wait while France rebuilt.  By the 1950’s, 
however, the workers were dissatisfied with the benefits of this strategy, and began to 
question the PCF.  Despite this, Sartre asserts that the workers passed no judgment on the 
PCF, but rather put their own interests first, unable to recognize their class interests.76  
The second error that Sartre makes in this statement is to assume that the PCF knows the 
interests of the working class better than the working class itself, especially given the fact 
that the purpose behind the failed strikes had very little to do with advancing the “class 
interests” of the workers.  Calling for strikes to protest “American imperialism” or to 




interests of the working class. Sartre’s blindness to the fact that the political interests of 
the PCF and the economic interests of the working class do not coincide greatly weakens 
his argument that the PCF is a representative of the French proletariat.  Only by 
devaluing the real interests of the workers, as well as their ability to express these 
interests autonomously, can Sartre defend the PCF in this manner. 
 Lefort attacks Sartre on this point, arguing that the working class is fully capable 
of articulating its own demands and advancing its own interests without the filter of the 
Communist party.  According to the Socialisme ou Barbarie position, the PCF is a 
bureaucratic organization, concerned with advancing its own interests as a class separated 
from the proletariat.  In this regard, the PCF resembles the bourgeoisie the latter claims to 
oppose.  The vanguard party does not speak on the behalf of the proletariat, nor does the 
party advance the interests of the working class.  Rather, the Communist party uses the 
proletariat to advance its own political interests, interests that are determined by the party 
itself, without any dialogue or input from the working class itself.  “Comme le 
bourgeoisie, le stalinisme élabore sa politique en secret, dure les éléments qu’il veut 
entraîner, et ne tolère l’action populaire qu’à la condition d’en garder le strict contrôle.”77  
This fact explains the PCF’s opposition to the spontaneous action of the workers at the 
Billancourt factory in 1947 and all other incidents of worker-initiated industrial actions 
throughout the post-Cold War era. 
 The supposed necessity of the PCF is reinforced by the party’s artificial 
distinction between “reformist” and “revolutionary” actions.  Sartre agrees with this 
distinction in his condemnation of the working class as incapable of understanding its 




revolution allows the Communist party to dictate the appropriate time for industrial 
actions, the required tactics, and the political goals that must be achieved.  However, the 
history of the PCF in France illustrates that the party simply used this distinction to 
advance its own political goals and allowed the party to denounce spontaneous action as 
counter-revolutionary.  Lefort’s position that the working class is capable of self-
management relies on the elimination of the distinction between reformist and 
revolutionary tactics.  The Communist party must insist on this distinction in order to 
reduce the proletariat to a passive object, acted upon by economic forces beyond the 
comprehension of the working class, but discoverable by the party through the 
application of Marxist theory.78  In this manner, the Communist party can assert those 
actions approved by the party can be classified as “revolutionary”, while any activity on 
the part of the working class itself can never be anything more than “reformist.”  
According to Lefort, the spontaneous action of the working class, even in pursuit of 
“reformist” goals, carries with it revolutionary demands against the bureaucratic nature of 
the capitalist system.  Reformism and revolutionary action have their roots in the same 
source: the experience of the working class in their struggle against capitalism, which 
takes a myriad of forms, and shapes the proletariat as a class, opening new possibilities 
for future spontaneous action.79  As such, the revolutionary organization must look to the 
working class for guidance in formulating the organization’s goals, and not attempt to 
impose a program on the proletariat that does not taken into account the actual needs of 
the working class or a program that ignores the history of the workers’ movement.  
Agreeing with Lefort’s position, Castoriadis illustrates the significance of a “reformist” 




paid coffee break.80  While Orthodox Marxists would dismiss such a demand as 
“reformist”, irrelevant, and doing nothing to advance the interests of the proletariat as a 
class, Castoriadis asserts that such a demand carries a revolutionary potential.  First, the 
demand for a fifteen minute break represents the real interests of the worker in the 
factory, and therefore must not be dismissed as irrelevant by a revolutionary organization.  
Second, and more importantly, this demand represents a rejection by the workers of the 
time-clock imposed by bureaucratic planners that seeks to dictate and regiment every 
single action the worker will perform on the assembly-line.  Since the goal of the 
bureaucratic manager is to reduce the worker to nothing more than another machine in 
the factory, the fifteen minute break represents a rupture from the imposed capitalist 
concept of time.  By demanding a paid coffee break, the worker breaks free from the 
capitalist routine, asserting his fundamental humanity and autonomy by stating, “I am 
more than an automaton and I do not leave my humanity at the factory door.”  The fact 
that he is being paid to drink coffee further asserts that his wage is not linked to constant 
output on the factory floor.  Furthermore, the coffee break reinforces the community of 
workers.  Taking a break during the workday is a social activity that allows the workers 
to talk to one another and to interact as human beings.  As such, it represents an 
important check against the dehumanizing agenda of the bureaucratic-capitalist 
apparatus. 
Lefort’s final critique of Sartre’s The Communists and the Peace deals with the 
messianic role Sartre attributes to the party.  According to Sartre, it is the PCF that will 
lead the French working class to salvation.  Working class action will occur through the 




Sartre argues that without the PCF, the working class will “distrust all politics, they will 
distrust their class; the universe will be bourgeois.”81  The only way to prevent such an 
apocalypse is if the working class devotes its allegiance and obedience to their savior, the 
PCF.  Furthermore, Sartre argues, “The Party is pure action; it must advance or 
disappear; it is the strength of the workers who are at the end of their strength and the 
hope of those who are without hope.”82  Apart from the messianic mysticism Sartre 
exhibits in this statement, it clearly ignores the fact that the PCF did everything in its 
power to prevent the workers from acting during the immediate post-war period, when 
the party was more concerned with maintaining its position of power.  The 1947 strike at 
Billancourt, opposed by the PCF, proved the capacity of the workers to find their own 
strength outside the party and make their own demands, far more radical than those the 
PCF was making of the behalf of the working class.  In taking these positions, Sartre 
exhibits his contempt for the working class, believing that only the messianic intervention 
of the Communist Party can save the proletariat from its miserable fate.  Lefort attacks 
Sartre on this point, arguing that Sartre is incapable of understanding the vast chasm that 
lies between the Marxism of Marx, Lenin, Luxembourg, and Trotsky and the “Marxism” 
of Stalin, the latter being the Marxism of the PCF.83  Sartre’s contempt for the working 
class would last far longer than his allegiance to the Soviet Union.  In a 1971 interview, 
Sartre states, “You know it’s much easier for a philosopher to explain a new concept to 
another philosopher than to a child.  Because the child, with all its naivete, asks the real 
questions.  So do the workers.”84  Even in this attempt to argue for the “authenticity” of 
the worker, by comparing the proletariat to children, Sartre only succeeds in reinforcing 




in the PCF’s standard response to any unsanctioned expression of worker discontent, 
which was condemned as adventurism or the work of gauchiste elements.  In the eyes of 
the PCF, the workers were only supposed to be the revolutionary class when they were 
told to by the party leadership.   
 Sartre further asserts that the Communist party will “save” the working class from 
the horrors imposed by the mechanization of the assembly line.  According to Sartre, 
mechanization in advanced capitalist society succeeds in completely atomizing the 
worker.  Sartre asserts that the mechanization of the factory results in the dehumanization 
of the worker.  The worker, according to Sartre, is a miserable being, cut off from other 
workers.  The worker on the factory floor has no human connection with other workers.  
Instead, all relationships exist through the filter of the assembly line.  Thus, the individual 
worker is only aware of other workers in terms of the errors the other makes on the 
assembly line, which leads to a loss of earnings.  Thus, human relationships are fully 
atomized and instrumentalized.85  This argument further legitimizes the role of the party, 
which can take a revolutionary stance on behalf of a splintered working class, incapable 
of advancing its own interests.  Lefort counters this position by arguing that Sartre does 
not recognize the social-historical circumstances of the modern proletariat, relying 
instead on an outdated view of the industrial proletariat.  First, Sartre must accept the fact 
that mechanization is a characteristic of modern capitalism and the clock cannot be 
turned back.  Second, it is the capitalist system, controlled ultimately by men, that cuts 
off man: “C’est l’homme qui ampute l’homme.” 86  Capitalism, not the machinery of the 
factory, forces human beings to give their life to the production process.  Sartre’s focus 




capitalism as an institution.  In Lefort’s estimation, this is in fact what the working class 
does on a daily basis, without the direction of the PCF.87  The working class is already 
organized into political clubs, unions, and other voluntary organizations that exist outside 
the apparatus of the PCF.88  Thus, the proletariat does not need the PCF to save them 
from the factory or from themselves. 
 The Lefort-Sartre debate represents an important milestone in the history of the 
mainstream French left’s confrontation with the anti-communist groups that, at the time, 
were a marginal, but rising force in the post-war intellectual climate.  The political 
positions taken by the PCF during the 1950’s would lead to both a waning influence 
among the working class and an increased alienation from the party by intellectuals who 
were once its staunchest defenders.  Sartre himself revised the stance he took in The 
Communists and the Peace, breaking with the party, but stopping short of completely 
denouncing communism.  Instead, Sartre invoked the danger of reactionary politics rising 
in Hungary as a result of the insurrection, and as a justification for the Soviet invasion.  
Furthermore, he argued that Hungary de-Stalinized too quickly, and that Eastern Europe 
as a whole was not ready for change.89  Meanwhile, the PCF completely ignored 
Khruschev’s “secret speech” denouncing Stalin and stubbornly resisted any attempt to 
de-Stalinize.90  In addition, intellectuals broke with party over the PCF’s failure to mount 
any significant resistance to DeGaulle’s creation of the Fifth Republic.  The PCF did little 
to resist DeGaulle’s rise to power, and the near 80 percent approval of the referendum 
creating the Fifth Republic, and the subsequent PCF defeat in the 1958 legislative 




Aron, Camus, and Castoriadis versus Jean-Paul Sartre 
 Jean-Paul Sartre’s defense of the Soviet Union defined the mainstream French 
left’s relationship to the PCF throughout the 1950’s.  However, the debate between Sartre 
and Lefort proved the possibility of staking a position in opposition to the mainstream 
left’s defense of Stalinism.  While taking such a position guaranteed marginalization 
given the philosophical and political dominance of Sartre and his allies, theorists such as 
Cornelius Castoriadis (and the Socialisme ou Barbarie group as a whole), Raymond 
Aron, and Albert Camus rejected the defense of Stalinism and the Soviet Union 
nonetheless.  Two elements of the position taken by Aron, Camus, and Castoriadis 
against Sartre and the intellectual allies of the PCF are important to consider.  The first 
element is that these three thinkers went beyond merely refusing to defend Soviet 
Communism.  Rather, Aron, Camus, and Castoriadis consistently argued that the Soviet 
Union represented a political, military, and existential threat to Western Europe.  From 
this perspective, each of these theorists argued that it was crucial to actively oppose and 
speak out against Western defenders of the Soviet Union such as Jean-Paul Sartre.  The 
second element of this oppositional position illustrates the fact that Aron, Camus, and 
Castoriadis, in varying degrees, took seriously the issue of intellectual responsibility, 
particularly the Weberian distinction between the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of 
ultimate ends.  According to Weber, an ethic of ultimate ends refuses to consider the 
consequences of a particular action, declaring that “if an action of good intent leads to 
bad results, then, in the actor’s eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, 
or God’s will who made them thus, is responsible for the evil.”92  By contrast, the 




of other men.  Rather than acting without limits and proclaiming, for example, that this 
particular act of violence will be the last one before the end is achieved, knowing that 
another act of violence will be necessary, the follower of the ethic of responsibility 
understands that when he reaches a certain point, he must state, “Here I stand; I can do no 
other.”93  At this point, the follower of the ethic of responsibility understands that the 
means he must use to achieve his end are disproportionate to the end and are 
unacceptable.  French apologists for the Soviet Union during the Cold War advanced an 
ethic of ultimate ends, arguing that the Soviet Union had to be defended, regardless of the 
crimes Stalin had committed against the Soviet people, because Soviet communism 
represented the best hope for humanity to escape from Western industrial capitalism.  In 
opposition to this position, Aron, Camus, and Castoriadis argued that political theorists 
had to seriously consider the connection between means and ends.  Particularly in the 
case of Castoriadis, the end of socialism did not justify any and all means.  Rather, 
socialism could only be achieved by linking existing means, which were expressed 
through the actions of workers on the factory floor, to a broader theoretical context that 
could posit ends beyond the reform of conditions in one particular factory. 
Throughout his life, Raymond Aron took a strong position against the Soviet 
Union, arguing that the Soviets represented a real threat to Western Europe.  This threat 
was ideological, political, and military.  The defense of the Soviet system by French 
intellectuals in the 1950’s was, according to Aron, a foolish and dangerous position.  
Intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s, who declared that 
their problems with the French Communists were “just family quarrels”, took a naïve and 




had to be opposed ideologically as well as militarily.  Aron’s rejection of the Soviet 
Union was not simply a reaction to the gulags and Stalinist repression.  Aron argued that 
the Soviet system was the product of the revolutionary movement itself, which placed the 
whole socialist movement into question.95  According to Aron, one-party totalitarian rule 
in the greatest menace, and only political and intellectual liberalism, which permits the 
economic and social conditions of pluralism, insures strong protections against 
totalitarianism.  Socialism’s rejection of the free market makes it inadequate to guard 
against the threat of one-party rule.96  Therefore, according to Aron, whatever problems 
might have existed in Western Europe, the fact that the Western world was founded on 
liberal principles that protected the rights of the individual made the capitalist system far 
superior to the Soviet system.  The Soviet threat to Western Europe led Aron to defend 
France’s alliance with the United States, an alliance that Sartre rejected.  For Aron, the 
United States, despite its mercantile culture that many on the French left despised, was a 
liberal civilization and the offspring of European traditions.97  “Since the Russian empire 
is, additionally, a Soviet or ideological empire, it seems to me there is every reason to 
take the Eastern menace seriously and to make a distinction between the Western 
multinationals and Soviet missiles.”98  This position led Aron to strongly advocate French 
participation in NATO, more as a psychological and political alliance than a military one, 
with the goal of reassuring Western Europe and diffusing the power of domestic 
Communist parties.99  As such, Aron disagreed with de Gaulle’s policy of breaking with 
NATO and establishing French nuclear autonomy, arguing that it would weaken NATO 




 Though a sharp critic of the Western capitalist model, Castoriadis concurred with 
Aron’s assessment of the ideological and military threat posed by the Soviet Union.  
Throughout his years in the Socialisme ou Barbarie group and in the years after the group 
dissolved, Castoriadis was a consistent critic of the Soviet Union and its expansionistic 
military ambitions, exemplified, in Castoriadis’ eyes, by the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and Soviet backed regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and South Yemen, 
among other places.101  Aron argued that “the Soviet Union today is essentially a military 
power with an economy that, on paper, produces a great deal of hardware, but provides 
very few goods to the population.”102  Castoriadis advances a similar argument in Devant 
la Guerre, a work he wrote in 1981 during the debate over the presence of NATO nuclear 
missiles in Western Europe.  During the protracted negotiations over the SALT II treaty, 
the Soviet Union began deploying SS-20 missiles aimed at targets in Western Europe.  In 
1979, Jimmy Carter responded with a plan to deploy Pershing II missiles in Western 
Europe to counter the Soviet installation of the SS-20’s.103  Castoriadis would argue that 
the less than successful SALT II agreement was the result of the fact that the Soviet 
Union had transformed into a militaristic empire, incapable of internal reform and 
concerned solely with expansion outside its borders.  A significant portion of this work 
compares the quantitative differences between Warsaw Pact military strength and NATO 
forces, arguing that the Soviet bloc possessed a stronger military than the West.104  This, 
according to Castoriadis, was a product of the fact that the Soviet economy had 
transformed into a war machine.  The economic system of the Soviet Union had become 
one wherein the military industry was capable of producing weaponry on par with any of 




goods industries in the USSR were inefficient and consistently under-produced in relation 
to the needs of the Soviet population.105  A dual economy existed in the Soviet Union; the 
civilian sector was inefficient, while the military sector was fully modernized and 
efficient.  As such, the army represented the only modern institution in the Soviet Union, 
completely dominating the existing social regime.  The Soviet Communist Party, for 
example, served the army by serving as a propaganda machine for the military.106  The 
military threat posed by the Soviet Union emerges from the fact that the institutional 
apparatus of the Soviet Union has reached a point where it has no other purpose other 
than to expand through military force.107  “Il est absurde de se demander pourquoi un 
lutteur de sumo ne fait pas de tennis.”108  The institutional petrifaction that pervades the 
Soviet system leads to a situation where the Soviet army takes advantage of all 
opportunities to expand outward, employing brute force solely for its own sake.109  Given 
this fact, Castoriadis argues that Alexander Dubcek was wrong to believe he could reason 
with the Soviets in 1968 before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; the Soviet army 
does not understand such appeals.110  For Castoriadis, the West is confronting a 
completely new instituted imaginary, one that does not understand or respond to appeals 
to peace or reason, but only comprehends military strength.  As such, Castoriadis staked a 
position far outside the mainstream left, more closely resembling “conservatives” during 
the Cold War who sought a military confrontation with the Soviets.  However, the logic 
of Castoriadis’s consistent opposition to the Soviet Union throughout his intellectual 
career demanded that he take such a confrontational position, regardless of whether his 




For Castoriadis, the Soviet threat was so great that a responsible intellectual could only 
advocate a strategy of military deterrence.    
 While Aron and Castoriadis emphasized the political and military threat posed by 
the Soviet Union, Albert Camus argued that the Soviet empire represented an existential 
threat to Western civilization and to the human capacity for spontaneity and creativity.  
For Camus, any hope for emancipation in the Marxian revolutionary project definitively 
died the day Lenin proclaimed that one could not determine beforehand how long the 
dictatorship of the proletariat would have to exist before the transition to the socialist 
utopia.111  With this pronouncement, Lenin, in Camus’ estimation, prepares the way for a 
permanent dictatorship of the Communist party, opening the door for Stalinism and 
justifying an ethic of ultimate ends.  From this perspective, Camus emphasizes the threat 
that the Soviet Union posed to European civilization.  According to Camus, Soviet 
Communism emphasized scientific determinism over human emotion and creativity to 
the extent that the Soviet project sought to decisively destroy spontaneity, art, and 
everything that Camus argues allows for the human subject to assert his own 
individuality in an absurd world.112  As such, a Western European intellectual who 
defended the Soviet project essentially called for the creation of a world where his own 
creativity would be destroyed.  Philosophy is not possible in the Soviet world.   
 Camus’ position on the Soviet Union made him very unpopular among French 
leftist intellectuals, due to the fact that he pointed out the naivete of the intellectual who 
supported a project that would inevitably lead to the obsolescence and irrelevance of 
philosophy itself.  For example, Albert Camus bore the brunt of some of Sartre’s most 




philosophy for high-school children, playing on Camus’ insecurities regarding his 
capabilities as a thinker vis-à-vis others on the Left such as Simone Beauvoir and Sartre 
himself.113  However, what this dismissive attitude towards Camus reveals is the French 
left’s refusal to confront its own status vis-à-vis the PCF and the Soviet Union and the 
consequences of the unqualified support it lent to the Soviet project.  Tony Judt 
characterizes Camus as a moralist, dedicated to telling the truth and making others, as 
well as oneself, feel uneasy, forcing the individual to examine the consequences of one’s 
actions and ideas.114  Camus accurately observed that the French Left suffered from 
cultural despair and self-loathing, which led them to a fascination with violence.115 For 
example, even after his denunciation of the Soviet Union, Sartre continued to advocate 
violence from the safety of the Left Bank, declaring in the introduction to Franz Fanon’s 
The Wretched of the Earth, that “to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one 
stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there remain a 
dead man, and a free man.”116  For Camus, as well as for Aron and Castoriadis, this 
advocacy of violence represented the height of intellectual irresponsibility, a condition 
that pervaded the mainstream French left throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s.     
 The position taken by Aron, Camus, and Castoriadis against the Soviet Union 
illustrates the problem of responsibility in an intellectual climate of intellectual 
irresponsibility.  Sartre and the mainstream left espoused an ethic of ultimate ends, 
arguing that the end of socialist revolution justified any and all means.  This refusal to 
connect means and ends is best exemplified by the mainstream left’s support for the PCF 
and its defense of the Soviet Union.  Aron represented the theorist most committed to 




consequences and outcomes and each individual must be responsible for the outcomes of 
her actions.117  Aron was particularly irritated by the irresponsibility of French 
intellectuals, who drew obsolete ideas from the past and attempted to apply them to 
contemporary problems.  This loyalty to ideas, according to Aron, was matched only by 
the French intellectuals’ indifference to reality.118  Leftist intellectuals, according to 
Aron, consistently refused to answer the question, “If you were in the minister’s position, 
what would you do?”119  For Aron, this is the fundamental question of political 
responsibility, demanding that the intellectual consider the consequences of the position 
he espouses.  For example, when Sartre and other leftist intellectuals signed the 
Manifesto of the 121, calling upon French youth to resist the draft, Aron declared, “I find 
it objectionable for intellectuals with nothing to lose to motivate young people to become 
deserters, thereby incurring risks.”120  In this particular case, Aron’s criticism of French 
intellectuals is valid.  However, Aron’s general standard of responsibility is too 
restrictive, assuming from the outset that the “minister” is, in fact, practicing an ethic of 
responsibility and rejecting outright a revolutionary critique that attacks the political 
system itself.   
 Aron’s question assumes from the beginning that the existing institutional 
structure allows for responsible action in the sense of connecting means to ends in a 
serious manner.  During the Algerian war, the French military routinely tortured Algerian 
suspects in an attempt to root out terrorists.  In this situation, the simple answer to Aron’s 
question is: “Do not torture Algerians.”  However, this, in reality, answers nothing other 
than a policy question.  What is necessary is an examination of what conditions exist that 




legitimate instrument of policy.  This question cannot be answered from the perspective 
of the “minister”, who is firmly embedded in the institutional context under which such a 
policy was implemented.  By creating a standard of responsibility that demands that the 
intellectual place himself in the position of a government minister, Aron restricts the 
capacity of the intellectual to criticize the existing institutional structure.  The acceptance 
of this high standard assumes that there is a single truth121, linked in this case, to the 
practical efficacy of an intellectual’s position in terms of whether or not the intellectual 
could actual implement his ideas if he were in the minister’s position.  As such, Aron’s 
question is a trap for the revolutionary.  Aron concedes that the revolutionary position is 
one that rejects existing social institutions.  Aron argues that political action, at its most 
basic level, requires the individual to make a fundamental choice: one must either accept 
society or reject it.  The rejection of society is a revolutionary position, and the individual 
who makes such a decision “chooses violence and adventure.  From this fundamental 
choice flow decisions, timely decisions, by which the individual defines himself.”122  As 
such, answering the question, “What would you do in the minister’s position?” is 
completely irrelevant to a revolutionary intellectual who, from the beginning, rejects 
participation in the existing institutional apparatus.  Furthermore, asking this question is, 
in essence, an exhortation to give a “realistic” answer, constraining the intellectual to 
what is feasible given the constraints and potential of the existing institutional apparatus.  
A revolutionary, who seeks to fundamentally change this institutional structure, cannot 
give a “realistic” answer to this question without compromising her desire to change 
society.  Presumably, if one cannot answer this question, one should remain silent.  This, 




multiplicity of truths, as Aron himself argues, the freedom to speak is the essential and 
necessary freedom for the intellectual, regardless of whether what the intellectual says is 
irresponsible.  “We value freedom of speech more than intellectual honesty – about the 
criteria of which in this world of unbelief we are unable to attain consent.”123  Even in the 
face of rampant intellectual irresponsibility in Cold War France, what is important is to 
allow the intellectual to speak.124  It is the task of intellectuals in a democratic society to 
criticize irresponsibility and propose alternatives beyond simply demanding that 
intellectuals be “realistic” or meet a strict standard of responsibility.  Aron himself served 
in this capacity, consistently criticizing Sartre and others on the mainstream French left 
within the context of a democratic discourse, seeking to convince others that supporting 
the Soviet Union was an unacceptable and dangerous political stance.  Aron’s own 
actions and statements are a far greater testament to intellectual responsibility than his 
demand that theorists must put themselves in the position of a government minister 
before they advance a political agenda.   
According to Aron’s perspective, one could legitimately criticize Castoriadis as 
irresponsible, placing him in the same category as Sartre and the defenders of the Soviet 
Union, despite Castoriadis’ consistent opposition to the Soviet regime and his rejection of 
totalitarian political systems.  For Castoriadis, however, Aron’s question is irrelevant, in 
that the “minister” is a member of the bureaucratic-capitalist institutional structure that 
must be resisted.  The more appropriate question the revolutionary intellectual must ask 
herself is Agnes Heller’s question, “How should we live?”125  This question allows for a 
plurality of responses, from all sides of the political spectrum.  Furthermore, it allows the 




about the means we use to achieve social ends.  Using this standard, the responsible 
intellectual can categorically reject the French Left’s defense of Stalinism and its 
fascination with violence.  The fundamental problem with the French Left during the 
Cold War was the luxury of a safe environment.  Intellectuals in France were able to 
defend Stalinism because they were not forced to experience it and suffer under it.  By 
asking “How should we live?” the intellectual must reconsider violent means; would the 
intellectual want to live in a society where Stalinist violence was an arbitrary and 
everyday occurrence?  Thus, one would ask Jean-Paul Sartre if he would be willing to 
live in the Soviet Union and risk execution or being sent to the gulag.  Would he want 
France to adopt the policies of Stalin?  Would he, as a European, sacrifice himself to a 
third-world revolutionary in order to end oppression and free the oppressor?  Presumably, 
Sartre’s answer would be “no”.  By asking Heller’s question, one can demand 
accountability for the irresponsible means espoused to achieve a particular set of ends 
without infringing upon the irresponsible intellectual’s ability to speak.  The irresponsible 
intellectual can still refuse to connect means and ends, but he must present and justify this 
position to others.  If, for example, Jean-Paul Sartre cannot answer whether France 
should institute a gulag system, a democratic society can reject this position through a 
counter-argument defending the values of democracy.  Heller’s question expands the 
definition of responsible and irresponsible, thus allowing for the revolutionary critique of 
existing society.  The intellectual can reject the existing instituted imaginary and demand 
significant social and political change, while considering appropriate means for the 
achievement of this end.  For example, throughout his life, Castoriadis sought to connect 




bureaucratic management structure to a broader revolutionary theory that espoused 
democratic participation and an opposition to rampant consumerism and the crisis of 
meaning that pervaded Western society.  One need not defend the existing institutional 
structure absolutely; it is possible to argue that we do not want to live in the society we 
currently live in, but rather we want to live in a better world.   
The Decline of Socialisme ou Barbarie 
During the 1950’s, Socialisme ou Barbarie remained a relatively marginal group, 
though many of the group’s unorthodox ideas criticizing both the West and the Soviet 
Union, began to disseminate within the mainstream left that was becoming increasingly 
disenchanted with the PCF’s subservience to the Soviets.  However, the influence of the 
group would suffer a severe blow in 1956 when a schism occurred between Castoriadis 
and Claude Lefort over the issue “organizational question.”  At issue was the role a 
revolutionary organization such as Socialisme ou Barbarie should play in a workers’ 
movement.  Both Castoriadis and Lefort rejected a vanguardist approach.  However, 
Castoriadis demanded a more active role in the workers’ movement than Lefort was 
willing to concede.   
Lefort’s concern arose from a chasm he perceived between the intellectuals in 
Socialisme ou Barbarie group and the workers’ movement, despite the group’s best 
efforts to address this problem.  Lefort disagreed with Castoriadis’ concept of the 
revolutionary organization, believing that it skirted too close to Leninism.  He argued 
instead that the revolutionary organization had no direct role to play in a workers’ 
uprising.  The proletarian revolution could only be made by the workers, when the 




a conduit for information between workers’ organizations.  The result of this 
disagreement was that Lefort left Socialisme ou Barbarie and founded his own 
organization, Informations et Liaisons Ouvrières (ILO), which followed more closely 
Lefort’s conception of a revolutionary group as a conduit for information for members of 
the working class.   
Castoriadis responded to Lefort’s criticisms by arguing that Lefort’s conception of 
the revolutionary organization represented an abdication of the responsibility of the 
intellectual.  According to Castoriadis’ criticism, the purpose of the ILO was this: “La 
seule tâche réelle que devait se proposer le groupe était de recueillir et de rediffuser des 
informations.”126  Castoriadis argues that the working class cannot simply be left alone to 
develop its own revolutionary program, due to the simple fact that no other group will 
leave the proletariat alone. The working class is already enmeshed in a web of 
relationships with bureaucratic managers in the factory and with the militants of other 
political organizations, particularly the PCF.  Thus, the revolutionary organization must 
step in to this network.   
The purpose of the revolutionary organization is to connect the struggles the 
workers face on a daily basis on the factory floor with a broader theoretical context.  This 
serves two purposes. First, it connects the workers in one particular factory with similar 
struggles occurring nationally and internationally.  Second, it links the everyday concerns 
of the working class with a revolutionary theory calling for the working class to act to 
change the conditions it must face in the factory.  Thus, the revolutionary organization 
cannot act as a “director” of the proletarian struggle, but rather it must serve as an 




formes d’organisation que le proletariat avait creées, et de leur ‘esprit’.”127  The burden of 
taking action remains with the workers’ movement, but the revolutionary organization 
serves a purpose by placing what the workers have done into a revolutionary, theoretical 
context.  Thus, for example, if a factory adopts a program of self-management, the task of 
the revolutionary organization is to ask, “why is this important?” and then to connect the 
actions of the single factory to a broader theoretical context, pointing out the 
interdependency of factories, coordinate communication between factories, and continue 
to agitate for self-management throughout the system.  Castoriadis argues that self-
management across the capitalist system will not occur spontaneously, because the 
system itself acts against these tendencies by isolating workers in one factory from other 
factories and isolating the workers from each other within a single factory.   
Castoriadis argues that a group such as the ILO did not play enough of a role in 
the revolutionary struggle.  Serving as a clearinghouse for information is insufficient.  
However, Lefort raises an important critique of the Socialisme ou Barbarie group: there 
is a very fine line between assisting the working class and directing it.  The development 
of theory itself is, in itself, a method of directing the working class.  The militant in a 
revolutionary organization can never simply place the existing worker struggles into a 
broader theoretical context.  Theorizing is itself a creative form of making/doing that will 
inevitably be the product of the intellectuals own creativity in synthesizing the struggles 
of the workers on the factory floor into a theoretical context.  By simply writing theory, 
one is imposing a constructed meaning on the struggles taking place in the working class, 




to broader theoretical constructs, one assumes that the working class is in fact interested 
in revolution.  Instead, a wage increase may be nothing more than a wage increase.  
Furthermore, Lefort is correct in pointing out the distinction between the workers 
at the factory floor and the intellectuals in a revolutionary organization.  This divide can 
never be fully bridged.  Daniel Mothé, one of the genuinely working class members of 
the group, commented, 
Pour les travailleurs, nos idées sont des sujets constants d’ennuis.  Dès que nous 
voulons former un groupe, faire un journal, un tract, les travailleurs mettent en 
question leur existence, c’est-à-dire leur travail, leurs camarades, leurs rapports 
avec leurs chefs et avec tout qui les entourent.  Nos idées ne peuvent aider les 
travailleurs que lorsque ces derniers veulent agir.128
The stakes for the worker on the factory floor are always higher; it is easy for an 
intellectual to call for revolutionary action, but it is the workers who must actually carry 
it out, threatening their ability to provide for themselves and for their families.  As such, 
there is always a chasm between the workers’ movement and the intellectuals in a 
revolutionary organization.  Lefort was correct to be concerned about this chasm, fearing 
that the Socialisme ou Barbarie group would degrade into a vanguardist organization.  
However, his answer to this dilemma is problematic.  In the end, Castoriadis is correct: if 
one hopes to effect revolutionary change, one must take a more active role and run the 
risk that Lefort points out.  The workers’ movement does exist within a social context 
that will seek to shape and take advantage the struggle.  It is imperative that a 
revolutionary organization such as Socialisme ou Barbarie take a more active role in the 




proletarian struggle to its own political advantage, and the pressure from the 
bureaucratic-capitalist apparatus that pushes for the degradation of the worker to a mere 
cog in the industrial machinery. 
In the years after Lefort left the group, Castoriadis became increasing 
disenchanted with Marxism.  Throughout his years in the group, Castoriadis developed a 
critique of both the Soviet Union and the Western world, arguing that these two systems 
were not as different as other theorists, both on the left and the right, contended.  On the 
surface, the two superpowers appeared as radically different political, economic, social, 
and cultural systems.  Castoriadis argued instead that at the most basic level the United 
States and the Soviet Union both represented a form of bureaucratic capitalism, with a 
fragmented version existing in the West, and a totalitarian one in the Soviet bloc.  For 
Castoriadis, the USSR was a class system, where a bureaucracy had taken the place of the 
bourgeoisie.  However, his views differed from Trotskyism in that he did not believe that 
this bureaucracy had been grafted on to an otherwise revolutionary system.  Rather, he 
argued that the bureaucratic class represented a key aspect of a Leninist system 
dominated by a single political party primarily interested in maintaining power.  
Castoriadis’ perspective on the Cold War was one of the central ideas that differentiated 
Socialisme ou Barbarie from other leftist groups in France, placing it opposition both to 
the orthodox Marxism of the PCF and the capitalism of the French establishment.  This 
critique represented one of Castoriadis’ most important contributions to leftist political 
thought, and would eventually contribute to his eventually rejection of Marxism itself. 
In the 1960's, Castoriadis published Marxism and Revolutionary Theory, which 




had questioned several particular elements of Marxist theory, such as the crisis of 
capitalist overproduction, the idea of pauperization of the working class, and the idea that 
the means of production could be seized and used for socialist goals.129   By the early 
1960’s, Castoriadis called the entire Marxist project into question, arguing that it was no 
longer a useful tool for the revolutionary project.130  On the most superficial level, 
Marxism had devolved into an ideological system, unconnected to the social-historical 
developments that had occurred within the capitalist West since the nineteenth century.  
The Orthodox Marxists still spoke in terms of the crisis of overproduction, the 
immiseration of the proletariat, and the inevitability of the capitalism’s collapse.  
However, by the mid-twentieth century, capitalism had evolved into bureaucratic-
capitalism and had addressed many of the criticisms Marx had discussed.  Furthermore, 
the bureaucratic-capitalist system was capable of harnessing the workers’ struggle in 
order to reproduce itself institutionally.  As such, ideological Marxism was disconnected 
from the reality of the workers’ struggle.   
More importantly, Castoriadis asserted that Marxism as a theory served a counter-
revolutionary purpose.  Marx’s economic reductionism neglected the role of the radical 
imaginary and the everyday struggles on the factory floor that did far more to advance the 
cause of proletarian revolution than any theoretical construct could hope to achieve.  
Furthermore, this economic reductionism, according to Castoriadis, was fundamentally 
bureaucratic.  Marx took for granted many of the contestable concepts over which the 
workers’ struggled, accepting the bureaucratic-capitalist framework.  For example, 
Marx’s labor theory of value ignores the contestability of the time clock, accepting the 




bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary, and as such, his theory is unsuitable for a revolutionary 
movement.  Given this fact, it is incorrect to consider Soviet totalitarianism as a 
“perversion” of Marxism.  Rather, one must concede that the roots of the Soviet system 
lie within the theory of Marx himself.  Castoriadis argues that in order to remain 
committed to the workers’ struggle, one must reject Marxism.  The bureaucratic ideology 
attempts to eliminate the everyday in favor of a determined tomorrow.  Furthermore, it 
emphasizes the efficacy of capitalism and rationalization, calling for the further 
development of the productive forces.  These are all elements of Marxist ideology, and 
for Castoriadis, since Marxism participates in capitalist culture it is absurd to use it as a 
tool for revolution.131  This rejection of Marxism would prove to be an important 
contribution both to Castoriadis’ political theory and his appeal to unorthodox leftists in 
France.    
The immediate consequence of Castoriadis’ break with Marxism was another split 
in the Socialisme ou Barbarie group.  After publishing Marxism and Revolutionary 
Theory, another schism arose in the group, this time between Castoriadis and a faction 
led by Jean-Francois Lyotard and Pierre Souyri.  This faction was associated with the 
newspaper Pouvoir Ouvrier, an offshoot of Socialisme ou Barbarie intended for a 
proletarian audience.  The Lyotard faction espoused a more traditional view of Marxist 
revolution, against Castoriadis’ rejection of the theory.  During this time, the schism 
impeded the activities of the group.  By July 1963, the split was final, with the Lyotard 
faction taking over the Pouvoir Ouvrier newspaper and those who remained in the group 




Shortly after the second schism, Castoriadis announced the journal would suspend 
publication, marking the end of the group.  During the early 1960’s, circulation of the 
journal was high, with about 1000 copies sold every issue.  However, Castoriadis was 
disappointed by the lack of feedback on the articles in the journal.  The readers of the 
journal had become passive consumers of ideas, rather than active participants in the 
theoretical project of the group.  Furthermore, during the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, 
many young members rebelled against the older members of the group.  In Castoriadis’ 
estimation, discussions within the group became less coherent, dramatically affecting the 
theoretical output of the organization.  As a result of these two factors, Castoriadis 
decided to dissolve the organization. 
The dissolution of Socialisme ou Barbarie and the group’s failure to reach a wide 
audience should not lead one to dismiss the importance of the group’s work.  From its 
inception, Socialisme ou Barbarie existed in an intellectual environment dominated by 
the orthodox Marxism of the PCF.  As a result, the group was pushed to the margins of 
the intellectual scene, grouped with the numerous other gauchiste elements on the left.  
This marginalization was clearly reflected in the number of people who joined the group 
throughout the 1950's and 1960's.  Socialisme ou Barbarie never exceeded one hundred 
members.  At the height of its influence in 1961, there were eighty-seven militants 
involved in the group.133  However, the contributions of Socialisme ou Barbarie after the 
collapse of the group are more significant.  The student movement of May 1968 owed a 
great deal to the theories expressed in the group’s journal.  In addition, the group=s 
resistance to the orthodox Marxism of the PCF and its intellectual supporters left 




Union.  This allowed both Castoriadis and Lefort to remain committed to political 
engagement while many former Marxists became so-called “new philosophers” in the 
1970's, who rejected politics in any form, and turned instead to an almost total 
resignation to the existing status quo.  Finally, by the 1970’s, French theorists who 
developed an anti-totalitarian philosophy recognized their debt to the Socialisme ou 
Barbarie group.  Francois Furet, for example, secured both Lefort and Castoriadis 
academic positions134, recognizing the important role both these theorists had played in 
the French left’s eventual rejection of Orthodox Marxism and the PCF.  
Post-1968 France 
By 1968, most of the French intellectuals who had once supported the PCF had 
become disillusioned with its subservience to Moscow, its inability to mobilize the 
French proletariat, and its almost complete abandonment of revolutionary tactics and 
goals.  The student uprising in Paris and its environs in 1968 reinvigorated the French 
left, giving new hope to revolutionary goals.  However, the 1968 uprising would come to 
represent a critical turning point for the French left.  The relative failure of the student 
movement would lead many on the French left to a rejection of political action in favor of 
theoretical examinations of French society.  Thus, one can argue that the post-modern 
turn and the development of “new philosophy” are a direct result of the failure of the 
student move to effect significant political change in France.  While there were some 
gains as a result of the movement, such as wage increases, the right-wing victory in the 
June 1968 effectively rolled back the broader potential gains of the May movement.  




that no new social and political basis was created in France from which new ideas might 
grow.”135
Though by 1968, Socialisme ou Barbarie had disbanded, Castoriadis’ work 
exerted a strong influence over certain elements within the uprising.   Daniel Cohn-
Bendit, one of the founders of the March 22nd Movement and a leader in the May 1968 
revolt, had credited Castoriadis as a significant influence on his thought and choice of 
tactics.136  Castoriadis, Lefort, and Edgar Morin published a critical appraisal of the 1968 
movement, wherein the authors argued the student rebellion represented a critical “break” 
(la breche) with previous conceptions of revolution and as an important movement 
against advanced capitalist societies.  The student movement rebelled against the 
university system as a bureaucratized institution, concerned only with producing future 
workers.  Furthermore, the movement was a revolt against the stagnation and 
conservatism of the PCF, viewed as a force for reaction, rather than revolution.137
The PCF proved the radical students’ charge that it was a corrupt and ossified 
organization through it reaction to the uprising.  By this point, the PCF had abandoned its 
revolutionary stance vis-à-vis the French state.  Furthermore, the party had lost most of its 
influence among the French working class.  By the time of the student uprising, the PCF 
was still relatively subservient to the CPSU, though it had begun to break with the latter.  
In 1968, the PCF criticized Moscow’s military action against the Prague Spring 
movement in Czechoslovakia.  However, the PCF’s political ideology remained 
resolutely Stalinist and the party continued its goal of achieving political power, even at 
the expense of the workers’ movement.  In 1968, the PCF refused to endorse or provide 




Gaullist regime against the students, and denounced the gauchiste elements in the 
uprising as adventurists, in part proving one of the primary criticisms of the PCF, namely 
that it was a bureaucratized, reformist party.  The most the PCF was willing to concede 
was that students could serve as natural allies to the proletariat, but could not be part of 
any revolutionary struggle, as they were isolated from the production process.138  Roger 
Garaudy was one of the few political theorists within the PCF to support the student 
movement, urging the rest of the PCF to follow his lead, arguing that the time of 
“official” theory was over, and the PCF had to embrace pluralism.  Garaudy eventually 
broke with the PCF as a result of the Party’s failure to support the student uprising and 
the PCF’s tepid condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslavika.139  As the 
example of 1968 illustrates, the PCF had become an ossified organization, unable to 
recognize a potentially revolutionary situation.  The students’ demands did not fall within 
the categories of Orthodox Marxism, as the student movement revolted against the 
stagnation of life in an affluent, advanced capitalist society.  As such, the PCF had no 
frame of reference to even consider such demands as revolutionary ones.  Instead, they 
turned to traditional Marxist orthodoxy, wherein university students have no place as 
revolutionary subjects and where the revolution must wait for the proper historical 
situation, making their judgment according to this orthodox ideology.    
The 1968 revolt expressed many of the concerns about life in an affluent society, 
but politically, the uprising effected little change.  Support for de Gaulle remained high, 
as evidenced by the thousands who marched in support of the government against the 
student uprising and by the later electoral victories of the Gaullist party.140  However, the 




felt as they struggled to live meaningful lives in an advanced capitalist society.  The 
reaction of the French working class to the 1968 uprising also revealed the bankruptcy of 
traditional Marxist theories of revolutionary action.  Other than a few solidarity strikes 
and factory occupations by more radical elements in the working class, the French 
proletariat did very little to support or further the demands of the student movement.  
Castoriadis argued that in this context, the industrial French proletariat represented a 
passive, lumbering rearguard of the revolutionary movement.  Few workers went on 
strike and those who did followed the lead of the union bureaucracies.  While refusing to 
condemn the French working class, Castoriadis argued that one of the biggest mistakes 
the student movement had made was to continue to adhere to its workerist mythology.141  
Furthermore, this fact reconfirmed Castoriadis’ rejection of Marxist theory, as he argued 
that revolutionaries should not privilege the industrial working class, or any particular 
class, as a privileged revolutionary subject.  The failure of the student movement further 
confirmed Castoriadis’ contention that revolutionary organizations were needed to place 
action on the street into a theoretical context.  One of Castoriadis’ main criticisms of the 
student movement was that it was too disorganized, incapable of moving beyond street 
level action by students and connecting their struggle to the broader struggle of the 
society against bureaucratic-capitalist institutions.  Despite these criticisms, Castoriadis 
argued that the student movement illustrated the possibility and importance of resisting 
the bureaucratic-capitalist apparatus, even in an advanced capitalist society where the 
necessities of life are essentially provided for by the system. 
 After the failure of the student revolt, a sea-change occurred on the left as many 




politics as a whole.  Castoriadis levels harsh criticism against those who abandon politics, 
writing that the postmodern turn in French thought represents a capitulation to 
bureaucratic capitalist institutions. Postmodernism, in Castoriadis’ estimation, is a fad 
that offers nothing that could lead to any greater understanding of the world or help to 
change it.  Castoriadis argues, “The value of postmodernism as ‘theory’ is that it mirrors 
the prevailing trends.  Its misery is that it simply rationalizes them through a high-brow 
apologetics of conformity and banality.  Complacently mixed up with loose, but 
fashionable talk about ‘pluralism’ and ‘respect for the difference of the other’, it ends up 
glorifying eclecticism, covering up sterility, and providing a generalized version of the 
‘anything goes principle’.”142  In general, while certain postmodern theorists offer 
interesting examinations of social relations and institutions, they fail to develop any 
political program to address the critiques they make.  “L’image la plus claire de cette 
situation est fournie par les ‘théories du postmodernisme,’ qui sont l’expression la plus 
nette, je dirais le plus cynique, du refus (ou de l’incapacité) de mettre en question la 
situation actuelle.”143  The term “postmodern” cannot define the present period, but it 
express well “the pathetic inability of the epoch to conceive of itself as something 
positive.”144  According to Castoriadis, postmodernism is simply the latest example of 
intellectuals abandoning their critical function and “enthusiastically adhering to that 
which is there just because it is there.”145  As such, postmodernism lacks any political 
content and is therefore incapable of actually addressing the crisis of meaning that exists 
in instituted-modern society.  In fact, postmodernism contributes to this crisis of meaning 
and the dilapidation that is prevalent in instituted-modern society as a result of its 




postmodernism simply confuses the situation even more by its inability to posit any 
critical method for judging between competing imaginary significations. 
 Worse than the postmodern retreat to the purely theoretical field, however, are the 
theories of the new philosophers, whose resignation to the status quo is total, driven by 
the fear that totalitarian possibilities lurk within any form of political activity.  New 
philosophy emerged as a critique of totalitarianism during the 1970’s in France, partially 
as a reaction to the impending victory of the PCF, by this point considered a totalitarian 
party by much of the mainstream left, in French elections in 1977.  The PCF had allied 
itself with the Socialist Party (PS) and formed the Union of the Left.  French intellectuals 
were concerned that the PCF would seek to take advantage of an electoral victory to 
introduce totalitarian policies in France.  This fear did not manifest after the 1977 
elections, primarily as a result of the PCF’s relationship to the Socialist Party.  In 
municipal elections in 1977, the Union of the Left, an alliance between the Socialist Party 
(PS) and the PCF, united according to a Common Program, won a landslide victory.  
However, the PCF soon demanded a radicalization of the Common Program, not content 
to occupy a subordinate position within the Union.  Intellectuals regarded this as a 
dangerous power play by the PCF, which remained stubbornly Stalinist.  The Socialists 
refused to comply, leading to the breakdown of the Union of the Left, and a right-wing 
victory in the 1978 elections.146  Before the Union of Left self-destructed, however, anti-
totalitarian theorists, calling themselves the “new philosophers” had emerged from the 
debris of post-1968 French left.  Castoriadis vehemently attacked the anti-political 




of any hope of political change in favor of acting “ethically” against the overbearing 
weight of state and social power. 
“New philosophy” was in fact a marketing ploy by the publisher Grasset.  Each of 
the new philosophers promoted one another’s books and the “movement” received a great 
deal of coverage in the cultural press.  “Le Magazine littéraire vigorously promoted the 
books of its owner’s publishing house, to the extent of publishing a flow chart of the 
‘Inter-fluences de la philosophie contemporaine” in which the new philosophers appeared 
as the sole inheritors … of the French philosophical tradition.”147  The new philosophers 
are completely irresponsible politically.  Though they speak out for democracy and 
human rights, they are unable to articulate a political position from which one can assert 
such claims against the existing institutional imaginary.  As such, the new philosophers 
essentially engage in a soliloquy, asserting the importance of individual rights, but 
presenting no possibility for actually defending these rights against the intrusion of 
bureaucratic-capitalist power.   
 Bernard-Henri Levy’s Barbarism with a Human Face presents the typical position 
of the new philosophers.  Levy argues that political action is futile and pointless, given 
the fact that power, and in particular, state power, is a fact of life of every society.  
Political action, according to Levy, can never, and should never, rise above individual 
bohemianism.  “We no longer have a politics, a language, or a recourse.  There remain 
only ethics and moral duty.  There remains only the duty to protest against Marxism, 
since we cannot forget it.”148  To engage in organized political activity is too dangerous, 
as the possibilities of totalitarianism become stronger as people organize to participate in 




intellectual, sitting around the coffee-house decrying the state of society.  Levy’s position 
on the role of the bohemian “revolutionary” is summed up in this statement: 
Yes, we know that the world is subject to the law of the Master, and we do not 
believe that that law will every give way to our desires.  But we will continue to 
think, to think to the end, to think without believing it, the impossible thought of a 
world freed from lordship.  Why so? Fools will ask.  Why persist in what has all 
the appearances of a trap?  Because it is from this place, and from this place 
alone, from this ‘trap’, as you call it, that it is at all possible to hunt down false 
appearances.  And besides, without it, without its unreasonable demands, the 
world would be even worse than we say it is.149
The world, therefore, is a terrible place, and we, the bohemians, will tell you how awful it 
is.  However, we will do nothing to change it because politics is too dangerous an 
endeavor in which to engage.  The rebel knows perfectly well “that rebellion is 
unthinkable inside the real world; that it is foolish to claim that rebellion can be 
socialized, because it is a negation of society, of what makes society livable.”150
 Levy’s critique of political action represents the most irresponsible resignation to 
the instituted-imaginary.  Levy condemns those who seek to challenge the instituted-
imaginary by arguing that, “’realistic’ or ‘progressive’ politics is always reactionary; 
nothing good can come from reality and progress or from their oracular and evergreen 
authorities, nothing that can ever escape from the stifling grip of power.”151  This 
complete resignation to status quo exposes the complete bankruptcy of both new 
philosophy and the instituted-imaginary social-historical context in which it is written.  In 




completely to the bureaucratic-capitalist institutional structure.  To do otherwise, 
according to Levy, is to skirt too close to totalitarianism.  As such, individuals should 
accept their fate and do nothing to change or challenge the instituted-imaginary. 
Such a “philosophy” is completely unacceptable and Castoriadis rightly criticizes 
it.  The choice is not between resignation and totalitarianism.  There is in fact a 
democratic possibility that emerges through the emancipatory potential of the modern 
imaginary.  Levy cannot conceive of this possibility because he revels in bohemianism 
and irresponsibility.  Castoriadis criticizes Bernard Henri-Levy for referring to 
responsibility as the domain of the “flic”.152  In Castoriadis’s estimation, a society must 
consist of mores, rules, and standards.  Without these, the threat of demagoguery 
becomes stronger.  Responsibility is therefore a guard against both totalitarianism and the 
cultural emptiness that is too prevalent in modern Western society.153  A democracy 
requires an ethos of responsibility.  Without it, only the pseudo-truths of the bureaucracy, 
the Church, and the media exist in the public sphere.154  The alternative, according to 
Castoriadis, is for citizens to actively engage in the political sphere, challenging the 
instituted-imaginary and constructing new significations through which a society can 
make sense of its world and the role the individual and the collective can play in this 
world.  When one looks more closely at Castoriadis’ conception of the imaginary, the 
impact of his participation in revolutionary politics becomes clear.  His emphasis on the 
spontaneous creativity of the workers, his insistence on self-management at the factory 
floor, and his critique of bureaucratic systems in the United States and the Soviet Union 
were all expanded and elaborated to form the foundation for the imaginary.  In essence, 




struggles in France and generalized them to create a theory of the origin of social 
institutions and argue for the potential for the creation of an autonomous society. 
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The Imaginary and the Western Political Tradition: Constructing a Framework for 
a Philosophy of the Political 
 The fundamental question Castoriadis explores in his evaluation of the Western 
philosophical tradition is to what extent Western theorists create a philosophical 
possibility for the instauration of the political as a separate sphere of action.  His simple 
answer is this: what links the diverse theorists of the Western tradition is their failure to 
fully account for human creativity and because the role of the radical imaginary is 
covered, the possibility of instaurating the political is closed off.  The political is by 
definition a sphere of creation, requiring openness and an acceptance of uncertainty.  
Western philosophy seeks to provide answers to “big” questions concerning, among other 
things, Being, justice, and good government.  While questions such as these are crucial to 
the philosophical endeavor, the possibility of the political is closed off when philosopher 
seeks to answer such questions definitively.  When philosophers seek to construct closed 
philosophical system the role of the radical imaginary is covered over.  The purpose of 
philosophy is to pose such questions to established institutions, not to answer them 
definitively.  When a philosopher pursues the latter goal, he confines himself to the realm 
of politics, where philosophy is limited to the defense of established institutions or the 
replacement of one alienated instituted imaginary with another.   As such, the political as 
a domain of creation becomes unnecessary, as politics will suffice, given the fact that the 
philosophical system can provide all the answers to whatever question we may pose to 
the instituted imaginary.     
Regardless of whether the philosopher accounts for it, the imaginary always plays 




human capacity to create.  It points to a relationship between human beings and their 
society wherein people both construct and are constructed by social institutions.  The 
imaginary is the source of this capacity to create meaning for the world in which human 
beings exist.  The imaginary “is the unceasing and essentially undetermined (social-
historical and psychical) creation of figures/forms/images on the basis of which alone 
there can ever be a question of ‘something’.”1  Most importantly, the imaginary underlies 
every existing social institution, whether its role is explicitly posited in the construction 
of institutions or not.  Every social institution is the product of the imaginary.  At the 
heart of every philosophical project, one finds the imaginary.  More importantly, at the 
heart of every social institution one finds the imaginary.    
The Construction of Meaning from the Meaningless 
“Man is a being that seeks meaning and that, for that purpose, creates it.”2  
Castoriadis contends that no inherent or objective meaning exists in the world, but rather 
human beings create meaning in order to organize and make sense of the world.  This 
idea contradicts one significant trend in the Western tradition that posits an underlying, 
universal mode of Being that characterizes the world and determines modes of being-in-
the-world.  In essence, philosophers who adhere to this position argue that an underlying 
order exists in the world itself that shapes society and human relationships.  While 
philosophers of the Western tradition disagree on the extent to which the world is 
determined by an inherent Being, what links these variations is an assertion that this 
underlying order exists beyond what is immediately apparent to human perception.  
Furthermore, these theorists argue that this underlying order can be discovered and 




therefore be used to “correctly” govern human interaction, both between individuals and 
between the individual and societal structures.  Thus, the knowledge of Being can be 
reliably employed to guide human action.  From this perspective, “to be” is “to be 
determined.”  Human social existence is linked to and determined by a broader, 
metaphysical mode of Being.  Philosophers who posit an inherent meaning (defined 
according to a broader concept of Being) to the world seek to ground the capacity to 
understand the world in this mode of Being.  The human capacity to understand the world 
is determined according to, and limited by, a mode of Being that exists prior to any 
particular society.   
The most significant manifestation of this concept of Being as an order underlying 
human society is present in the work of Plato and Martin Heidegger, both of whom argue 
that there is a “hidden” meaning in the world, accessible only to the privileged few.  Both 
Plato and Heidegger argue that if such a higher order exists in the face of a flawed or 
inauthentic existence, the only logical goal of human beings should be to strive to achieve 
a form of society determined by the ideals of this higher truth.  Since a higher truth 
already exists, and the only question is how to alter political institutions in order to 
conform to it, society need only be governed through politics, and the possibility of the 
political is removed completely from human endeavor.  These visions of Being as a 
hidden Truth are the most dangerous ontological positions, as they completely eliminate 
the possibility of the political.  The danger of this mode of thinking is that to assume 
there is an inherent meaning in the world leads one to the conclusion that there is a 
“True” way of shaping human relationships and humans’ relationship to the world.  What 




for the construction of social institutions, one removes human creativity completely from 
the equation.  According to such theorists, the ideal society is predetermined by the very 
fact that a hidden “Truth” exists, underlying the world of appearance. 
Plato’s allegory of the cave posits both the possibility of understanding this 
hidden Being and the role such an understanding can play in guiding human action and 
shaping social institutions.  According to Plato, those who are trapped in the proverbial 
cave are only capable of sensory interaction with the world.  As a result, they are easily 
convinced that the shadows they see projected on the wall in front of them are real.  
However, the senses are poor guides to understanding Truth and one cannot achieve 
knowledge (episteme) through everyday interaction with the material world.3  Guiding 
Plato throughout the entire body of his work is the theory of the forms as a higher mode 
of Being, from which the reality around us, our sensory reality, is derived, though 
ultimately as a pale shadow of its respective form.4  The average person, and, more 
significantly for Plato’s anti-democratic project, the average citizen, is guided solely by 
opinion (doxa), unaware that there is something beyond the shadows they see on the wall.  
Thus, according to Plato, any form of democratic governance is inherently flawed, due to 
the fact that the citizenry is incapable of making decisions based on true knowledge 
(episteme).  Only the philosopher, who devotes his life to knowledge, is able to escape 
the cave and understand reality and the forms from which reality is derived.  For Plato, 
the philosopher, who is able to understand Truth, should rule the state, given the fact that 
only the philosopher-king is capable of understanding the Form of the Good and using it 
to create and govern his state.5  Though Plato recognizes that the philosopher-king is an 




him, Plato’s political project throughout the Republic and other works such as the Laws 
represents an attempt to institute as closely as possible the ideal state posited in the 
Republic.  Plato constructs a regimented hierarchical society based on his theory of the 
forms, wherein human society is derived from a Form of the Good.  For Plato, societies 
can be judged based on how far degraded they are from this Form of the Good.6  
Furthermore, Plato’s intention is to undermine the democratic polis of Athens by 
attacking the philosophical basis of the political.  The Athenian political system relies on 
the idea that doxa guides individual decision-making in the political sphere.  Within the 
context of the democratic Assembly, a rough consensus on what the best policies for the 
city-state can be achieved through democratic debate.  By degrading doxa to “mere” 
opinion, Plato completely undermines the democratic decision-making process.  
According to Castoriadis, Plato is the first philosopher to leave the polis, but still seeks to 
dictate its laws, ignoring the instituting imaginary of the citizens who remain.7  If there is 
a Form of the Good and if the philosopher-king can discover it and rule according to its 
dictates then democracy is unnecessary.  The philosopher-king can lead the state and the 
people can keep their “mere” opinions to themselves.  According to Plato, only when the 
philosopher-king rules according to his “special” knowledge (episteme) can a society 
progress towards the ideal form of government as dictated by the Form of the Good.  Any 
other form of government, such as a democratic one, is degraded and incapable of 
achieving the Good. 
 Similarly, Martin Heidegger advances an idea of Being as a “hidden truth” that is 
concealed from the majority of those living within a particular society.  According to 




and reflecting upon the question of Being.  However, Heidegger further argues that 
reflecting on this question of Being is impeded by the fact that Da-sein lives among 
others in a world constructed in such a way that Da-sein’s Being is covered over by other 
modes of being.  Heidegger characterizes Da-sein’s everyday mode of being as being-
thrown into an inauthentic they-self.  “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself.  The 
they, which supplies the answer to the who of everyday Da-sein, is the nobody to whom 
every Da-sein has always already surrendered itself, in its being-among-one-another.”8  
The they-self exerts a powerful, constitutive influence over Da-sein’s everyday mode of 
being, in that this condition of thrownness and being-among-others creates a world 
defined by the impossibility of living authentically.  “As everyday being-with-one-
another, Da-Sein stands in subservience to the others.  It itself is not; the others have 
taken its being away from it.”9  As such, Da-sein’s potentiality is restricted by the fact 
that the existence of others in the they-self serves to cover over the Being of Da-sein; the 
they-self creates an inauthentic world where each Da-sein is cut off from its own 
potentiality.  In this manner, Da-sein falls prey to a world constructed by the they-self.  
“Falling prey to the ‘world’ means being absorbed in being-with-one-another as it is 
guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.”10  Heidegger posits that Da-Sein must 
begin reflection on Being from a starting point of being-thrown, where Being is covered 
over by the inauthenticity of being-among-others and Da-sein is absorbed into the they 
self.   
The reflection on Being begins through glimpses of Being that arise from feelings 
of Angst, where Da-sein’s potentiality-for-being is briefly revealed despite the fact that 




the-world; that about which we have Angst is thrown being-in-the-world; that for which 
we have Angst is our potentiality-for-being-in-the-world.”11  Da-sein catches a glimpse of 
Being and the potential for authenticity through these feelings of Angst, opening the 
possibility for reflection on the inauthentic being of the they-self.  Heidegger argues that 
the seeking to discover authentic Being against the inauthentic being of the they-self can 
be a daunting and lonely task.  In Heidegger’s estimation, it is fully possible to live 
inauthentically without ever reflecting upon the glimpse of Being revealed by Angst.  
Inauthentic being is tempting and tranquilizing, but it leads to an uninhibited “busyness” 
not stagnation.  An inauthentic society can be a thriving, active, and dynamic one, 
though, according to Heidegger, one that will never rise above the idle chatter and 
meaningless busyness that is characteristic of Da-sein’s being-thrown.  Concerned with 
this busyness, the right questions about Da-sein are never asked.  This entanglement in 
the world leads to alienation, closing off the possibility of authenticity.12  As a result, the 
potential for discovering Being is impeded by the constant presence of the they-self and 
the idle talk that characterizes the discourse of the they-self.   
What is significant here is that Heidegger characterizes idle talk as public 
discourse, the discourse that occurs through the groundless understanding of everyday 
Da-sein.  As such, this form of public discourse is incapable of understanding 
innerworldly beings.13  Heidegger’s characterization of public discourse as the idle 
chatter of the they reveals his anti-democratic political stance.  If one accepts Heidegger’s 
argument that the everyday mode of being of Da-sein is characterized by being-thrown 
into the they self, and furthermore, if one accepts that the only discourse possible in the 




form of government.  Public discourse as idle chatter condemns democratic forms of 
government, in that democracy relies solely on “idle chatter”, the “inauthentic” public 
discourse of citizens seeking to achieve some political goal.  If this discourse is 
inauthentic, it will consistently cover over the hidden “Truth” of Being.  In this regard, 
Heidegger’s distinction between public discourse as idle chatter and a “higher” form of 
discourse is equivalent to Plato’s distinction between doxa and episteme. 
Heidegger’s anti-democratic position is further illustrated through his discussion 
of the possibility of breaking free from the inauthenticity of the they-self and seeking the 
authentic truth of Being.  The disclosure of Being through feelings of Angst is a private 
affair, in the sense that Da-sein glimpses Being in the privacy of his own mind.  The 
public world of social living with others represents an impediment to such glimpse of 
Being; feelings of Angst can be easily dispelled once Da-sein immerses himself in the 
busyness of the they.  Angst forces Da-sein to make a decision: retreat into the being-
thrown of the they-self or heed the call of conscience that arises from these glimpses of 
Being.  The retreat from Being is easy, as Da-sein becomes lost in the they self.  “Losing 
itself in the publicness of the they and its idle talk, it fails to hear its own self in listening 
to the they-self.  If Da-sein is to be brought back from this lostness of failing to hear 
itself, it must first be able to find itself, to find itself as something that has failed to hear 
itself and continues to do so in listening to the they.”14  According to Heidegger, only the 
few will be capable of such a task, because the they-self exerts such a powerful influence 
over the typical individual.  Da-sein can begin to find itself through the call of 
conscience, a form of discourse that summons Da-sein to itself.  The call of conscience as 




collapses.15  “The summons calls back by calling forth: forth to the possibility of taking 
over in existence the thrown being that it is, back to thrownness in order to understand it 
as the null ground that it has to take up into existence.”16  The call of conscience is an 
elitist discourse, available only to the few.  While these few will undertake this 
examination of their own being, the rest of the world, thrown into the they self, will 
continue living inauthentically. 
 Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity is inherently anti-democratic, setting apart 
a chosen few who are “superior” to all those who continue to wallow in the inauthenticity 
of the they.  Politically, this can only lead to proto-totalitarian or totalitarian political 
systems.  Philosophers who posit the concept of a “hidden truth” accessible only to an 
elite reject the democratic decision-making potential that exists within each particular 
society, limiting autonomy to the select few while denying this capacity to the majority of 
the collective.  Heidegger’s vision of authentic life cannot be achieved through 
democratic decision-making.  Rather, the authentic Da-Sein exists as a Nietzschean 
superman, standing above the idle chatter of the they, able to live in accordance with true 
Being.  In this manner, Heidegger differs little from the Platonic conception of the 
philosopher-king.  What is most dangerous about Heidegger’s ontology is that he never 
makes a connection between the individual living authentically and the type of 
government that would exist in an authentic society other than the implicit rejection of 
democracy.  As a result, Heidegger’s support for the Nazi regime in Germany is not 
surprising and does not represent a distortion of his philosophical position.  There is no 
indication in Being and Time that Nazi ideology does not present an “authentic” 




The problem of authenticity also emerges in the work of Herbert Marcuse, who 
attempts to attribute a revolutionary political content to this idea.  Marcuse argues that the 
industrial proletariat is no longer a revolutionary subject, thus forcing a reconsideration 
of the nature of late modern society and the possibilities for social and political change.  
Late capitalism, according to Marcuse, has successfully stupefied the industrial 
proletariat by providing a higher standard of living to this class.  Advanced capitalist 
society can “deliver the goods” to the masses, such that the average worker is able to live 
a comfortable life, not questioning the oppressive aspects of the existing economic 
system.  As a result, Marcuse concludes that the traditional Marxist category of the 
proletariat no longer exists as a negation of the system; revolution will not arise from the 
industrial proletariat.  Liberation, according to Marcuse, requires a consciousness of 
servitude on the part of the individual, which is hindered by the replacement of “true” 
needs by the “false” ones promoted through the culture industry.17  In this regard, 
Marcuse recognizes the dynamic nature of capitalism and the system’s capacity to adapt 
to changing social-historical circumstances.  However, his solution to this dilemma relies 
too greatly on the possibility of discovering an authentic revolutionary subject that is 
capable of distinguishing between “true” needs and “false” ones. 
Marcuse argues that the culture industry in late capitalist societies creates a set of 
“false” needs and convinces those living in that society that the fulfillment of these needs 
is essential to their survival.  However, such “false” needs only serve the purpose of 
reinforcing the dominance of the capitalist system.  “No matter how much he identifies 
himself with them and finds himself in their satisfaction, they continue to be what they 




repression.”18  The construction of these “false” needs creates a situation where the 
possibilities of political and social change are blocked.  Marcuse defines “utopian” not as 
that which no longer has a place in historical universe, but rather the range of possibilities 
that are blocked by established society.  He argues that utopian possibilities are inherent 
in the technology of advanced capitalism; global poverty could be completely eliminated 
if the technological structure of capitalist society were turned toward this purpose.19  
However, capitalist society blocks this possibility by burying human potential through the 
construction of false needs.  
The distinction between “true” and “false” needs is a dangerous one that carries 
anti-democratic possibilities.  First, who determines what needs are “true” and which are 
“false”?  Marcuse argues that “the only needs that have an unqualified claim for 
satisfaction are the vital ones – nourishment, clothing, lodging at the attainable level of 
culture.”20  If this is the definition of “true” needs, it reduces political and social life to a 
state of bare existence, where survival itself becomes the purpose of collective living.  
Second, because Marcuse argues that the industrial proletariat is stupefied by the “false” 
needs created by the culture industry, an authentic revolutionary subject must be found 
elsewhere.  If the definition of “true” needs depends on the needs of this revolutionary 
subject, the anti-democratic dangers of this distinction increase.  Any revolutionary 
subject will have a particular set of needs and interests, which might conflict with the 
needs and interests of other groups in the society.  Thus, if the revolutionary subject’s 
needs are “true” needs, there is nothing to prevent them from enforcing this definition of 




ones falls into the same anti-democratic category as Heidegger’s conception of 
“authenticity” and “inauthenticity”.   
Marcuse’s emphasis on needs eliminates the possibility of the political, 
concerning itself solely with politics.  If it were possible to truly distinguish between 
“true” and “false” needs, the only purpose for political association would be to create the 
social institutions necessary to distribute the “true” needs to the society in question.  
While Marcuse certainly intends to address the malaise that affects late capitalist 
societies, the artificial distinction between “true” and “false” needs, and the inherent anti-
democratic possibilities that this distinction carries, is an inappropriate framework for 
effecting political change.  Furthermore, Marcuse’s emphasis on needs leads him, and 
many other radical theorists, to a futile search for an authentic revolutionary subject.  For 
example, in the Essay on Liberation, argues that the African-American population 
represents the best hope for an authentic revolutionary subject in the United States.21  
Other radical theorists looked to the Third World to find this revolutionary subject.  What 
none of these theorists recognize is the possibility that if the culture industry is so 
powerful, able to alter a person’s identity and redefine her needs, it is fully possible that 
late capitalism can “buy off” everyone.   
A philosophical framework for the political must, first and foremost, reject any 
concept of an inherent truth that underlies the world.  Castoriadis wholly rejects the 
theory that a universal mode of Being underlies the world and that this Being differs from 
the manner in which we experience the world.  Instead, human beings create meaning for 
the world in which they live through the imaginary.  Castoriadis argues that human 




forms of life on this planet.  Unlike other animals, which will respond with fixed routines 
to specific stimuli, human beings are capable of responding in different ways to the same 
stimuli and, more importantly, are able to construct completely new responses to these 
stimuli.22  The imaginary is at the heart of every human endeavor to understand and 
construct meaning for the world.  However, the imaginary has no content and determines 
nothing; meaning as such is in no way derived from the imaginary in a deterministic 
manner.  It is only through the imaginary that one can even conceive of “content” and 
“determinacy”, which are posited in the form of social imaginary significations.23  When 
a society constructs meaning for itself, it takes the form of the social imaginary 
signification that structure representations of the world in general, which are specific to 
each society; define the limits of action by imposing what can and cannot be done, and 
what is good and what is bad; and finally, “elles établissent les types d’affects 
caractéristiques d’une société.”24  Castoriadis’s response to Plato and Heidegger is that 
there is no “hidden truth” underlying the world as it is presented to us through doxa, in 
Plato’s case, or through the “they” self, in Heidegger’s.  No Truth or Being underlies any 
society.  Social existence is about the construction of truths and beings through the 
mechanism of the radical imaginary.   
Castoriadis makes the following “dogmatic” assertion about Being: “’Being’ is 
not a system, is not a system of systems, and it is not a great chain.  Being is abyss, or 
chaos, or the groundless.”25  “To be” therefore does not imply “to be determined”.  The 
mode of Being as chaos and groundlessness cannot lead to any particular mode of being.  
Rather, Being-as-chaos posits a multiplicity of modes of being, expressed through 




groundlessness, but it is also creation.  It is a vis formandi (a power of formation) which 
is not predetermined and which superimposes on chaos a world that is ordered in some 
way.  Vis formandi is accompanied by a libido formandi, a desire for formation.26  
Human beings living in any society desire to make sense of their relationship to one 
another and to the world around them.  In order to accomplish this, they construct 
meaning for the world around them and their society’s place in that world by positing 
social imaginary significations.   
 The role of imaginary significations is to posit an answer for the questions 
society raises in articulating itself.  It is in the doing of each collectivity that these 
answers are embodied.27  Thus, within every society there is a constant and continual 
positing of social imaginary significations in order to come to terms with and create an 
order for the world.  These significations impose an order on the world and serve as the 
cornerstone for the construction of every social institution.  Being, therefore, is posited by 
those living in a society.  Order does not emerge from an extra-social source, but rather it 
is imposed on chaos by the creative capacity of those living in society.  “Being” and 
“being determined” both represent the result of the imposition of a particular meaning at 
a particular time by a particular society. 
The set of possible social imaginary significations is not infinite.  The first natural 
stratum, the natural world, imposes limitations on the imaginary.28  One cannot, for 
example, seriously posit that world hunger can be solved through the magical conjuration 
of enough food to feed the entire human race.  Or, one cannot be born male and become a 




first natural stratum.  As such, the natural world imposes limitations on the possible set of 
imaginary significations that can be constructed within a particular society. 
The first natural stratum in no way determines the social imaginary.  A cross-
cultural examination will quickly reveal that societies have diverse methods by which 
they organize the world.  This diversity of social imaginaries can be understood through 
an examination of how a society incorporates these limits into its social imaginary.  For 
example, human subjects living in a particular society endow physical objects and the 
processes that govern them with meaning through the exercise of the imaginary.  Objects 
in the physical world simply exist; they carry no ontological meaning or being-in-
themselves.  It is only through the collective imaginary that objects have any meaning in 
the world; ontological being is created by placing objects in a social relationship with the 
rest of the world.  By placing objects into a social relationship, the limitations imposed by 
the first natural stratum become embedded in the institutions that exist within the society.  
While these limitations are significant, they in no way determine the form the instituted 
imaginary will take.  For example, determinacy, especially in the form of “scientific 
laws”, exists to some extent in the first natural stratum, and this can serve as a limitation 
on human action.  The laws of gravity, conservation of energy, inertia, and other laws of 
physics are objectively true.  These are facts of the natural world, governing cause and 
effect relationship that are always true and we cannot break them through force of will.  
However, scientific laws in themselves carry no social meaning.  Their meaning, as well 
as the meaning of the limitations they impose is constructed through the imaginary.  The 
form these limitations take is expressed by the instituted imaginary of the particular 




historical context does the determinacy that exists have any ontological meaning.  Max 
Weber argues that science is based on certain presuppositions, the most important of 
which is that science itself is a worthwhile pursuit and actually contributes something to 
the world.  He writes, “No science is absolutely free from presuppositions, and no science 
can prove its fundamental value to the man who rejects these presuppositions.”30  Thus, 
the real question one must examine is this: “In what kind of society does this have any 
meaning for human beings?”  The first law of thermodynamics has no meaning for a pre-
modern society, even if one were to tell them and demonstrate it in some way.  For 
people in such a society, thermodynamics has no relevance to their social institutions or 
their lives, and as such, does not play a part in that society’s social imaginary.  The 
foundation of the pre-modern world is most often magic or mythology, with the gods 
setting limits on human society, making such physical laws irrelevant.  Thermodynamics 
does have meaning for a modern society founded on the centrality of science and the 
importance of knowing the processes of the physical world.  Modern societies posit 
themselves as relying on science in order to insure progress and development in every 
sphere of life.  As a result, thermodynamics and scientific laws in general have 
significance because they are relied upon to explain and give meaning to the world in 
which the society is situated.  However, in modern societies, these scientific laws do not 
determine the form the existing social institutions will take.  Determinism is always 
fragmentary; it is a partial dynamic that allows the discovery or positing of causal laws, 
but these laws in no way determine the form social institutions will take in any particular 




creativity, where the partial determinism that exists in the natural world in incorporated in 
a system of meaning through the construction of social institutions.   
In addition to accounting for the limitations imposed by the first natural stratum, 
social imaginary significations also draw from the existing social imaginary in any given 
society.  Each social imaginary signification consists of an ensemblist-identitary, or 
ensidic, dimension, which makes the signification comprehensible to other members of a 
particular society.32  The ensidic dimension represents constraints imposed by the society 
delimiting a domain within which a signification must fall in order to be coherent.  
Within this ensidic dimension are two components.  The first is legein, which Castoriadis 
describes as “distinguish-choose-posit-assemble-count-speak.”33  Language is the 
primary instrument of legein; in order for a social imaginary signification to have any 
coherence, it must be able to be communicated from one person to another within a 
particular society.  The second aspect of the ensidic dimension is teukhein or 
“assembling-adjusting-making-constructing”34 which takes into account common ways of 
doing in a society.  Legein and teukhein have been accurately described as “îles de 
determinité dans une mer d’indeterminité.”35  They represent partial dynamics through 
which determinism can be posited.  However, they cannot be integrated to form a 
completely determined system.  To a certain extent, legein and teukhein are fixed, in the 
sense that certain aspects are immutable.  In language, rules of syntax are fixed, limiting 
the possibilities of speech (where speech is conceived as a mode of communication with 
others).  One can violate syntactic rules, but to do so would render speaking 
incomprehensible to others.  Similarly, teukhein limits the individual with regard to what 




In every society, the ensemblist-identitary dimension exists as a magma 
underlying each particular instauration of the instituted-imaginary.36  Magma is an apt 
metaphor, evoking the image of churning molten rock, erupting forth from time to time 
and solidifying once it emerges through the Earth’s crust.  In terms of the imaginary, a 
similar churning, chaotic force underlies social institutions.  No institution can 
encompass the whole of the magma.  As such, the magma always represents a remainder, 
a large set of existing and potential imaginary significations underlying every particular 
instauration of a social institution.  Castoriadis writes, “A magma is that from which one 
can extract (or in which one can construct) an indefinite number of ensemblist 
organizations but which can never be reconstituted (ideally) by a (finite or infinite) 
ensemblist composition of these organizations.”37  Magmas are not pure chaos but, rather 
they represent a different, non-logical organization that underlies each particular 
society.38  Human beings can solidify this magma by creating institutions, drawn in part 
from the magma.  When creating institutions and social imaginary significations, human 
beings draw upon pre-existing knowledge in the form of legein and teukhein.  This 
ensidic knowledge is fragmentary and is therefore not the sole component to the 
signification.  Rather, the ensidic dimension bounds the realm of the possible, allowing 
the signification to be coherent to the whole of the society.  In doing this, the ensidic 
dimension creates a link between the individual’s radical imaginary and the society in 
which that person lives, which allows the separation between fantasy and the social 
imaginary.  For example, if a person were to fantasize a world where people 
communicated through telepathy, this would remain within the realm of the radical 




communication would be incoherent at the social level.  However, if one were to argue 
the idea that existing technology should be used to reduce the duration of the working 
day, this could leave the sphere of fantasy and be understood by the members of a 
technologically advanced capitalist society, and therefore become a part of the social 
imaginary.   
 The positing of a social imaginary signification is a creative act by an individual 
or by a collective.  No signification or institutions simply arises from the ensidic magma 
underlying each particular society.  Rather, every social imaginary signification, and 
consequently every social institution, emerges through a creative act.  The ensidic 
dimension is incomplete, representing partial determinisms that are can only be given 
meaning through their incorporation into a set of social institutions.  This is only possible 
through the poietic dimension, which represents the creative capacity of a particular 
society to attribute and construct meaning for themselves and for the world around 
them.39  Legein and teukhein make the new signification comprehensible to others within 
a particular society, but the social imaginary signification represents a new eidos, created 
ex nihilo.40   The role of the poietic dimension represents the fact that each instauration of 
an institution will represent, in some manner, the creation of a completely new mode of 
organizing the world.  Accepting the creative novelty of each particular mode of 
organizing the world requires a rejection of the idea that an underlying Being or truth 
exists that defines the universe and can be discovered in order to guide the construction 
of social institutions.  If human beings are defined by their ability to create, this thwarts 
any theory of an inherent Truth in the universe.  The poietic dimension, the creative 




insuring that there always is some unknown, unpredictable variable present in the 
instauration of each particular society.   Furthermore, the poietic dimension accounts for 
the diversity of human social imaginaries; “not only is it in and through the institution of 
society that individuals, things, and world exist ... But each society is this particular 
institution, bringing into being this particular magma of social imaginary significations 
and not some other one, in this particular way and not in any other, by means of a given 
socialization of the psyche and not some other.”42  This particularity of social imaginary 
significations requires recognition of the role temporality plays in the instauration of 
social institutions.  To account for the role of time, Castoriadis develops the concept of 
the social-historical.   
Castoriadis’ makes another “dogmatic” assertion concerning the social-historical, 
which links a particular instauration of being with time.  Thus, Castoriadis asserts that 
“being is not only ‘in’ time, but is through (by means of, by virtue of) time.”43  
Furthermore, time is creation.  “Time, properly speaking, is unthinkable without creation; 
otherwise, time would be only a supernumerary fourth spatial dimension.”44  Castoriadis 
argues that philosophical systems that posit Being or an order underlying the social 
universe are ahistorical.  If one accepts that there is a Being beyond human perception, 
one must also accept that this Being is universal and timeless, in the sense that it is an 
unchanging order that determines every society in human history.  Therefore, if Plato is 
correct in his theory of the forms, the Being of ancient Greece is the same as the Being of 
twenty-first century America.  If this were true, one could apply Plato’s political 




Castoriadis rejects the notion that Being is an ahistorical, atemporal universal, 
arguing instead that our understanding of the world changes as new social imaginary 
significations are posited.  What might have made sense two hundred years ago in a 
particular society might be meaningless given contemporary “reality.”  As such, it is 
critical to recognize that our understanding of the world, and the way that we conceive of 
the world, is contingent upon historical conditions.  Castoriadis refers to such conditions 
as the social-historical, recognizing the critical role temporality plays in any society’s 
understanding of itself.  Castoriadis defines the social-historical as “the anonymous 
collective whole, the impersonal-human element that fills every given social formation 
but which also engulfs it, setting each society in the midst of others.”45  As such, the 
social-historical represents the recognition that each instauration of an institution takes 
place within a context of already existing institutions, previously existing institutions, and 
the possibility for the instauration of new institutions, both within the given society and 
in the wider world as a whole, as represented by other societies.  “In short, it is the union 
and the tension of instituting society, and of instituted society, of history made and 
history in the making.”46  The social-historical does not represent “objective” historical 
conditions.  Rather, the social-historical recognizes that each society, in articulating itself 
at any given time, must reconcile its past with its present and its future.  The past of any 
given society casts its shadow over the present and the future of that society, but it does 
not determine the manner in which the society will articulate itself at any given time.  
Rather, the social-historical represents the boundaries of the possible; in articulating 




the social imaginary.  Within these boundaries, however, the second dimension of the 
social imaginary signification, the poietic, creative element, is expressed. 
 At the collective level, if one compares two distinct societies, one will see that 
they will respond to the world around them in different ways.  Given similar social 
conditions, each particular society will construct a different view of the world and their 
place in it.  This will occur despite the fact that the respective societies might face very 
similar conditions.  In these instances, one can see the role the creative plays in the 
construction of meaning for the society in question.  For example, a giant redwood tree is 
a biological entity that exists in certain climates and is characterized by tremendous 
height and size.  Human beings who have seen a redwood, heard of it, or live nearby 
create the ontological meaning of the redwood tree.  This meaning varies according to the 
characteristics of the particular society.  Thus, a pre-modern society, where magic and 
mythology plays a central role, might view a redwood as the home of spirits who play a 
direct role in human life.  For an industrial society, on the other hand, the redwood might 
represent an obstacle to progress, or, conversely, for a modern environmentalist, the tree 
signifies the grandeur of a too quickly vanishing natural world.  In a desert society, the 
giant redwood would have no significance at all.  None of these meanings are inherent to 
the redwood, but rather are created by human beings through the exercise of the 
imaginary. 
Over time, the responses of a particular society to the same stimuli will also 
change, given the particular social-historical conditions facing that society.  The social-
historical contains non-causal elements as elements of its essential moments.  These non-




typical behavior by individuals at any given time, which introduces uncertainty into the 
system.  The second is creativity, which introduces the positing of completely new forms 
and types of behavior.47  Thus, in accounting for the role the human creativity plays in the 
construction of institutions, one must also account for time.  Social-historical conditions 
impact the manner in which human beings living in a particular society organize and 
understand the world.  As time progresses, new conditions in the world arise, and the 
response by the collective will also change.  Furthermore, the collective may respond to 
the same conditions in a new manner, thus introducing uncertainty into the manner in 
which the established institutions organize and make sense of the world.   
 It is important to recognize that the ensidic and poietical dimensions are not 
discrete and cannot be completely separated from one another.  Furthermore, the ensidic 
and poietical are tied to the particular social-historical circumstances that are present 
within a society.  Ensidic logic is not a collection of immutable “Truths” serving as a 
foundation for creative activity.  Legein and teukhein are the result of human creativity in 
the sense that both are social institutions.  Legein and teukhein are not a priori to human 
making/doing; at some point in time, they were created and continue to be altered 
through the instituting imaginary.48  The Internet, both as a word and a tool, is a good 
example of this.  Twenty years ago, if a person were to say “Internet”, most people would 
not know what he was talking about.  Today, this word has become common parlance, 
often across adapted across diverse languages.  Furthermore, it has become a standard 
tool for carrying out various practices, from business to information gathering and 
dissemination.  In this way, the Internet, as a word and as a tool, has become part of 




Internet as a social imaginary signification.  If a person has never seen a computer, the 
Internet is meaningless to him.  Furthermore, any and all social imaginary significations 
that include the Internet in its ensidic context would be incoherent to this person.  In a 
society where computers are present, the Internet has ensidic meaning, in that each 
person knows what the Internet is and recognizes the word and its function as a tool, even 
if he has never himself used it.  Furthermore, in such a society, the Internet has a poietical 
meaning.  While the Internet is part of legein and teukhein, its meaning goes far beyond 
the ensidic dimension.  The Internet as an imaginary signification, for example, posits the 
possibility and the desirability of a more integrated global system. 
The Individual and Subjectivity  
 Having established that the world around him is given meaning only through the 
creativity of the human subject, the next question must concern the subjectivity of the 
individual himself.  The question posed here is, “Does an individual qua individual 
possess any inherent characteristics, and, if so, how do these characteristics influence the 
manner in which the individual agent interacts with the world?”  Many theorists of the 
Western tradition, particularly social-contractarians like John Locke, found their 
philosophical systems on the subjectivity of the individual, creating a division between 
the subject, the autonomous individual, and the object, the world with which the subject 
interacts as the objective target of human subjectivity.  According to these theorists, the 
individual subject qua subject has meaning and an inherent Being while the world of 
things in which she lives only has meaning insofar as the subject interacts with it. 
For example, Locke’s labor theory of value posits a subject-object relationship 




foundation of Locke’s philosophy is his belief that human beings are inherently rational 
creatures whose primary motivation is individual self-interest.  Because of their essential 
rationality, humans are able to discover and obey natural laws, which guarantee relative 
peace in the state of nature.49  The state of nature is characterized as one of plenty, where 
God has provided ample sustenance, so long as men are willing to work to acquire it.  
Locke writes that “God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for 
their benefit and the greatest convenience of life they were capable to draw from it, it 
cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated.”50  The 
material world exists as a storehouse of raw material that enables human beings to 
express their fundamental nature as rational, self-interested laborers.  The material world 
is reduced to the position of mere object, the target of the human subject’s making/doing.  
The only agent with inherent meaning in the world is the human subject, and the 
objective world exists to allow this subject to express his subjectivity.  Locke removes 
any independent meaning from the objective world.  Therefore, the object’s value and 
meaning is completely dependent upon the action of the subject.  Furthermore, objects 
are drawn into the subjective world through labor, where they are endowed with “value”.  
The “meaning” of these objects is restricted solely to the instrumental calculus of value.  
The tree becomes lumber which is assessed an exchange value in the market and which is 
then used to purchase various goods and services for the individual.  No other meaning is 
attributed to these objects that are brought into the subjective world beyond their use-
value for the individual subject.  What remains in the material world unworked retains its 




Philosophical systems such as Locke’s differ significantly from theories that posit 
an underlying order in the world in that the former focuses on the individual agent and 
recognizes, to some degree, the role the individual plays in the construction of social 
institutions.  Social contract theorists, for example, recognize that society itself is a 
construction of its constituent members, though they posit this creation as a single event, 
the “signing” of the social contract.  This differs greatly from Plato’s conception of an 
organic society, where each individual plays a prescribed role in an already existing 
social order.  As such, theorists such as Locke move closer to the possibility of 
instaurating the political, in the sense that these theorists recognize and posit an active 
role for the human subject.  However, a serious flaw exists in this view of the individual 
subject in that the characteristics of the individual are posited as a foundation from which 
the organization of the world can be derived.  Social contractarians argue in favor of the 
individual as the prime mover in the world.  Such theories posit that if the individual is 
inherently X, then the world must logically be organized according to this characteristic 
in order to best express the inherent qualities of the subject.  This view fails to account 
for human creativity, and the possibility of responding in different ways to the external 
world that confront the human subject.  Furthermore, such a view eliminates the necessity 
of the political.  If the world should be organized in a certain way to best express the 
fundamental qualities of the human subject, politics is sufficient to achieve this task.  In 
essence, social contract theorists overvalue the agency of the individual.  What the social 
contract theorists do not recognize is that society is not something created once and for 




constituent members.  Furthermore, they do not recognize the role society itself plays in 
the construction of the individual.  
Karl Marx presents one important critique of the social-contractarian vision of 
subjectivity, arguing that subjectivity itself can be altered by the value given to objects.  
In his critique of the liberal tradition, Karl Marx asserts the important influence of 
“objects” on the social sphere.  This is most evident in his essay “The Power of Money in 
Bourgeois Society.”  In this essay, Marx argues that money, an object in the terms of the 
traditional subject-object dichotomy, in fact plays an important role in the construction of 
social reality.  In Marx’s estimation, money has a magical power to transform human 
beings and human relationships.  He writes, “Money’s properties are my properties and 
essential powers - the properties and powers of its possessor.  Thus, what I am and am 
capable of is by no means determined by my individuality.”51  In essence, Marx reverses 
the subject-object dichotomy, positing that human beings in capitalist society are in fact 
the objects, manipulated and constructed by property and money as a subject.  The 
Marxist tradition is, in part, about the reassertion of subjectivity, through revolution, 
against the objective conditions of capitalism.  What Marx, and other Marxist theorists 
point to, however, is that the world of objects is not simply a world to be manipulated by 
human subjects, but rather it has a powerful influence on the nature and structure of 
human relationships. 
Foundationalism of this sort is ultimately a limited and limiting concept, because 
it essentially restricts the possibilities of the human subject in constructing social 
institutions.  The point of foundationalism is to assert a set of first principles that are 




understanding of the world he intends to examine.52  However, as illustrated above, there 
is no “Truth” underlying the world, hence, first principles are not possible.  If we accept 
that meaning in the world is constructed by those living within a particular society 
through the imaginary, we must reject the deterministic first principles can be discovered 
from which political theory can be deduced.  Foundationalist theories represent the 
construction of a social imaginary framework with which a theorist can attempt to 
understand the world in which he lives.  However, the assertion of first principles carries 
no more Truth than any other social imaginary signification.  Furthermore, the positing of 
founding first principles endangers the possibility for the instauration of the political.  
Foundationalism relies on the exteriority of the theorist, the idea that the theorist can 
stand apart from society and view it from an objective perspective.  The theorist positions 
himself objectively and purports to discover truths about the world or, in the case of the 
social contract theorists, human subjectivity.  Foundationalism is a static perspective, 
assuming that human beings do not change and are not affected by the environment in 
which they live or by others around them.  It is incapable of dealing with anything that 
falls outside its perspective on the world.  What if a person is not rational?  Locke has no 
answer to this but to declare such persons “rebels” and exclude them from civil society 
until they learn how to act rationally.53  As history shows, however, human beings do not 
act the way philosophers believe is in their nature to act.  Furthermore, if one accepts 
foundational principles, there is no need for the political.  A domain of decision-making 
based on the active, democratic participation of citizens is unnecessary if human beings 
do not change.  The answers to political questions are always already answered by theory.  




of which is the construction of “ideal” institutions that reflect the inherent characteristics 
of the human subject.  In practical terms, one these ideal institutions have been created, 
they can limit themselves to the administration of governmental tasks and the distribution 
of public goods.  The institutions themselves need not be challenged, thus eliminating the 
need for the political.   
 The political requires that first principles be subject to the same critique as any 
other social imaginary signification.  Locke, for example, advances a certain argument 
regarding human nature, while Rousseau advances a different one.  Within a political 
domain, neither of these ideas would be taken as “given”, but rather would be open to 
questioning and criticism.  Similarly, any institutions founded upon these first principles 
must also be subject to questioning by the collective.  The institution, and its proponents, 
must defend the legitimacy of the institution and explain why it is appropriate for society 
at a given social-historical point.  If an institution defends itself through recourse to the 
“truth” of a first principle, it is an alienated institution and has removed itself from the 
political sphere. 
Castoriadis responds to foundational theories of the subject by arguing that the 
human subject, and the concept of subjectivity itself, is a product of the prevailing social 
imaginary framework that exists in a particular society.  Subjects exist as subjects and as 
particular subjects through the existing social imaginary significations that have been 
created at a certain time in each particular society.54  Thus, a strong subject emerges in 
societies where the social imaginary posits a central role for the individual.  The modern 
age in Western Europe represents such a social-historical period, where strong individual 




Europe, where the role of the divine occupies a more central role than the individual 
subject, this may not be the case.  Therefore, the critical question in examining the idea of 
subjectivity is to examine the type of society in which the concept of strong subjectivity 
emerges.  The individual subject as a dominant agent is not an inherent attribute of the 
individual human being.  Strong subjectivity is a constructed concept that emerges only 
in societies that posit the individual as an independent, potentially autonomous being.  
Furthermore, Castoriadis argues that a reciprocal relationship exists between human 
beings and the world of things, such that one cannot think of the subject in relation to 
objects.  It is through social imaginary significations that these objects and any 
relationship of reference are made possible.55  Objects are endowed with subjectivity 
when drawn into the magma of social imaginary significations in a given society through 
the creation of meaning for the given object.  These subjective objects become enmeshed 
in the social relations of the particular society and influence the construction of the 
individual through the socialization process.  They are no longer “objects” in the terms of 
the subject-object dichotomy, but rather they exert a powerful influence on the social 
imaginary of a particular society.  At the same time, these subjective objects are in turn 
shaped and re-conceptualized by the human subjects living in the given society, such that 
the meaning attributed to these objects is consistently open to change and questioning.  
Neither, however, dominates the other, but rather the world of things becomes subjective 
through a thing’s incorporation into the imaginary structure of a given society at a 
particular point in time. 
In essence, Castoriadis rejects philosophies that attribute inherent characteristics 




subject outside the context of the society in which she exists.  Therefore, Castoriadis 
argues that one must account for human sociability and the impact this has on the 
construction of the human subject.  In Politics, Aristotle asserts that humans are political 
beings by nature; their nature draws them together to form societies and political 
institutions.56  Aristotle’s philosophy is, in part, the product of Athenian democracy, 
where the citizen played an important role in the governance of the city-state.  As such, 
the Athenian citizen is constructed as a strong subject, capable of influencing the political 
world around him through his own action.  The Athenian is not a citizen by nature; rather 
the Athenian social imaginary constructs the individual citizen as an active participant in 
the democratic system.  Socialized in this manner, the Athenian citizen is more likely to 
play an active role in the political system than if that individual had been born in a 
different social-historical period.  Castoriadis agrees with Aristotle that human beings are 
social, but not because it is ingrained in their nature.  He reverses the relationship 
between human beings and sociability, arguing that each particular society exists before 
the individual is born into it.  Humans do not form societies because of any inherent 
characteristic or nature.  Instead, the history of the human species is a history of social 
living.  Castoriadis asserts that it is absurd to consider the nature of a pre-social man, as 
many political theorists have done.  “Pre-social man” is a contradiction in terms, because 
a pre-social creature would also be pre-human.57  Human beings are human beings solely 
through their participation and integration into a society, so without society there is no 
such thing as a “human being.”  A person is born and socialized into a particular society; 
this is what makes him human.  Given this fact, one can assert that there is no such thing 




a “human nature”, “reason”, or “self-interestedness”.  Instead of the “individual”, 
Castoriadis conceives of humans as “socially fabricated individuals”58, conditioned to act 
and believe a certain way based on the dominant social imaginary significations in their 
particular societies.  The individual as a discrete and essential being does not exist; the 
“individual” is a fabricated product of the particular society into which he or she is born. 
 At the moment of his birth, one cannot consider the infant a human subject.  
Every human being is born insane and unfit for life, completely disconnected from others 
and having no conception of the outside world or even the existence of other beings.59  It 
(and “it” is the appropriate word, since the infant essentially exists in a pre-human state) 
lives as a narcissistic monad, concerned only with the gratification of its desires and 
convinced of its own omnipotence in achieving this goal.60  However, from the moment 
of birth the socialization process, the process of becoming human, begins.  Through the 
process of socialization, the infant is torn from this primal state and becomes a social 
being, a functioning human.  “Socialization is the process whereby the psyche is forced to 
abandon (never fully) its pristine solipsistic meaning for the shaped meanings provided 
by society.”61  This occurs primarily through the infant’s relationship with his mother 
who serves a twofold purpose.  First, she is the means through which the infant gratifies 
its desires.  Second, and more importantly for the socialization process, she acts as a 
representative of the society, embodying the dominant social imaginary significations of 
the society into which the infant is born.62  Socialization progresses through the infant’s 
relationship with its father, who represents an agent completely external to the infant-
mother dyad.  This third party exists as an Other to the infant, forcing it to recognize the 




The socialization process represents a violent break; the infant is torn from its 
narcissistic existence, its psyche is forced to integrate into a social existence.  The psyche 
is forced into socialization through its relation to others, which takes the form of an 
invasion of others as others.64  Socialization “culminates in the social individual, a 
speaking entity that has an identity and a social state, conforms more or less to certain 
rules, pursues certain ends, accepts certain values, and acts according to motivations and 
ways of doing things that are sufficiently stable for its behavior to be, most of the time, 
foreseeable ... for other individuals.”65  Though individuals only become human through 
the socialization process, human beings are not automatons completely determined by 
social institutions.  Social institutions must lean on the remnants of the psychic monadic 
state.  Thus, “the social institution of the individual must make a world exist for the 
psyche as a public and common world.  It cannot absorb the psyche into society.”66  
Thus, while the instituted-imaginary wrenches the infant from it monadic, insane state, it 
must provide a meaningful world to the individual.  In this manner, the social institution 
of a society relies on the madness of the psyche.  The radical imaginary is the source of 
the construction of the social imaginary; as such, it must lead on this creativity, 
constructing a world within which the newly socialized individual can find meaning for 
itself. 
Socialization is not, and cannot be, total.  “Man cannot be extricated from what 
has made him as he is, nor from what, being what he is, he makes.  But neither can he be 
reduced to this.”67  The process of socialization culminates in the creation of a human 
being, capable of living with others and functioning within society.  The goal of society is 




things.68  However a monadic core of the original undifferentiated and unsocialized 
psyche remains.  This unsocialized and unsocializable core is the source of the radical 
imaginary.  The radical imaginary is similar in some ways to Freud’s concept of the id, 
but where Freud emphasizes the darker elements of this primal core of the psyche, 
Castoriadis argues that the radical imaginary is multifaceted with both positive and 
negative aspects.   
According to Freud, the Unconscious is the source of humanity’s most base 
desires and most destructive impulses.  The fundamental human desires of murder, 
cannibalism, and incest emerge from the Unconscious.69  For society to exist, these 
desires must be repressed through the imposition of social rules, one of the earliest of 
which is the taboo against incest.70  The construction of such rules allows for the creation 
of the superego, the element of the psyche responsible for keeping human desire in check.  
The superego employs guilt to punish the individual for even considering acting on these 
base desires.71  For Freud, therefore, there is a fragile balance between civilization and 
human destructiveness, but one that must always be maintained, regardless of the cost to 
the human psyche, in order for people to be able to exist alongside one another.72  For 
example, in The Future of an Illusion Freud argues that religion is a social construction 
whose purpose is to restrain human instincts and provide a meaningful world for the 
individual.  Only through this restraint, which comes in the form of a series of rules, 
internalized in the superego as “sin”, can human beings live together in society.  
Furthermore, the cruelty and suffering that does exist in the world can be explained 
through reference to some form of divine order.73  However, Freud also argues that the 




will be punished in the afterlife for their transgressions in this world.  As a result, 
according to Freud, the world is becoming more chaotic leading to a situation where 
violence and transgression play a central role in both politics and social life as a whole.74  
Freud’s solution to this dilemma is to replace religion with social institutions founded 
upon scientific principles.  In Freud’s view, society would be better off if people 
recognized their fundamental desires and instincts and created institutions based on this 
recognition.75  The significance of Freud’s theory for Castoriadis is that Freud recognizes 
two important aspects of the individual’s relationship to institutions and to the world 
around him.  First, the human subject requires social institutions to provide meaning for 
his own life and for the world in which he exists.  Second, Freud recognizes the tension 
that exists in every society between institutions and the desires of the individuals living in 
that society.  However, a significant point of difference exists between Freud’s theory of 
the Unconscious and Castoriadis’ conception of the imaginary.  Castoriadis does not 
accept Freud’s argument that the Unconscious represents an element of human nature, 
nor does Castoriadis agree that Unconscious desires exist in a wholly antagonistic 
relationship with social institutions.   
Castoriadis recognizes the destructive aspects of the Unconscious in his 
conception of the radical imaginary, but also argues that this unsocialized remnant of pre-
human infancy also represents the source of human creativity.  The creative aspect of the 
radical imaginary is unpredictable and irreducible.  The Unconscious “is determinate in 
its mode of being and in the nature of its manifestations, but it is not determinate in the 
content of what unfolds therein.  In what unfolds therein is emergence, a surging forth.”76  




While these desires exist, the radical imaginary is not reducible to such desires, nor can it 
be characterized solely according to these desires.  The radical imaginary is a far more 
complex vision of the Unconscious than that advanced by Freud, in the sense that the 
radical imaginary gives human beings the capacity to create ex nihilo, to posit something 
that hitherto did not exist.  This capacity is what differentiates human beings from other 
animals.  “The living being goes beyond a simple mechanism because it can provide new 
responses to new situations.  But the historical being goes beyond the simply living being 
because it can provide new responses to the ‘same’ situations or create new situations.”77  
Human beings are capable of more than mimesis; they are able to posit completely new 
forms, or eide.  The sculptor, for example, is able to change a block of stone into a work 
of art, and this work can be a completely new style of sculpture, previously unknown and 
unseen in the world.  “The statue is brought into being as a statue and as this particular 
statue only if its eidos is invented, imagined, posited out of nothing.”78  Similarly, in the 
construction of social imaginary significations and institutions, human beings are capable 
of creating something completely new to the world. 
 Peter Shaffer’s Equus illustrates the role of the radical imaginary in the creation 
of imaginary significations.  In the play, a young man named Alan is remanded to the 
care of a psychiatric institute after being caught blinding several horses.  A psychiatrist, 
Dysart, is determined to figure out what led Alan to commit this horrible act.  During the 
course of psychoanalysis, Dysart discovers that Alan has created an entire religion based 
on the worship of a horse-god named Equus.  This religion is fully formed, with sacred 
rituals of riding horses, holy relics, and a Scripture that Alan is able to recite.  Both the 




religion.  Alan’s mother is a religious Christian, who would recite passages of the Bible 
to him in his youth.  In his Equus religion, Alan borrows many of the trappings of the 
Christian religion, especially in the Scripture he has created.  However, the fact of 
worshiping horses represents the poietic dimension.  Alan lives according to a completely 
unique and new eidos.  Furthermore, Equus reveals the depth and complexity of the 
radical imaginary.  During the last session of psychoanalysis, Dysart forces Alan to 
confront the repressed memory leading to the maiming of the horses.  Alan reveals that a 
young woman led him to the stables after a date and the two of them had sex.  For Alan, 
this is a desecration of Equus’ temple and an affront to his God.  As a result, Alan blinds 
the horses and represses the memory of what he had done.  Having confronted this 
memory, Alan is psychologically destroyed.  Dysart recognizes he has cured Alan and 
made him normal, but at the cost of the young man’s passionate adherence to his religion.  
In the end, however, Dysart never discovers the incidents in Alan’s life that led him to 
create this religion.  There are situations throughout his past that may have contributed, 
but Dysart is unable to determine any cause.  In this sense, Dysart’s psychiatry has failed 
completely.  After curing Alan, Dysart says, “And now for me it never stops: that voice 
of Equus out of the cave - ‘Why me? ... Why me? ... Account for me!’ ... All right - I 
surrender!  I say it! ... In an ultimate sense I cannot know what I do in this place - yet I do 
ultimate things.  Essentially I cannot know what I do - yet I do essential things.  
Irreversible, terminal things.  I stand in the dark with a pick in my hand, striking at 





The radical imaginary is a persistent unknown in the human psyche.  As such, it 
becomes a source of dread for the individual, who is unable to comprehend this aspect of 
himself and unable to predict the desires the radical imaginary will produce when 
confronted with certain external stimuli.  If I am caught up in the middle of a riot, how 
will I act?  Will I be rational and leave the scene or will I be caught up in the frenzy and 
help turn over the nearest police car?  The socialized aspect of the self will always choose 
to act according to morality and law.  However, within the self there will always be the 
desire to join the mob and lose oneself, giving in to the incomprehensible desires of the 
radical imaginary.  Every individual is confronted with this self-uncertainty: if given the 
chance, will I act on my darkest desires?  The individual cannot answer this question with 
any certainty and must live with the constant dread produced by the radical imaginary.  
Dysart’s reaction to Equus staring back at him in the dark void is characteristic of the 
individual’s psychical relationship to the radical imaginary.  Though the radical 
imaginary is the source of creativity and consequently the source of humanity’s greatest 
achievements, as the unsocialized core of the original narcissistic state of the infant 
psyche, the radical imaginary is also the source of our basest desires and instincts.  This 
element of the radical imaginary persists in being solely concerned with the gratification 
of pleasure by any means necessary.  In treating Alan, Dysart discovers that he secretly 
envies the young man’s passion and dedication to his religious beliefs.  As a result, 
Dysart is reluctant to “cure” Alan, believing that such a cure will destroy the heroic 
aspects of Alan’s personality.  Knowing this, Dysart proceeds and succeeds in destroying 
Alan and consequently destroying that which Dysart admires, envies, and fears the most 




This same source of dread is also the source of the human capacity to create new 
social imaginary significations and new social institutions.  The radical imaginary 
provides the ability to question and reflect upon existing social imaginary significations 
and established institutions.  Because the radical imaginary is the unsocializable core of 
the original monadic self, the possibility for resistance always exists within each 
particular society.  No institutional organization of the world can completely socialize the 
radical imaginary.  As such, it represents a constant threat to the established institutional 
organization of the world.  While many institutional forms throughout history have 
sought to completely eliminate the radical imaginary from their respective societies, such 
a project always fails.  Castoriadis argues that,    
No human system can stay alive...unless it postulates, even under slavery, some 
minimum capacity for autonomy among its subjects.  And this is, as a matter of 
fact, the ultimate contradiction of heteronomous systems, at least from the 
moment when these systems are not completely internalized by their subjects.  So 
long as a slave, in the southern United States, picks cotton devotedly because 
that’s the way things are, because for him it’s nearly a divine mission, 
heteronomy prospers.  But let him say, ‘I am picking cotton for that bastard of an 
owner’, starting from that moment it’s over; there’s already an antimony in the 
system.81
In every society there is a gap between the instituted imaginary and the instituting 
imaginary.  “A life in which we had rules made to fit us the way a good tailor makes our 
clothes fit would indeed be total slavery.  It would be the ideal penal colony.  But it’s 




what we can have as autonomy qua social beings is established.”82  The radical, 
instituting imaginary represents an unresolved remainder in each particular instauration 
of a social institution.  Because this gap exists between the instituted imaginary and the 
radical, instituting imaginary, the capacity to resist and question established institutions 
also exists.  Was this not the case, it would be possible to construct an institutional 
system that would endure for all time.  However, given the fact that the radical imaginary 
cannot be socialized and controlled by the instituted imaginary, and given the fact that the 
social-historical conditions in any society will change over time, challenges to the 
established institutions will always arise in some form or another.  
The persistence of the unsocialized radical imaginary does not mean that social 
institutions are constantly under attack by those living within the society.  In fact, 
heteronomy and alienation have been prevalent throughout human history.  The reason 
for the predominance of heteronomous institutions lies within the human desire for 
certainty and the need to make sense of the world and our place in it.  Living with the 
radical imaginary as a constant threat to the self, individuals turn to society for the 
certainty they cannot achieve within themselves.  In constructing its institutions, a society 
will seek to guarantee the optimal level of certainty and predictability in order to 
compensate for the psychic uncertainty individuals must face on a daily basis.  As a 
result, societies are willing to attribute the construction of institutions to other-worldly 
powers in order to deal with the psychic dread each individual must confront on a daily 
basis.  To deal with the radical imaginary, individuals are willing to sacrifice their 
autonomy for the certainty provided by alienated social institutions.  Hannah Arendt 




order has in fact so much to recommend it that the greater part of political philosophy 
since Plato could easily be interpreted as various attempts to find theoretical foundations 
and practical ways for an escape from [the political] altogether.”83
Institutions 
Michel Foucault’s post-structuralist account of the formation of institutions and 
the impact they have on a given society represents one perspective on this topic.  
Foucault’s general thesis is that institutions exercise disciplinary power over the members 
of a particular society.  For Foucault, disciplinary power and knowledge are inextricably 
linked; those who claim knowledge are best able to accrue and exercise the power that 
flows throughout the network of social relations.84  Thus, the state is not the sole power in 
society.  More powerful in fact are the institutions that exist within the social sphere.  
These are the nodes of power that are most able to influence the individuals living in a 
particular society.  In works such as Discipline and Punish and the Birth of the Clinic, 
Foucault illustrates how techniques developed in prisons and mental hospitals are adapted 
by other social institutions to serve the need for disciplining and controlling the members 
of a society.  These common practices and informal institutions are best able to enforce 
conformity and an adherence to the dominant power/knowledges that exist within a given 
society.  In essence, these institutions construct a set of rules and punishments with which 
they are able to enforce conformity to specific social norms.85  Foucault recognizes that 
this type of discipline is necessary in order to insure the continued functioning of the 
society in question.  However, he also recognizes that the conformity imposed by these 
institutions can stifle and oppress the individual.86  Foucault, however, is also ambivalent 




theory seems to allow no escape from the network of power that exists in every social 
interaction.  Richard Wolin argues that “in the work of Foucault ‘power’ is elevated to 
the status of an impregnable prime mover.  Its workings persist in defiance of the best-
intentioned efforts to cast them off.  Popular sovereignty and the virtues of public reason 
have a negligible effect on power’s capacity to persevere and proliferate.”87  However, at 
the same time, he praises transgression of the dominant discourses as a mode of 
resistance.88  Such transgressions, however, are politically ineffective.  In most cases, 
transgression can only occur at the individual level.  Thus, for Foucault, resistance is 
possible, but only for those who are willing to fly in the face of the dominant discourse 
and act against the dictates of social power.  For most of those living in society, however, 
this is not possible, as it is far safer to conform to the dominant discourse than it is to 
transgress it. 
Foucault’s discussion of disciplinary power emphasizes the role of institutions in 
the production of a particular, conforming subject.  However, he conceives of the 
relationship between institutions and the subject as unidirectional, where disciplinary 
power flows from the institution to be exerted on the subject.  As a result, resistance can 
only take the form of transgression, where the individual breaks with conformist 
discipline and asserts his non-conformist individualism against the institution.  
Castoriadis agrees with the constitutive power of the institution, in the sense that the 
existing instituted-imaginary exerts a powerful influence on the socialization of the 
individual.  The individual born into a particular society will be socialized by the 
instituted-imaginary to accept the dominant social imaginary significations present in a 




the relationship between the individual and the institution.  The institution does not 
ensnare the individual subject in a web of power that enforces discipline upon the human 
subject.  While the instituted-imaginary fabricates the “individual”, the unsocializability 
of the radical imaginary insures that the collective of individuals living in a particular 
society plays a constitutive role in the reproduction of the instituted-imaginary.  
Institutions must respond in some way to challenges that surge forth or face crisis and 
possibly collapse. 
 As such, Castoriadis presents a very different picture of the creation of social 
institutions.  He argues that institutions do not simply emerge from particular spaces in a 
given society to influence the manner in which other institutions govern individuals.  
Instead, social institutions are the product of a creative act by the collective imaginary of 
a particular society.  “Society is self-creation, ‘that which’ creates society and history is 
the instituting society, as opposed to the instituted society.  The instituting society is the 
social imaginary in the radical sense.”89  The instauration of an institution is not simply 
the formalization of pre-existing social customs and norms.  While such pre-existing 
customs and norms are indeed taken into account in the construction of institutions, in the 
sense that each social imaginary signification incorporates the existing ensidic dimension, 
every institution also represents a new way of organizing this dimension.  Furthermore, 
each institution is constructed in order to answer some question posed by the individuals 
living in a particular society about their relationships to one another or to the world 
around them, always affected by the prevailing social-historical conditions.  In this 




Institutions exist in order to organize the world in which the collective exists and 
to provide certainty and stability for the individuals in that collective.  Every society 
develops an image of the universe in which it lives, attempting to make it a signifying 
whole in which a place must be made for nature and for the collectivity.  The 
construction of its own world by each society is the creation of a world of meanings 
which “organize the (presocial, ‘biologically given’) natural world, instaurate a social 
world proper to each society (with its articulations, rules, purposes, etc.), establish the 
ways in which socialized and humanized individuals are to be fabricated, and institute the 
motives, values, and hierarchies of social (human) life.”90  Every institution is 
constructed as a closed system that attempts to fully organize and explain whatever 
domain it is created to govern.91  These institutions endure to the extent that they are able 
to answer any challenge posed by the instituting imaginary.     
The social imaginary significations created by individuals do not necessarily lead 
to the instauration of social institutions.  However, such social imaginary significations 
form the building blocks of the social institution.  The difference between the individual 
imaginary and the social imaginary is that the latter is constrained by the limits imposed 
by the first natural stratum, the existing magma of social imaginary significations, and the 
social-historical of the particular society.  Society constitutes a symbolic order in a 
different way than the individual can.  An individual can construct private fantasy, not 
institutions.  A junction can occur between these, but this occurs at the right time and 
place, where it fills holes in others’ unconscious and possesses enough rational and 
functional coherence to prove itself viable.92  While the individual can constitute such an 




already there.  First, there is nature, and since natural objects are connected to one 
another, certain consequences ensue as a result.93  Each social institution must “lean on” 
the first natural stratum and no institution can violate the limits imposed on it by the 
natural world.  Second, there is the ensidic dimension of legein and teukhin, both of 
which must be taken into account in order to insure the coherence and comprehensibility 
of the social institution.  Finally, the creation of institutions is bound by the social-
historical.  Thus, society constitutes its symbolism, but not with total freedom.  Society is 
bound up with nature, history, and it partakes of rationality, but none of these limiting 
factors are deterministic; they do not dictate the form social imaginary significations, or 
society as a whole, will take.94  For example, in each instance, rational lines are used to 
construct a closed view of the world.  However, these rational lines are subordinated to 
significations that do not belong to rational order, but to the imaginary.95  Thus, a 
collective creates an image of the world that is in accordance with a “rational” order, but 
this is a rationality created by the collective itself.  In other words, the ordering of the 
world makes sense to the collective itself, rather than being determined by some a priori 
rules of rationality.  Since there is no extra-social rationality governing the world, the 
society must create such an order, and it does so through the imaginary.   
The purpose of the social institution is to provide meaning to some aspect of the 
world and to explain any question an individual or the society poses about the 
institution’s respective domain.  If the institution is unable to accomplish this task, it 
begins to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the collective.  Institutions, and those individuals 
who benefit from the continued existence of a particular institution, seek to perpetuate the 




legitimacy outside the imaginary of the collective.  By relying on an extra-social source 
of legitimacy, such as religion, myth, rationality, or science, to name a few, the institution 
is able to insulate itself from the radical imaginary of the collective.  The institution 
essentially seeks to disconnect itself from the society, elevating itself to a position where 
it is beyond the questioning of the collective.   
Castoriadis’s primary concern with regard to the construction of institutions is 
their tendency to become alienated from the collective that created them.  The concept of 
alienation is most often conceived in Marxist terms.  Marx argues that alienation is the 
condition of the proletariat under capitalism, whereby the worker is cut off from a 
fundamental element of himself.  “The more the worker produces, the less he has to 
consume; the more value he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes; 
the better formed the product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the more civilized 
his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker.”96  The worker produces for the 
capitalist, but in doing so, he is forced to sell his creativity for a pittance, thus selling an 
essential element of his own being.  According to Marx, the worker is alienated from the 
product he makes, the creativity he uses to manufacture this product, and most 
importantly, his species being.97  Species being represents a concept of the complete and 
fulfilled human, able to develop himself to the greatest extent, through the full use of his 
senses.  Furthermore, species being represents the essential connectedness of the 
individual with the collective.98  Under communism, every person is free because all are 
free, and one person’s freedom to develop himself is strengthened by the ability of all to 
do the same.  In its Marxist context, alienation under the capitalist system can be 




his or her being, which can only be recovered through a revolution and the transition to 
communism. 
Castoriadis argues that Marx is wrong in his assertion that alienation is linked to 
the class system.  First, alienation is not tied to the class relationship in a particular 
society, because alienation can exist in societies without a class system.  More 
importantly, however, the dominant class is also alienated.  This dominant class cannot 
use ideology to mystify society without also mystifying itself.99  Alienation can only be 
understood through an examination of the society’s relationship to the institutions that 
govern it.  “Alienation is neither inherent in history nor the existence of the institution as 
such.  Alienation, however, appears as a modality of the relation to the institution and, 
through its intermediary, as a modality of the relation to history.”100  Alienation occurs 
when the institution becomes disconnected from its society by covering over the role of 
the radical imaginary in the construction and legitimation of social institutions.  “The 
institution is a socially sanctioned, symbolic network in which a functional component 
and an imaginary component are combined in variable proportions and relations.  
Alienation occurs when the imaginary moment in the institution becomes autonomous 
and predominates, which leads to the institution’s becoming autonomous and 
predominating with respect to society.”101  Thus, the alienated institution relies on some 
extra-social source for its legitimacy, insulating itself from the questioning of the 
collective.  In essence, the alienated institution attempts to close itself off from the radical 
imaginary by basing its legitimacy on its original raison d’etre, ignoring the existing 
social-historical conditions and seeking to force the world as-it-is into its own view of the 




Throughout the majority of human history, heteronomy has been the norm, where 
institutions are legitimated through reference to some extra-social force beyond the 
control of the collective.  It is important to recognize that ultimately the collective itself 
posits these heteronomous justifications for the existing social imaginary.  Heteronomy is 
an attractive proposition for human beings seeking certainty and security in their 
individual and collective lives.  The nature of the radical imaginary explains why human 
beings create social institutions that are legitimated heteronomously.  The radical 
imaginary confronts human beings as an incomprehensible Abyss.  It cannot be 
understood, categorized, or compartmentalized in any meaningful way.  Human beings 
create meaning for the world around them because they must do so in the face of this 
horrifying element of their own psyches.  The fact that the radical imaginary is the root of 
both creation and destruction is difficult for human beings to accept.  Though 
Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel is a product of human creativity, so too are the horrors of 
Auschwitz and the Gulag.  To accept the radical imaginary as a fundamental part of the 
human self is to accept the dark instincts that are an essential element of this Abyss.  In 
response to this, human beings must create a stable and ordered place for themselves in 
the world.  To accomplish this, they construct social institutions that can provide answers 
for their own existence.  To provide stability, human beings tend to reify these 
institutions, abstracting them from their own making/doing, and, in so doing, from any 
responsibility for their creation.  We as human beings create meaning for the world 
because we must in the face of the radical imaginary.  Human beings crave certainty.  
“The social institution of the individual must make a world exist for the psyche as a 




institution seems to be able to make of the psyche what it wills, but it must provide 
meaning for the psyche in terms of its life and its death.103  In this regard, heteronomous 
institutions have three advantages.  First, birth and death are outside human 
responsibility.  Second, such institutions replace the burden of choice with the injunction 
to follow rules.  Finally, these imaginary significations cannot be proven false.104  When 
heteronomous institutions exist, the individual does not need to question his relationship 
to the institution or his relationship to the world around him.  These answers are provided 
to him by the dominant instituted-imaginary.  As such, he can abdicate all responsibility 
for questioning the failures of the instituted-imaginary and resign himself to an alienated 
existence.   
Castoriadis’ second response to the Marxist concept of alienation is that alienation 
is not the result of human beings being cut off from some fundamental element of 
themselves.  The radical imaginary is always present.  Alienation emerges when the 
radical imaginary is covered over by the instituted imaginary.  The radical imaginary 
always plays a role in the construction of new institutions.  However, we attribute this 
and justify it based on a heteronomous source of legitimacy.  The example of the Marxian 
revolutionary project illustrates both the impact the social-historical has on the continuing 
relevance of an institution and the consequences of alienation.  In Castoriadis’s 
estimation, Karl Marx makes an important contribution to Western philosophy through 
his recognition of the fact that theory could not be understood if it was isolated from 
historical and social practice.105  In this regard, Marx continues the tradition of 
philosophers such as Kant and Hegel, but his contribution lies in his concrete 




of nineteenth century Europe and in the development of a praxis through which the 
proletariat can fundamentally recreate economic and social structures.  “Philosophy is not 
a neutral or contemplative knowledge separated from society.  If it pretends to play the 
role of educator, philosophy perpetuates the social divisions consecrated by the 
separation of manual and mental labor.  This makes philosophy itself into an ideology 
that hinders progress.  The task of the revolutionary is to make the world ‘philosophical’ 
by overcoming social divisions.”106  While Kant and Hegel restricted themselves 
primarily to the domain of ideas, Marx rooted his philosophy in the existing material 
conditions of nineteenth century Europe.  As such, Marx represents a shift from the 
idealism of previous philosophers to a primary focus on material conditions.  In this 
regard, Marx’s intention is to create a philosophy of praxis that can achieve a 
revolutionary goal.  For Marx, theory and revolutionary praxis must be derived from the 
material conditions of the prevailing economic system.     
Marx sought to ground a theory of revolution in the objective historical laws that 
he argued governed every society.  Marx believed that by applying scientific methods to 
the study of history and his theory of revolution he could overcome the obstacles faced 
by previous utopian socialists.  His used of the dialectical method was an attempt to erase 
the distinction between fact and value.  The moral imperative for revolution would 
become a historical inevitability.  The significance of Marx’s work was the attention he 
paid to the actually existing material conditions of industrial capitalism, which served as 
the foundation for his theories.  However, Marx’s reductionism assumes an economic 
motive for every individual and this is his primary error.  He overlooks the fact that types 




prevailing social-historical circumstances.107  As a result, while Marx may have 
accurately described the conditions of late nineteenth century Western Europe, his model 
collapses when removed from those social-historical conditions.  What Marx did not 
foresee was the evolution of the capitalist system.  Essentially, the material conditions in 
which Marx grounded his theories changed dramatically.  Capitalism adapted to historical 
developments and to the very criticisms that Marx himself had made.  Rather than 
operating in a free-market system, capitalism evolved to include a significant role for the 
state in the market, primarily through state intervention to protect business.  Furthermore, 
workers in the capitalist system could rely on their governments to protect them to some 
extent from the excesses of the market.  Most Western countries instituted minimum 
wage laws, protection for labor unions, pension systems, and the various elements of the 
social safety net.  As a result, the Marxist prediction that capitalism would continue to 
pauperize the proletariat and eventually lead to the collapse of the system did not come 
true, because the capitalist system was able to alter itself in order to address the 
contradictions Marx had pointed out in the nineteenth century.  Applying Marx’s theories 
to twentieth century conditions without modifications makes Marxism an ideology, in 
Marx’s own definition of the term.  Twentieth century Marxists use this ideology to veil 
and justify reality, not to shed light on it or change it.108  The point of Marxism was not to 
establish eternal truths, but to think the real.109  When removed from its social-historical 
context, Marxist theory becomes an alienated social institution, incapable of addressing 
the problems of late capitalist societies.  According to Castoriadis, this is the central 
problem of constructing a philosophical system that seeks to answer all the questions that 




institutions exists with the relationship between Marxism as a theory and its proponents 
and critics in the twentieth century.  When this occurs, the institution will defend itself 
through reference to extra-social sources of legitimacy.  Social institutions will attribute 
their authority to a source of legitimacy beyond the actual making/doing of the collective.  
In the case of Marxism, its proponents find authority in historical inevitability.  The 
result, however, is the same as with any other social institution: the alienation of the 
institution from the society in which it exists.   
 Despite the fact that heteronomy is an attractive proposition for dealing with the 
radical imaginary, in the end, the instituted imaginary can never completely insulate itself 
from the instituting imaginary.  In every society, three things will always menace the 
instituted imaginary.  First, itself, since the underlying magma of significations can 
resurge and put the instituted imaginary into question.  Second, individuals, by means of 
the radical imaginary, will always pose questions to the instituted imaginary that the 
established institutions cannot answer.  Finally, it is menaced by the imaginary of other 
societies with which it comes into contact.110  As a result, the established institutions of 
every heteronomous society are constantly threatened by the creativity of individuals 
living within the societies they govern.  The heteronomous institution must rely on the 
fact that it is alienated and disconnected from the society in order to continue functioning.  
It is because of this fact that resistance to the instituted imaginary is always a possibility 
in any society, no matter how alienated the institutions are from the collective.   
 The gap that exists between the instituted-imaginary and the radical instituting-
imaginary is the space from which a collective is capable of instaurating an autonomous 




space is the central concern for Castoriadis’ philosophical and political project.  Late 
modern societies have constructed a world where the individual plays a central role and 
where liberty and the possibility of freedom represent a pillar upon which existing social 
institutions are built.  However, social institutions in late modern societies continue to 
rely on alienated sources of authority to assert their legitimacy.  The political project that 
Castoriadis advances is one where individuals are able to recognize the role their 
creativity plays in the construction of institutions and to create a political domain where 
each individual actively participates in the legitimation of existing social institutions or in 
the construction of new institutions when the instituted-imaginary no longer fulfills its 
purpose. 
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The Modern and Instituted-Modern Imaginaries 
Modernity represents what Castoriadis refers to as the second great break with 
heteronomy, which introduced a long historical period where people questioned society 
and created new forms in art, literature and politics.1  As the second great break, the 
modern era represents the emergence of a possibility for the creation of the political as 
both a separate sphere of action and as the source of legitimacy for social institutions.  As 
such, the modern imaginary opens the possibility for the active participation of human 
subjects in the construction of the social institutions that govern them.  Furthermore, 
modernity posits the capacity for a society to openly and actively question established 
institutions through participation in the public sphere.  In essence, the early modern era 
represents a resurgence of the radical imaginary to challenge the heteronomous 
institutions of the medieval period in Europe.  By placing human beings at the center of 
the universe, the modern imaginary posits the possibility of integrating human creativity 
and the radical imaginary into political life.  With the advent of the modern era, the 
possibility arose for the instauration of an autonomous society, where social institutions 
relied on the making/doing of those living within the society for their legitimacy.   
The first decisive break with heteronomy emerged through the development of the 
democratic polis of fifth century BC Athens.2  The significance of the second break with 
heteronomy that occurred with the advent of modernity is that it posits the possibility for 
the construction of expansive democratic systems based on human agency in the material 
world.  Unlike the Athenian polis, modern democratic systems allow for equal 
participation by the individual subject as an individual subject, unrestricted by social 




is born.  As such, the modern imaginary makes possible the types of democratic systems 
that emerged in the eighteenth century and which continue to be developed to this day.  
Furthermore, according to Castoriadis, it is only within modern societies that the forms of 
democratic participation that exist today are possible.  For example, in an article on the 
first Persian Gulf War, Castoriadis rejects the possibility of imposing democracy in the 
Middle East, arguing that these many of these societies must first break with religious 
heteronomy and “modernize”, though not necessarily as clones of Western democracies. 
What is required is a social imaginary that posits active human agency in the construction 
of meaning, rather than a reliance on divine law as the source of legitimacy for existing 
institutions.3  Any form of democratic governance requires a decisive break with 
heteronomous authority and recognition of the role that individuals play in the material 
world.  
The modern imaginary introduced new significations that placed the individual 
human subject as the active agent in the material world, allowing the subject to 
understand and shape the material world around him.  The roots of the modern imaginary 
can be traced to the early Renaissance period where innovations in the arts and sciences 
dramatically altered the manner in which people viewed the world around them.  A 
humanist perspective that emphasizes the role of the human subject in this world is the 
predominant characteristic of these innovations.  Early modern theorists placed the 
human subject as the focus of philosophy, arguing that the material world was the domain 
of man and it was up to him to shape it as he saw fit.  The humanistic turn in Western 
thought pervaded all spheres of creativity, from art to philosophy to science.  In the field 




through realistic portrayals of human beings and the natural world, employing techniques 
such as one-point perspective and the use of light and shade to lend a sense of realism to 
their works.  Early scientists such as Galileo challenged the institutional authority of the 
Church by asserting the accuracy of the heliocentric theory of the universe over the 
geocentric theory, basing his challenge on empirical observation, thus rejecting the 
authority of the Church in favor of what he himself could test empirically. 
One of the most significant imaginary significations constructed during the 
transition to modernity is the idea that the individual represents an active agent, capable 
of comprehending and shaping the world around him, rather than a passive object of an 
otherworldly will.  The Cartesian cogito, for example, defines man both in terms of his 
individuality and his ability to exercise reason.4  Descartes’ assertion of individual 
subjectivity allows each human being to become an active agent in the material world, 
rather than a passive member of a world already ordered by a divine subject.  As such, 
Descartes contributes to the construction of individual subjectivity.  This signification of 
the individual as an active subject is reinforced by modern political theory, which shifts 
the focus from legitimizing political structures based on heteronomous authoritative 
sources to institutional justifications founded on human subjectivity.  Thomas Hobbes, 
for example, argues that that the sovereign power must be founded in the consent of the 
governed, presenting a systematic justification for state power based on the transition 
from the state of nature to civil society through the creation of a social contract.  In order 
to escape the dangers of the state of nature and guarantee their personal security, human 
beings must bind themselves together in a social contract and cede certain rights to the 




social contract made between independent, autonomous subjects, where the sovereign’s 
sole purpose is to provide order and stability.  As such, modern political theory 
emphasizes the role of state power in the maintenance of social stability, the form of 
government institutions necessary for the exercise of this power, and, most significantly, 
the justification of institutions based on the consent of individuals living in a particular 
society.  Human life is no longer dictated by rules imposed by an external, supernatural 
authority; the world is no longer presented to the human subject, but rather is constituted 
by that subject.5  Furthermore, the rise of the modern state, founded on the interaction 
between the government and the people, created a system wherein the state had to 
account for the nature of the human subject and tailor its policies accordingly.  The state 
relies on some measure of consent by the people it governs in order to continue to 
function.  As such, legitimacy is linked to human agency, which introduces the possibility 
of constructing democratic systems wherein each individual can become an active citizen.  
According to Habermas, the public sphere, defined the domain in which individuals can 
shape the political and social order of their society through the collective pursuit of free 
and rational inquiry,6 emerges through the transition to modernity in the Western world.  
The construction of the bourgeois public sphere represents a significant break with pre-
modern societies.  In pre-modern societies, the legitimacy of institutions is tied to rituals 
performed in the life-world.  As such, system and life-world become intertwined, in the 
sense that institutions rely on the beliefs and practices of the private sphere for 
legitimacy.  Furthermore, in the pre-modern world, there is no concept of subjectivity. 
With the transition to modernity, the system and life-world become separated through the 




this division occurs can subjectivity arise.7  The bourgeois public sphere, which 
introduces purposive rationality, mediates between the state and the private domain.  As a 
result, institutions must perform in order to legitimize themselves; the possibility of 
legitimation crises emerges as a result of the advent of the modern era.8  When an 
institution is incapable of performing according to the dictates of the collective of 
individuals participating in the public sphere, the institution’s legitimacy is called into 
question.  
Descartes reinforces the relationship between the individual subject as a 
constitutive agent and the world around him and the institutions that govern him by 
arguing that the individual is capable, through the exercise of reason, to fully comprehend 
the natural world.  Descartes argues, “There is nothing so far removed from us as to be 
beyond our reach, or so hidden that we cannot discover it, provided only we abstain from 
accepting the false for the true, and always preserve in our thoughts the order necessary 
for the deduction of one truth from another.”9  Descartes’ foundational principle is 
skepticism.  In searching for the truth, Descartes’ first principle is, “never to accept 
anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such.”10  The only given Descartes 
accepts is the cogito.  Descartes argues that this maxim is self-evident, that it “was so 
certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be 
alleged by the skeptics capable of shaking it.”11  Once this assumption is made, 
everything else must be demonstrated through empirical inquiry.  The significance of 
Descartes’ skepticism is that the doctrines of established authority must be called into 
question.  Cartesian doubt introduces the capacity to examine the inherited wisdom of 




authority of the institution is no longer sufficient grounds to accept a statement as true.  
Descartes’ skepticism represents a radical break with the heteronomy of the Middle Ages, 
particularly with regard to the institutional authority of the Catholic Church.  Descartes 
essentially argues that each individual must question the doctrines of the Church; only 
with proper critical inquiry should the individual accept the truth of religious authority.  
The individual, according to Descartes, should not rely on the inherited truth of 
institutional authority, but rather should seek to discover truth and meaning in the world 
on his own.   
Descartes’ call for the use of reason to discover truth reinforces the modern 
scientific concern for the progressive accumulation of knowledge.  In the modern mind, 
the accumulation of knowledge is equated with progress, both in terms of the 
development of scientific knowledge and the moral development of society.  Beginning 
with the assumption that it is in fact possible to know everything about the natural world, 
modern philosophers follow with a normative claim that this knowledge should be 
disseminated to the population as a whole in order to improve society.  Implied in this 
claim is the idea that science and knowledge are neutral, unallied forces; the 
dissemination of such objective knowledge can only improve the material condition of 
the human species.  The progressive development of science and technology can improve 
the lives of every individual by harnessing the now comprehensible natural world.  
Famine can be eliminated by advances in agriculture, developments in medicine can 
prolong the individual’s lifespan, and the everyday well-being of the individual can be 
improved by the development of the means of production through industrialization.  




race as a species can be improved through the continued accumulation of knowledge.12  
The more the human species can understand about itself and the world around it, the 
greater the potential for making the human species better and more moral.  Moral 
progress thus becomes closely linked to the development of the scientific method and the 
possibilities science brings for more fully comprehending the natural world.  
The project of autonomy, as Castoriadis conceives it, and the construction of 
democratic institutions in general, relies on the transition to modernity.  The modern 
imaginary posits a world in which the individual subject can reflect upon himself and the 
world around him.  The construction of the Cartesian individual subject contributes to the 
possibility of conceiving a political system that incorporates an expansive definition of 
political participation.  If each individual has the capacity to exercise reason and if each 
individual is equally endowed with this capacity, this creates the possibility for the equal 
participation of each individual in the political system as an independent subject.  
Autonomy and an expansive concept of freedom, which Castoriadis asserts, requires a 
subject that is not dependent on external forms of authority, neither in terms of the 
subject’s identity nor in terms of an authority that limits the capacity of the human 
subject to construct meaning for the world around him.  Furthermore, the project of 
autonomy requires the construction of a world where the individual is an active agent in 
the construction and legitimation of political institutions.  The emergence of the 
bourgeois public sphere links institutional legitimacy to the capacity of these institutions 
to provide meaning for the individual subjects living within particular society.  The 




when an institution can no longer do this, the instituted imaginary can be called into 
question and altered through democratic processes.     
From the Modern to the Instituted-Modern 
Though the advent of modernity represents a break with the heteronomy of the 
Middle Ages, and the second great break with heteronomy in Western history, alienation 
is a persistent characteristic of modern institutions.  Thus, the advent of the modern era, 
while it introduced radically new, potentially emancipatory significations, did not lead to 
the construction of an autonomous society where the role of the radical imaginary in the 
construction of social institutions is recognized.  In essence, the emancipatory promise of 
modernity is not fulfilled.  Both Habermas and Castoriadis argue that modernity 
represents a dual heritage.  On the one hand, modernity represents the emancipation of 
human beings from sources of authority beyond their control introducing the possibility 
for the active participation of citizens in the legitimation of institutions.  On the other 
hand, however, modernity, particularly through the development of instrumental 
rationality, has a repressive face, manifested through the development of bureaucratic 
institutions that intrude upon all aspects of modern life.   
Therefore, recognizing that the emancipatory potential of the modern imaginary 
has not been fulfilled does not require a rejection of the modern imaginary as a whole.  A 
crucial distinction must be made between modernity and instituted-modernity.  
Modernity is the magma of social imaginary significations that began to be created 
during the Renaissance and continue to be created to this day, encompassing a diverse 
and multifaceted tradition, where the conception of the role the human subject plays in 




By contrast, instituted-modernity represents the particular instauration of a 
particular set of modern significations in an institutional form.  The instituted-modern 
imaginary posits a world subject to the rational control and rational planning by human 
agents.  As with any institution, instituted-modern institutions institute themselves as 
closed systems, in the sense that they claim to represent the whole of the modern 
imaginary.  In fact, they only encompass a small part of the myriad of social imaginary 
significations created, and which continue to be created, during the modern age. 
This distinction is important because while the modern imaginary asserts the 
subjectivity of the individual and his independence from the domination of extra-social 
forces, it does not lead to the creation of the political domain necessary for modern 
society to construct autonomous institutions.  In essence, two paths emerge with the 
advent of the modern age.  The first path, the project of autonomy, creates the possibility 
for the instauration of the political where human beings recognize the role they play in 
the construction of the institutions that govern them and actively participate in the 
questioning and alteration of the instituted imaginary.  This path represents the 
emancipatory potential of the modern imaginary.  However, this path requires the 
construction of the political as an independent domain and the active, democratic 
participation of a citizenry.  These conditions are not an inevitable result of the 
emergence of the modern imaginary, but rather require an active expression of individual 
and social autonomy.  Without the active participation of those living in a particular 
society, modernity follows the second path, where modern institutions become alienated, 
resulting in the creation of the instituted-modern and the instauration of institutions that 




While instituted-modern institutions are in fact the product of human 
making/doing, the societies in which they exist do not recognize the creative role of the 
collective in the construction of these institutions.  The instituted-modern is a unique set 
of significations in human history in the sense that though instituted-modern institutions 
are alienated, they rely on the subjectivity of the individual for their legitimacy.  The 
instituted-modern emerges from the broader magma of modern imaginary significations 
that emphasizes the central role of the human subject in this world.  As such, the 
instituted-modern relies on the legein and teukhein of modernity.  However, it conceives 
of the relationship of the individual to institutions in a particular manner that reinforces 
alienation.  The instituted-modern develops as a particular institutionalization of the 
modern imaginary, reinforced by the changing social-historical conditions in Europe 
from the end of the Renaissance to the present day.  The development of the instituted-
modern represents a creative transformation of many of the key aspects of the modern 
imaginary.  Reason is transformed into instrumental rationality, individual subjectivity 
becomes depoliticized atomization, and progress is conceived as limitless human control 
over the natural world. 
The distinction between modernity and instituted-modernity expresses an 
important characteristic about modern freedom.  Modern freedom is deeply paradoxical 
in the sense that liberation and repression are closely linked to the extent that apparent 
expressions of freedom in fact reproduce the repressive aspects of the instituted-modern 
imaginary.  Marshall Berman accurately asserts, “The process of modernization, even as 
it exploits and torments us, brings our energies and imaginations to life, drives us to grasp 




Even though human beings liberated themselves from the heteronomy of the Middle 
Ages, they continue to be frustrated by the new forms of alienation that are created during 
the modern age and which are sustained by instituted-modern institutions.  The paradox 
of modern freedom is this: as beings socialized into modern societies by institutions 
founded originally on human making/doing, we are convinced that we are autonomous 
subjects, but in the face of instituted-modern institutions, our autonomy is severely 
constrained.  The ability to act is constrained by the limitations imposed by the instituted-
modern imaginary’s conception of the human subject and his relationship to the world.  
On the one hand, modernity places human beings at the center of the universe and 
instituted-modern institutions are explicitly posited as the product of human 
making/doing.  This represents the emancipatory potential inherent in the modern 
imaginary, allowing, for example, the construction of democratic forms of governance.  
At the same time, however, the human-oriented sources of legitimacy, such as science 
and reason, become alienated from the making/doing of the collective.  As such, 
instituted-modern institutions become alienated, covering over the role of the radical 
imaginary and relying on these alienated sources of legitimacy rather than on an explicit 
justification rooted in the radical imaginary of the collective.  The human subject’s range 
of actions therefore become reduced to a narrow spectrum and constrained by an 
instrumental calculus.  As a result, thought loses the element of self-reflection,14 reduced 
to an individual calculation of utility.  Thus, while the modern individual conceives of 
himself as an autonomous being, in reality he is subject to the dictates of instituted-
modern institutional forms.  Since the radical imaginary is covered over, our autonomy is 




Furthermore, our own actions as seemingly autonomous subjects in fact reinforce and 
reproduce the alienation and repression that pervades modern societies.  “Liberation”, as 
it is conceived in the instituted-modern imaginary, allows for limited human participation 
in existing institutions, but it is through this participation that we also contribute to the 
reproduction of the imaginary significations that perpetuate our own alienation.  As a 
result, we are simultaneously freer than in the past, but frustrated by the very institutions 
we have created to administer an increasingly complex society.       
The construction of the instituted-modern as the dominant imaginary relies on a 
transformation of reason from the objective reason of the pre-modern and early modern 
era to subjective reason.  Max Horkheimer argues that in the pre-modern era, “reason was 
supposed to regulate our preferences and our relations with other human beings and with 
nature.  It was thought of as an entity, a spiritual power living in each man.”15  
Horkheimer classifies this form of reason “objective.”  According to the precepts of 
objective reason, an act is reasonable if it conforms to the totality of man’s relationship to 
other men and to nature.16  In other words, “there is a universally valid hierarchy of ends, 
but there are no universally valid rules of action.”17  
Furthermore, the hierarchy of ends posited by objective reason is linked to a broader 
conception of the common good in society as a whole.   
These two ideas lie at the center of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, which aptly 
illustrates the concept of objective reason.  According to Aristotle, arête, or excellence, is 
achieved through acting in moderation.18  Any potential action must be conceived in 
terms of the situation at hand and the consequences of this action on others in society.  A 




lies in the mean between cowardice and recklessness.19  However, there is no single 
standard for a courageous act.  A meek individual would not be expected to act in the 
same manner as a person of strong character.  However, both are able to find a mean 
between cowardice and recklessness that can be called courage, though the actual action 
may not be the same.  Furthermore, objective reason relies on the will of the individual to 
choose the proper path.  In the example of the soldier above, while reason might tell him 
to choose a course of action that aims for the mean between cowardice and recklessness, 
he is free not to choose this path, and to act contrary to what reason tells him to do.  For 
Aristotle, reason is a set of guidelines for action that exists independently of the human 
subject.  The individual must choose to participate by allowing proper reason to guide the 
actions he selects.  As such, objective reason confers upon the individual subject a degree 
of autonomy.  Reason does not determine the actions of the individual.  Rather, the 
individual himself must choose to act according to the guidelines that reason dictates.     
In addition, the individual must consider his action in the context of his 
relationship to others.  For an act to be reasonable, it must be judged as such by others.  
As a result, the consideration of the mean is not the sole purview of the individual 
deciding on which action will be best to take.  Any action by an individual is entwined 
within the broader social context in which he acts.  A soldier in battle, while expected to 
act courageously, must take into account the lives of his fellow soldiers and the broader 
victory of the army.  Thus, a single-handed assault on an enemy position, even if the 
soldier were victorious, would be a reckless act, as it could have endangered the lives of 
his fellow soldiers and jeopardized the successful outcome of the battle.  The mean 




commanders, and the wider context of the battle in which the individual soldier makes his 
decision.  The social context within which such judgments of excellence occur illustrates 
the public nature of objective reason.  The hierarchy of ends need not be dictated by a 
source external to the society nor does it require that ends be constructed once and for all 
time.  Rather, the hierarchy of ends can be publicly contestable and be the product of the 
autonomous making/doing of those living within a particular society. 
As such, reason can be used to properly guide a society towards the achievement 
of this common good.  This element of reason dominates Aristotelian thought, but is also 
evident in early liberalism.  The early liberals such as John Locke argue that reason, as an 
inherent attribute of the individual, can properly guide a society towards a limited 
common good.  Locke, for example, posits that human beings are able to achieve the 
good of living up to their nature as rational beings through participation in civil society 
and through labor.  Thus, while self-interest is the primary characteristic of human nature, 
Locke does not conclude that human beings are selfish by nature.  Rather, self-interest 
derives from reason as an ordering principle in the definition of ends.  The end of civil 
society is to promote prosperity through labor and the possibility of living in a secure 
society.  Locke does not argue that men in civil society will pursue self-interest at the 
expense of their reason, but rather reason serves as a guide for living as a human being in 
civil society. 
Within early liberalism, however, the move toward subjective reason is also 
evident.  Equating reason and individual self-interest is problematic, leading to later 
liberal theory asserting a purely utilitarian definition of reason.  Locke’s emphasis on 




construction of subjective reason.  Locke posits no limitation to human accumulation20 
and does not preclude the possibility of selfishness.  In the state of nature, war arises due 
to conflict over resources that each individual seeks to accumulate for his own use.  Thus, 
greed and selfishness can be derived from self-interest given the proper conditions.  The 
fact that Locke posits a minimal role for government does little to insure that those living 
in civil society will not revert to a selfish pursuit of wealth instead of a self-interested 
pursuit of wealth.  Furthermore, early liberals privilege the private domain over the 
public.  Objective reason cannot exist without a publicly defined hierarchy of ends and 
actions cannot be judged separated from a web of social relationships.  Liberalism 
removes the individual from the presence of others by emphasizing the importance of the 
private domain of material accumulation.  As a result, reason is transformed into a private 
means for the pursuit of an end of material accumulation.  The individual no longer 
requires the presence of others to determine the rationality of his actions; she herself 
becomes the sole judge of the rationality of her actions.   
The private nature of early liberal reason contributes to the construction of the 
instituted-modern concept of instrumental rationality.  Instituted-modern reason, or, in 
Horkheimer’s terms subjective reason, is specifically defined as individual utility 
maximization.  The instituted-modern imaginary posits that humans, by nature, are driven 
primarily by self-interest and given a set of options, each individual will rank them 
according to her preferences and choose based on which option will maximize her own 
utility.  An act is considered rational only insofar as it reflects the individual calculation 
of utility and seeks to maximize that utility.21  Thus, an individual can only be rational if 




definition, irrational.  In this manner, subjective reason determines the actions of the 
rational individual, in the sense that the rational individual is defined as a rational being 
through the calculation of utility and the pursuit of utility-maximization.  Human beings 
are defined as human beings by their rationality; to act contrary to rationality is to be less 
than human.  
The calculation of utility, according to the logic of subjective reason, is the 
domain of the individual divorced from the social context within which he makes a 
decision.  The ranking of preferences may differ from person to person, but both 
individuals can be considered rational so long as they choose an action based on their 
own personal calculation of expected utility.  As such, subjective reason eliminates the 
standards set forth by objective reason for judging an act as reasonable.  This 
transformation of reason creates a view of the world wherein an action is rational only if 
it serves some other purpose.22  No rational individual will choose an action “for its own 
sake” or as an end in itself.  Rather, each decision is made in the pursuit of further utility-
maximization.  Following this logic, only “productive” activity is valid, and all else is 
superfluous.23   
Subjective reason essentially disconnects the individual from the social context in 
which he exists.  The individual is the sole calculator of utility.  The judgment of others 
affects the calculation of utility only insofar as the individual believes that the judgment 
of others can positively benefit his own self-interest.  As a result, in pursuit of utility-
maximization, the relationship of the individual to others is reduced to instrumentality; 
others are significant only insofar as they are incorporated into the calculus of means and 




calculating individual can achieve his ends.  Other individuals are degraded into a means 
towards achieving the end of utility maximization.  The instituted-modern conception of 
the rational individual prevents the possibility of community and solidarity with others.  
When all others are reduced to a means for maximizing utility, the instauration of the 
political becomes nearly impossible.  In essence, the repression of the hierarchical, 
organic society of the medieval era is replaced by the repression that emerges from an 
atomized society, where individuals are unable to connect with others in any meaningful 
manner. 
Subjective reason’s emphasis on the subject as rational utility maximizer 
reinforces atomistic individualism, the second central imaginary signification of the 
instituted-modern imaginary.  The instituted-modern imaginary conceives of the 
individual as the primary agent in the modern world, emphasizing the actions of the 
individual as an individual, and de-emphasizing the individual as a member of a 
community.  Atomistic individualism disconnects the individual from other beings living 
in his society, emphasizing the primacy of the private sphere against the public realm of 
the political.    The consequence of atomistic individualism is this: over the course of 
modern history, while the citizen has involved himself primarily in the private sphere, the 
bureaucratic-capitalist apparatus has expanded to encompass a greater share of modern 
life and politics.  According to Habermas, the problem that emerges during the 
development of modernity is that the state and private corporations intrude into the 
bourgeois public sphere, which then degenerates into a sphere of domination.24  
Capitalism, for example, privileges instrumental rationality, which colonizes the public 




of this form of rationality.  Habermas does not reject instrumental rationality; he argues 
that this form of reason has its functions within particular contexts, such as the economic 
market.  However, instrumental rationality is not suitable for the discursive practices of 
the public sphere.25  As a result, when instrumental reason invades the public domain, the 
discursive practices of this sphere are degraded, such that the public sphere becomes an 
appendage of the state and the capitalist economic system.  Public institutions such as the 
state and the bureaucracy intrude into the private sphere, regulating the actions of citizens 
once considered off-limits to the state.  The life-world, the private domain, becomes 
subjected to the dictates of instrumental rationality, further eroding the possibility of 
public discourse.  The colonization of the life-world represents the extension of 
instrumental reason over all other value-spheres.  This occurs through the rise of 
information industries as a form of veiled domination, the rise of corporate experts and 
their management of almost all social functions, the bureaucratic control of consumption, 
the erosion of personal integrity and the rise of ‘administrative despotism’, the 
transformation of public citizens into private consumers, and the decline of bourgeois 
individualism.26  In essence, individuals become atomized and restricted to the life-world, 
unable to participate in any meaningful way in the legitimation processes of the society in 
which they live.  The liberal concern for individual rights has little meaning when the 
bureaucratic-capitalist apparatus has intruded into the private sphere to the extent that it is 
able to constrain the choices of the individual citizen. 
The liberal emphasis on negative liberty reinforces the atomistic individualism of 
the instituted-modern imaginary.  Liberal philosophy conceives of rights as absolute 




negative liberties is aptly described by Judith Shklar, who argues, “Every adult should be 
able to make as many effective decisions without fear or favor about as many aspects of 
his or life as is compatible with the like freedom of every other adult.”27  Shklar posits an 
absolute injunction against the infringement of individual rights by either the state or 
other individuals.  However, this defense of the rights of the individual is problematic in 
that it constructs too sharp a delineation between the public and private and prevents the 
possibility of constructing the political as a domain of action built around the collective 
decision-making of those living in society.  Shklar’s conception of liberalism is entirely 
negative.  Liberalism does not have a positive doctrine of how one should live one’s 
life.28  She is primarily concerned with protecting the individual from abusive 
governmental power and the infliction of cruelty by the state.  According to Shklar, 
“liberalism must restrict itself to politics and proposals to restrain potential abusers of 
power in order to life the burden of fear and favor from the shoulders of adult men and 
women, who can then conduct their lives in accordance with their own beliefs and 
preferences as long as they do not prevent others from doing so as well.”29  By founding 
her philosophy on the fear of governmental abuse, Shklar contributes to the atomized 
view of the individual and neglects to address the potential oppression that can occur in 
the private realm.  Combined with the instituted-modern view of reason, there is no 
injunction against treating another individual as a means to some end.  So long as the 
basic rights of the individual are respected, any individual can treat another as a means.  
As such, the instituted-modern imaginary erodes the possibility of freedom introduced by 
the modern break with medieval heteronomy.  When individuals can treat each other as 




individual cannot participate freely in the political domain.  As a result, the instituted-
modern imaginary thwarts the possibility of constructing the political.  
Furthermore, when freedom is defined solely in negative terms, it becomes 
constrained to a private freedom to participate in the economic market.  According to 
Hannah Arendt, human life can be divided into labor, the biological processes that sustain 
human life; work, concerned with the artificial world of man-made things; and action, the 
social relations between humans that is the condition for political life.30  Subjective 
reason and atomistic individualism privilege labor and work over action by constraining 
the modern individual to private sphere.  The individual acts according to a calculation of 
utility, asking how he will benefit from each and every particular action.  Any action that 
serves some purpose is considered rational; the decision to opt out of the market, or to act 
in any other way that does not serve some ultimate economic purpose is, by definition, 
irrational.  As a result, a society of individual laborers is instituted.  The individual on her 
own, disconnected from the other individuals living in her society, finds it difficult to 
confront or resist bureaucratic-capitalist institutions.  Furthermore, concerns that were 
once private intrude into the degraded public realm.  Thus, a politics emerges that is 
concerned primarily with the maintenance of biological life and the protection of private 
property instead of the collective questioning of existing institutions.31
The significations of atomistic individualism and instrumental reason combine 
with an instituted-modern concept of limitlessness to posit both a technical and normative 
argument for the organization of society.  The instituted-modern signification of 
limitlessness posits that the world can and should be fully classified and organized by 




world of objects around them by subjecting it completely to their own imaginary 
constructs.  Zygmunt Bauman argues that this is a requirement of the transition to 
modernity:   
The war against mystery and magic was for modernity the war of liberation 
leading to the declaration of reason’s independence.  It was the declaration of 
hostilities that made the unprocessed, pristine world into the enemy.  As is the 
case with all genocide, the world of nature … had to be beheaded and thus 
deprived of autonomous will and power of resistance.  At stake in the war was the 
right to initiative and the authorship of action, the right to pronounce on 
meanings, to construe narratives.  To win the stakes, to win all of them and to win 
them for good, the world had to be de-spiritualized, de-animated: denied the 
capacity of the subject.32
The world as an independent subject confronting us represents uncertainty and a lack of 
control.  As such, the world must be disenchanted.  Human beings must make an attempt 
to fully understand the uncertainty and the mystery of the natural world.  By 
disenchanting the world, the modern individual subject is able to eliminate the 
supernatural (defined as the uncertainty presented by the natural world) as an Other 
confronting human society.  In constructing modern institutions, the supernatural Other is 
brought “down to earth” and incorporated into the modern imaginary through the practice 
of science.33  As a result of this development, the natural world can be objectified and put 
under complete human control.  This leads to the idea that the world should be organized 
and controlled in such a way as to benefit the individual subject.  Therefore, institutions 




interested utility maximization vis-à-vis the world in which they live.  The logic of 
limitlessness, combined with instrumental reason, dictates that humans will seek to fully 
dominate the world around them according to the potential utility the individual and the 
collective can gain from this domination. 
For the ancient Greeks, the instituted-modern signification of limitlessness would 
be defined as hubris.  According to the Greeks, forces beyond human control, such as 
Fate or the Gods, limit human beings.  To act as if these forces have no bearing on one’s 
life is to court disaster.  As the classical Greek tragedies show, the hero who ignores the 
limits placed on him by outside forces is ultimately destroyed.  Oedipus, for example, 
leaves his home in order to escape the Oracle’s prophecy that he would kill his father and 
marry his mother.  However, because Fate always limits human action, Oedipus actually 
fulfills the prophecy by leaving the home of his adoptive parents, meeting his true father, 
killing him, and then marrying his true mother, Jocasta.  This tragic vision was not 
restricted to literature, but extended to encompass the Athenian political imaginary.  The 
Athenian democratic system has been described as necessarily self-limiting.34  There are 
certain policies that could not be undertaken, lest they threaten the democratic system 
itself.  “In a democracy, people can do anything – and must know that they ought not to 
do just anything.”35  Furthermore, in the ancient Athenian polis, the continued existence 
of the democratic system was predicated on the continuous participation of the citizenry.  
If the citizens did not show up for the assembly, the democracy could not continue to 
function.  The self-limiting nature of the Greek polis marked this institution with 
impermanence.36  The democratic system only existed insofar as the citizens participated.  




criticism of the institution itself.  Democracy was not assumed in the ancient Greek 
system, but rather was always open to the questioning of its citizens.  A person such as 
Socrates could subject the Athenian democracy to fundamental questions about its 
existence and being, which had to be addressed by its supporters in order to insure that 
the institution continued to exist.  When Greek politicians went beyond these self-
imposed limits, an act of hubris, the system found itself in a serious crisis.  Athens’ 
imperialistic expansion during the Peloponnesian War and the trial and execution of 
Socrates both represent situations where the polis overstepped its self-limiting 
boundaries.  As in the Greek tragedies, the hubris of the late Athenian polis led to a fall. 
The instituted-modern imaginary has no conception of hubris and modern 
bureaucratic institutions do not recognize any limits to the possibility of fully organizing 
and dominating the world.  As the world becomes disenchanted and the instituted-modern 
is constructed as the dominant set of social imaginary significations, science replaces 
religion as the means through which human beings explain the world around them.  
Because science and reason are so closely connected in the modern imaginary, the 
instituted-modern posits that science is the only acceptable methodology for making 
sense of the world.  All other perspectives are labeled irrational and anti-modern.  
Furthermore, modern science asserts that there are no limits to the capacity for human 
beings to understand the natural world in which they live.  This claim about the “hard” 
sciences transcends the narrow field of scientific discovery and intrudes upon all other 
aspects of human life.  The instituted-modern imaginary posits that the scientific method 
can be applied to the organization of any aspect of human life, thus transforming science 




imperative asserting that science alone is the engine of societal progress.  The 
institutional organization of society itself becomes a field where the scientific method can 
be applied.  As such, instituted-modern institutions claim to efficiently and rationally 
order each aspect of society, thus intruding into every domain of human life.  At the same 
time, this instituted-modern logic posits that no sphere of human existence need be 
excluded from this drive to dominate.  At its most basic level, this drive towards “rational 
mastery” can be seen in the subjugation of the natural world to the needs and desires of 
human beings.  The drive to dominate and master the natural world has two crucial 
consequences for societies constructed according to the instituted-modern imaginary.  
First, it empties the self of all substance except its attempt to transform everything into a 
means for its preservation.  Second, nature is emptied and degraded to mere material with 
no other purpose than to be dominated.37  As a result, modern life revolves around a drive 
to fully subjugate the natural world through the breaking of any previously conceived 
limits to expansion.   
In positing that there are no limits to the possibilities of science, scientists are 
simply ignoring both the natural and the human limitations to the understanding of the 
world.  The most significant example of this is the place of the radical imaginary.  In 
essence, since the radical imaginary cannot be reduced to a quantifiable essence or to a 
deterministic relationship between cause and effect, modern science simply ignores the 
role it plays in human life and in the construction of meaning in society. 
The dominance of science and the covering over of the radical imaginary creates a 
unique problem for modern society.  Science is a human endeavor, an expression of 




institution.  The collective radical imaginary of a particular society will always exist to 
challenge both the methodology of science and the consequences of scientific discovery.  
There will always be a struggle to force science into the network of social institutions that 
exists within a particular society.  At the same time, however, science and scientists 
actively seek to disconnect scientific practice from the social imaginary context in which 
they carry out this endeavor.  Science makes a claim of objectivity and neutrality, when it 
is neither.  The scientist claims that in practicing science, he stands above the social-
historical conditions that exist in a given society.  The work the scientist does, in his eyes, 
is universally valid, as it seeks to promote the progress of the human species, regardless 
of the social imaginary in which he is embedded.  Furthermore, the scientist claims the 
work he does is value-neutral.  He simply seeks to discover something about the world in 
which he lives.  What is done with his discovery is, according to the scientist, beyond his 
control.  In reality, science is an institution and “as such, it is caught up in the material 
means, the forms of organization and the ideas which it both takes from and brings to the 
world.”38  Science, therefore, cannot be divorced from the social-historical conditions of 
the particular society in which it is practiced.  However, science as an imaginary 
institution is constructed around the premise that it, in fact, can be practiced objectively 
and neutrally, outside the boundaries of the social-historical.  Challenges to science as an 
institution can be dismissed as irrational.  “Like every institution, [science] is an inertia 
sustained by a myth.  Left to itself, it continues in the same direction at the same speed; to 
question its value, its method, its orientation and its results, amounts to iconoclasm.”39  




questioning of the collective.  As a result, scientists are able to operate freely, regardless 
of the consequences of the discoveries they make.    
Divorced from the social-historical, the practice of science contributes to the 
instituted-modern signification of limitlessness.  It becomes a means by which modern 
society can continue to ignore any limits to growth.  The emphasis placed on economic 
growth and development is an appropriate example of this signification.  For every 
nation-state, economic growth is one of its primary imperatives.  However, absent from 
any discussion of development is a real acceptance of the fact that there are limited 
resources on this planet.  It is clear that not every country in the world can attain the level 
of industrialization that the United States and Europe has reached, simply because there 
are not enough resources to do so.  However, this issue is never raised when it comes to 
discussions of growth in the developing world.  To do so is to be considered politically 
incorrect or oppressive to less developed countries.  The assumption that everyone makes 
is that every country can and should develop, despite the physical limitations to such a 
task.  By claiming the ability to surpass any natural boundaries, science reinforces the 
idea that every country in the world can become industrialized, despite the environmental 
consequences such growth would have on the ecosphere.  Environmental problems, and 
the limitation such problems impose, can and will be solved by science. 
In terms of the impact on society, the supposed objectivity and neutrality of 
science releases the institution from any consequences that might arise from the manner 
in which scientific discoveries are implemented in society.  As the prevailing method of 
understanding the world, scientific logic posits that whatever is “true” must be proven 




regardless of the validity of the claim or the consequences of such a claim in a particular 
society.  Thus, Nazism and Marxism-Leninism adhere to a scientific logic, both claiming 
to be “true” according to the scientific method.40  By relinquishing responsibility for the 
consequences of scientific discovery in the name of pursuing a “pure” form of science, 
scientists create a situation where their methods can be used for the most sinister of 
purposes.  Horkheimer argues that “like any existing creed, science can be used to serve 
the most diabolical social forces, and scientism is no less narrow-minded than militant 
religion.”41  When science is used as a weapon of the powerful against the weak, as 
during the Nazi Holocaust or in the movement to sterilize “undesirables” in the United 
States, this exacerbates the ambivalence people living in modern society feel towards 
institutions founded upon scientific principles.  If science can be so easily subverted to 
serve monstrous ends, what prevents such a situation from occurring again?  The answer 
is “nothing” and instituted-modern institutions are incapable of providing any other 
answer.  Since science is part of the instituted imaginary, the type of science conducted 
will reflect the instituted imaginary of a particular society.  In modern societies, science 
posits itself as capable of breaking every limitation imposed on the human species, all in 
the name of progress.  Progress, however, is an institution that emerges from the 
particular social-historical conditions of a given time and place.  Eugenics, for example, 
is considered unacceptable in the contemporary Western world.  At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, however, it was widely accepted.  Progress was defined as eliminating 
undesirable characteristics of the human species, such as indolence, poverty, and low 
intelligence.  As a result, scientists mobilized to weed out these supposedly natural 




This logic of progress culminated in the Nazi regime’s attempt to eliminate all “life 
unworthy of life.”  Abuses such as these are the product of an institution that is 
instaurated as existing outside the social-historical and which seeks to transcend all limits 
imposed on it by the first natural stratum and by the particular collective radical 
imaginary in which it operates.  Instituted in this manner, science is able to violate all 
taboos and break all limits by referring to its own self-described objectivity and 
neutrality. 
The increasing importance of technology in everyday life reinforces both the 
dominance of science and the instituted-modern signification of limitlessness, while 
degrading and covering over the role of the radical imaginary.  Technology privileges 
calculation, the instrumental use of thought aimed at effectiveness, over contemplative 
thought.42  “We are entering into the reign of instrumental thought, in which every 
problem must find a purely technical solution.  This perspective deeply influences the 
organization of life in society…The possibility of doing something becomes sufficient 
reason to do it: capability becomes wish, which is transformed in turn into duty.”43  As a 
result, technological development for the purpose of dominating the world becomes a 
moral imperative.  Science allows human beings to develop the technology that will bring 
the natural world under human dominion and the instituted-modern signification of 
limitlessness asserts that it is therefore the duty of the human race to dominate the world 
through advanced technology.  Technology allows the world to be reduced to mere matter 
under the control of human beings.  As such, technology reinforces and reproduces the 
signification of homo faber.  As homo faber, man instrumentalizes, and thereby degrades 




  Furthermore, in a society constructed around this imaginary signification, 
individuals born into that society will be conditioned to privilege instrumental reasoning 
over contemplative thought.  Technology reinforces this tendency, in the sense that 
individuals living in such a society have access to technology that will assist them in 
instrumental calculation.  This has a devastating effect on political participation in the 
sense that  
people whose lives are mediated by a technology that uproots and subjects them 
to the empire of calculation are particularly vulnerable to the superficial appeal of 
the politics described here as characteristic of the universal homogeneous state-a 
politics wherein thoughtless submission to perceived technological imperatives is 
identified with freedom and prosperity.45
As technology develops, there is also a “democratization” of access to this higher 
technology.  Thus, each individual in an advanced society can interact with the natural 
world as a master of that world.  However, such a world is completely devoid of 
meaning.46  Technology cannot answer questions about the meaning of the world or the 
individual’s place in that world.  However, it can allow the individual herself to assert 
more control over the natural world around them.  “The essence of technology-and its 
greatest danger-is not located in this or that particular instance of pollution or 
disemployment or privacy invasion, but, rather, in its propensity to enframe the condition 
of Being, mistakenly, as one of calculation and rootlessness.”47  Each individual interacts 
with the world, and with other individuals through the medium of technology, where this 
interaction is driven by an instrumental calculus.  As such, the primary drive of each 




world around him, both in terms of the environment and in terms of other individuals 
with which he comes into contact.  Technology allows each individual to become an 
island, exacerbating the atomization of the world that emerges as a result of the 
development of the instituted-modern.   
According to Anthony Giddens, modernity is like a juggernaut, “a runaway 
engine of enormous power which, collectively as human beings, we can drive to some 
extent but which also threatens to rush out of our control and which could rend itself 
asunder.”48  The construction of the instituted-modern exacerbates this problem by 
eliminating responsibility and political participation in late modern societies.  The 
dominant significations of the instituted-modern imaginary create a world where the 
individual citizen need not participate in democratic decision-making.  As such, she has 
no say over the direction the society takes.  The result of this is a continuous expansion of 
bureaucratic institutions, the subjugation of the natural world without limits, and the 
increasing atomization and depoliticization of the society.  Individuals resign themselves 
to this situation by retreating in the private sphere, allowing the existing instituted-
imaginary to reproduce itself and continue to expand into all spheres of life.  The danger 
here is the fact that since the instituted-modern imaginary does not conceive of any limits 
to expansion, the existing institutional structure will continue to expand, regardless of the 
damage to democracy, society, or the natural environment. 
The Kantian Alternative 
 Though the instituted-modern imaginary represents the dominant imaginary of the 
contemporary era, this does not suggest that the modern imaginary as a whole represents 




instituted-modern significations of instrumental rationality, atomistic individualism, and 
limitlessness.  Therefore, one need not reject modernity as a whole in order to challenge 
the instituted-modern imaginary.  In this regard, Immanuel Kant’s challenge to the 
instituted-modern is particularly important for Castoriadis’ project.  Kant represents the 
possibility of asserting the modern, and the emancipatory potential of the modern 
imaginary, against the instituted-modern and the alienation that this imaginary 
reproduces.  Castoriadis in no way rejects modernity, but rather he seeks to reclaim the 
emancipatory potential of the modern imaginary and construct institutions that fulfill the 
promise represented by modernity’s great break with the heteronomy of the pre-modern 
era.  Kant’s philosophy encompasses several critical points for Castoriadis’ work.  The 
first of these is the limited scope of human understanding. 
 Kant argues that human beings are by nature rational.  However, his vision of 
rationality is not monolithic and independent of the world, such as that found in the work 
of Descartes.  Where Cartesian rationalism argues that an objective description of the 
world is possible, uncontaminated by the perspective of the observer, Kant disagrees, 
asserting that the experience of the observer plays an important role in certain cases.  As 
such, Kant asserts that reason has multiple modalities.   
The first of these modalities is pure reason, where Kant posits a theory of 
transcendental idealism, arguing that some truths, a priori truths, are true propositions 
regardless of experience.  A priori truths are absolute, universal, and create a framework 
of concepts that are presupposed in experience; such knowledge is not gained through 
experience and is therefore not empirical.  A priori truths differ from a posteriori truths in 




whereas the former are not.49  “Empirical objects are real, whereas transcendental objects 
are ideal.  A transcendental object is not perceivable, and does not belong to the world of 
space, time, and causality.”50  Thus, Kant’s concept of pure reason posits that there are 
limits to what the human subject is capable of knowing.  Reason is not a means through 
which the individual can come to understand the whole of the world.  In Kant’s 
estimation, there are elements of the world and of human behavior that cannot be 
empirically known and must simply be taken as a given.  These givens, however, are not 
supernatural in the sense that they do not derive from some higher power to govern 
human action.  Instead, they are rooted firmly in human subjectivity itself.  Therefore, 
Kant asserts that there are aspects of the human subject that must always remain 
unknowable, despite the fact that our reason is in fact a powerful force capable of 
understanding much of the world in which we live.   
The most important of these a priori truths for Kant is the moral sense that guides 
every human being.  Within each individual, according to Kant, there is a moral law that 
acts as a guide for human behavior.  Kant writes, “Two things fill the mind with ever new 
and increasing awe … the starred heaven above me and the moral law within me.”51  This 
quote represents the transcendental, in terms of the moral law that guides our actions, and 
the empirical, that which we can comprehend through the use of reason.  Kant’s assertion 
of a moral law within us subverts instrumental rationality by arguing that pleasure and 
pain are not determinants of how an individual will choose to behave.  For example, Kant 
asserts that while it may be pleasing to steal from someone, the individual knows that 




world where everyone could steal from each other at any time.  Thus, what is pleasant is 
not, and cannot be, the determining factor in how we choose to live our lives.  
The second modality of reason, according to Kant, is practical reason.  This is the 
second aspect of Kant’s philosophy that is significant in Castoriadis’ work because it 
posits the autonomy of the human subject.  Pure reason lacks a moral agent, which is why 
practical reason, which guides us in our actions, must also play a role.  Practical reason 
“facilitates the derivation of universals, which scientific reason employs, but whose 
existence it cannot explain.”52  Kant posits that one of the central characteristics of 
human actors is their ability to make free choices in the decisions they make.  Freedom, a 
central concept for Kant, is a transcendental idea; it is not subject to empirical inquiry and 
it cannot be deduced from knowledge of the empirical world.53  Kant is not concerned 
with the nature of freedom, but rather he is concerned with developing imperatives that 
can guide the human subject in his autonomous actions.  As such, practical reason is 
concerned with imperatives, not a description of the world.  It tells the agent what he 
should do and is concerned with ends and means.54  Furthermore, practical reason guides 
the autonomous agent.  This agent acts through his own will alone, not as a conduit for 
some higher power or concept.  Free action requires that the agent will an act and choose 
it for its own sake as an end in itself.55  “For Kant, autonomy consists not only of 
governing oneself but also of obeying only the law that we ourselves have prescribed.”56  
Thus, while the actor is autonomous, this does not give him carte blanche to act in any 
way he sees fit.  Kant argues that each autonomous actor exists within a web of all other 
autonomous individuals.  This assertion of human sociability is the final aspect of Kant’s 




subject is social, not an atomized individual.  His actions must take account of the 
autonomy of all other actors within his society.  As such, a categorical imperative must 
exist to guide the human agent in his decision making.   
The categorical imperative emerges from practical reason.  It is universal, stating 
what all free agents ought to do.  This imperative states that when I will an action, and 
thus choose an end, I will be constrained by reason to act only if I would will that end as 
a universal law.57  We as human beings can only be free if all rational beings are similarly 
free.  This is the only way freedom can be a universal law.  As such, we must always 
respect the autonomy of our fellow beings.58  Kant, however, recognizes that not every 
individual will adhere to the categorical imperative.  As such, the categorical imperative 
does not determine human action.  Instead, the categorical imperative serves as a guide 
for the individual exercising his freedom in an ethical fashion.59
The importance of Kant’s philosophy is that it illustrates the possibility of 
asserting the modern imaginary as a challenge to the instituted-modern.  Thus, one need 
not reject the modern in order challenge instituted-modern institutions.  Rather, it is 
possible to develop a critique centered on the emancipatory potential of the modern 
imaginary and use this critique to construct new social imaginary significations in 
opposition of the instituted-modern.  For Castoriadis, this possibility is crucial for his 
project of autonomy.  Castoriadis is not a Kantian.  For example, he argues that the 
categorical imperative cannot guide us in difficult cases.  “The overwhelming fact of 
human life, however, is that what is Good and what is Evil under given circumstances is 
often obscure or can be attained only through the sacrifice of other Goods.”60  According 




contestable set of guidelines that can be altered or criticized by the collective at any time.  
By rooting the categorical imperative in the moral sense of the individual subject, Kant 
limits the political possibilities for the exercise of practical reason.  Thus, while Kant 
recognizes the importance of creating laws autonomously, Castoriadis does not agree 
with Kant’s emphasis on the individual nature of freedom.  However, Kant shares several 
crucial concerns with Castoriadis, namely that human knowledge is limited, against the 
instituted-modern signification that human beings are capable of fully understanding the 
world.  Furthermore, there are elements of human subjectivity that cannot be understood.  
In Kant’s philosophy, this is illustrated through a priori concepts, while Castoriadis 
asserts the role of the radical imaginary.  Finally, Kant insists upon the role of practical 
reason and judgment in political decision-making.  Castoriadis shares this concern.  As 
such, though these two philosophers assert different theories, Castoriadis and Kant both 
represent the possibility of challenging the instituted-modern through a return to the 
emancipatory potential of the modern imaginary.   
                                                 
1 Castoriadis, “Le Délabrement de l’Occident,” La Montée de l’Insignifiance, 64. 
2 Castoriadis, “The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy,” Philosophy, Politics, 
Autonomy 82. 
3 Cornelius Castoriadis, “Entre le vide occidental et le mythe arabe,” La Montée de 
l’Insignifiance (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1996) 53. 
4 Rene Descartes, “Discourse on Method”, Discourse on Method and the Meditations, 
trans. John Veitch (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1989) 44-45. 
5 Marcel Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World, trans. Oscar Burge (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press: 1997) 95. 
6 Best and Kellner, Postmodern Theory, 235. 
7 Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1, trans. Thomas 
McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984) 51. 
8 Howard, The Marxian Legacy, 124. 
9 Descartes, “Discourse on Method”, 21. 
10 ibid. 21. 
11 ibid. 30. 




                                                                                                                                                 
13 Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1982) 348. 
14 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John 
Cumming (London: Allen Lane, 1972) 37. 
15 Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: Seabury Press, 1974) 9. 
16 ibid. 4. 
17 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) 
162. 
18 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Oswald (Indianapolis: Bobbs, Merrill,  
1962) 43. 
19 ibid. 68-77. 
20 The only limit to acquisition, according to Locke, is spoilage.  The individual is not 
permitted to accumulate perishable goods beyond his capacity to use such goods.  This 
problem is solved through the invention of currency, which can be accumulated without 
limits.  Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, 19, 29. 
21 Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason 3. 
22 ibid. 37. 
23 ibid. 41. 
24 Best and Kellner, Postmodern Theory, 235. 
25 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action Vol 1, 61. 
26 Ales Debeljak, Reluctant Modernity (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998) 88. 
27 Judith Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. 
Rosenblum (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989) 21. 
28 ibid. 21. 
29 ibid. 31. 
30 Arendt, The Human Condition, 7. 
31 ibid. 45. 
32 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 1992) x. 
Author’s italics. 
33 Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World, 163. 
34 Castoriadis, “The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy,” Philosophy, Politics, 
Autonomy, 115. 
35 ibid. 115. 
36 ibid. 115. 
37 Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason 97. 
38 Cornelius Castoriadis, “Modern Science and Philosophical Interrogation,” Crossroads 
in the Labyrinth, trans. Kate Soper and Martin H. Ryle (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1984) 
221. 
39 ibid. 221. 
40 Heller, A Theory of Modernity 76. 
41 Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason 71. 
42 Darin Barney, Prometheus Wired (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) 44. 
43 Todorov, Imperfect Garden, 231. 
44 Arendt, The Human Condition, 156. 




                                                                                                                                                 
46 Arendt, The Human Condition 155. 
47 Barney, Prometheus Wired, 45.  Barney is mostly correct in this assertion, though he 
errs when he states that technology “mistakenly” enframes a particular condition of 
Being.  There is no “correct” condition of Being. 
48 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1990) 139. 
49 Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, The Philosophy of Kant, ed. Carl J. 
Friedrich (New York: Modern Library, 1949) 25. 
50 Roger Scruton, Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 58. 
51 Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Practical Reason,” The Philosophy of Kant, ed. Carl 
J. Friedrich (New York: Modern Library, 1949) 261. 
52 Stephen Eric Bronner, Of Critical Theory and its Theorists, 2nd ed (New York: 
Routledge, 2002)14. 
53 Scruton, Kant 75-76. 
54 ibid. 79. 
55 Scruton, Kant 80. 
56 Todorov, Imperfect Garden, 47. 
57 Scruton, Kant 85. 
58 ibid. 86. 
59 Bronner, Of Critical Theory and its Theorists 15. 
60 Cornelius Castoriadis, “The Ethicists’ New Clothes,” World in Fragments, ed. and 




Capitalism, Bureaucracy, and Bureaucratic Capitalism 
The previous chapter examined the development of the modern imaginary and the 
subsequent construction of the instituted-modern as a particular constellation of modern 
imaginary significations.  Within modern societies, a tension exists between the 
emancipatory promise of the modern imaginary and the repressive potential of the 
instituted-modern.  The purpose of this chapter is to examine the consequences of the 
instauration of the instituted-modern in the forms of capitalism and bureaucracy on the 
individual and on modern society.  As the two institutional pillars of the instituted-
modern imaginary, capitalism and bureaucracy embody the dominant instituted-modern 
significations: individualism, limitlessness, and rationality.  The repressive capacity of 
capitalism and bureaucracy emerges through the relationship between the modern and 
instituted-modern imaginaries.  The instituted-modern imaginary is a particular creation 
based on the significations of the modern imaginary.  Thus, instituted-modern institutions 
are constructed, and base their legitimacy, on the centrality of the human subject in the 
material world.  Instituted-modern institutions legitimize themselves by referring to 
human making/doing and human participation in these institutions.  However, these 
institutions exert a repressive capacity by sharply limiting actual participation, and most 
importantly, by preventing the questioning of the instituted-modern, thus suppressing and 
covering over the emancipatory promise of the modern imaginary.  The consequence of 
the tension between these two imaginaries is a strict definition of freedom by the 
instituted-modern imaginary and, as a result, the emergence of a social situation where 
individuals become complicit in their own alienation through their participation in 




Bureaucracy and capitalism are distinct, in the sense that each has its own set of 
institutional purposes and goals.  However, in advanced modern societies, the capitalist 
imaginary and the bureaucratic imaginary combine to instaurate a new institutional form: 
bureaucratic-capitalism.  In bureaucratic-capitalist societies, the repressive potential of 
established institutions is maximized in the sense that the pervasiveness of bureaucratic-
capitalist institutions increases.  Both capitalism and bureaucracy rely on modern 
imaginary significations for their legitimacy.  As such, the authority of these institutions 
is based on the fact that they are created through the participation of human subjects; they 
do not rely on heteronomous authority beyond the society.  For example, God did not 
create the free market, those individuals living in society and freely participating in 
economic life did.  However, free participation in the market is a strictly delimited 
concept, defined according to the instituted-modern imaginary, rather than the modern 
imaginary.  Freedom is limited to participation in established institutional structures; the 
possibility of questioning these structures is covered over.  Thus, one can buy and sell 
goods in the economic market, but one cannot question the market system itself.  Since 
bureaucracy and capitalism are the predominant established institutions, they are able to 
reproduce this definition of freedom through the socialization process.  Furthermore, the 
more the individual “participates” in the existing institutional apparatus, the more she 
contributes to the reproduction of the imaginary significations that perpetuates her own 
alienation.  As such, instituted-modern institutions cover over the role of the radical 
imaginary, relying on anomie, disorientation, atomization, and depoliticization to endure 
as institutions rather than on an explicit justification rooted in the radical imaginary of the 




The real problem is the totalitarian possibility present in the combination of an 
alienated institutional apparatus, repression, and the paradox inherent in modern freedom.  
Because of this fact, Castoriadis argues that resistance and the instauration of the political 
is critical to avoid the descent into barbarism.  In his earlier work, Castoriadis argues that 
the division of the world economy into two “hermetically sealed sectors”1 is an untenable 
situation that will result in war between these two poles.  The result of such a war, 
according to Castoriadis, will be the dominance of one of these poles and the subsequent 
concentration of productive forces that will emerge through the unification of capital and 
the ruling class.2  The result of such unification will be the total domination of the world 
by one pole, the subjugation of the masses, and a regress into barbarism.  According to 
Castoriadis, only the resistance of the masses can prevent this catastrophe from 
occurring.3  For Castoriadis, the world faced a stark choice: either socialist revolution or 
the total domination of the world by the bureaucratic-capitalist apparatus.  Clearly, the 
war Castoriadis predicted did not occur; the Soviet Union collapsed under its own weight, 
making the Soviet bureaucratic class the only class in history to have self-destructed.4  As 
a result, the fragmented bureaucratic-capitalist economic system rose to dominance 
without an armed conflict with the Soviet Union.  While Castoriadis concedes that a fully 
totalitarian system is unlikely to emerge in the Western capitalist societies, the repressive 
potential still exists within such societies.  As such, it is absolutely essential to assert the 
power of the radical, instituting imaginary against the established institutional apparatus.  
In the twenty-first century, the regress into barbarism takes the form of the increasing 
privatization, depoliticization, and bureaucratization that occurs in instituted-modern 




of social living, leading to a situation where individuals are disconnected from one 
another, forcing them to retreat into the private realm, thus eroding community and the 
possibility of exercising their autonomy.  However, the possibility of resistance to the 
dilapidation of instituted-modern societies remains despite the increasing 
bureaucratization of society.  The existence of the radical imaginary thwarts any attempt 
to completely subsume the world to scientific or rational methodology.  No attempt at 
applying the scientific method or rational planning can be completely successful because 
the unpredictability of the radical imaginary will always exhibit itself.  No matter how 
much institutional repression exists in a given society, a gap always exists between the 
instituted and the instituting imaginary.  It is in this gap that resistance to the instituted 
imaginary is possible, and therein lays the possibility for the instauration of the political.   
Modern Institutions: Capitalism and Bureaucracy 
The modern capitalist system is a possessive market society, where labor and land 
are both owned by individuals and are alienable in the market; where there is no 
authoritative allocation of resources or work and no authoritative allocation of rewards 
for any labor performed; and where individuals are rational, utility-maximizers.  In any 
such society, there are those who seek a higher level of utility than they currently possess 
and there are those who have more energy, skills, or possessions than others.5  Liberal 
theorists such as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, writing in the historical context of a 
rapidly developing free-market economic system and developing the earlier pre-capitalist 
theories of John Locke, argue that individuals will act out of self-interest in their 
interactions with others and with the market.  MacPherson characterizes this form of self-




to accumulate goods, with no upper limit on the amount of resources one can accumulate.  
Competition in the market is endless and the whole of life is directed towards 
accumulation.6  The individual’s ability to accumulate without limits serves as an 
incentive to participate in the economic market.  In addition, it separates the public and 
private realms into discrete domains, where the private sphere is privileged.   
Thomas Hobbes is one of the first theorists to assert the necessity of privileging 
the private sphere over the public.  By creating a distinct division between the public and 
private spheres, Hobbes is able to ground the legitimacy of the sovereign in the material 
world, without relying on an external authoritative source.  Since Hobbes’ primary 
concern is order and stability against the passionate nature of the individual human 
subject and because Hobbes’ state is founded ultimately upon the consent of the people 
through the formation of the social contract, he must conceive of a way to guarantee the 
legitimacy of the sovereign power without reference to an external, supra-human 
authority.  Furthermore, the sovereign power, responsible for dictating the moral code of 
the society and promulgating the laws necessary for maintaining order and stability, must 
be able to rule without challenges to its authority.7  To accomplish this, Hobbes argues 
that the public domain and the private sphere must be separated.  The public domain must 
be the sole realm of the sovereign, while the private realm becomes the domain of the 
individual subject.  The task of the sovereign becomes the protection of individuals living 
and working in the private sphere.  Hobbes directs human beings to the private realm of 
accumulation in order to prevent them from participating in political life.  The subjects of 
the state, according to Hobbes, are to submit themselves completely to the sovereign 




actions of the state.  The sovereign should grant his subjects total freedom in the pursuit 
of “commodious living.”8  Thus, so long as a subject does not infringe upon the security 
of other subjects, she is free to do what she wills in the private sphere and her attention 
will be sufficiently diverted from the public realm.  Essentially, Hobbes closes off the 
public realm in the name of order and security, which fulfills the purpose of the social 
contract, thus guaranteeing the legitimacy of the sovereign power.  The trade-off is that 
the individual is “free” to pursue his own interests in the market, accumulating goods 
without limits in exchange for allowing the sovereign to remove him from political life.  
In Hobbes’ estimation, all parties to the social contract will be satisfied: the sovereign can 
insure the stability of the society and the individual in the private sphere can continue to 
satisfy her desires without living in constant fear of death. 
The later liberal theorists rejected Hobbes’ vision of the individual as subject 
rather than citizen.  However, the foundation for the legitimacy of the state remains the 
same: the consent of those living in a particular society and the separation of the public 
and private spheres.  From Locke onward, liberalism envisions equal citizenship for 
every individual.  This transformation is possible due to a conception of the state where 
the government serves the private sphere.  Locke envisions the government as a type of 
limited “sheriff”, responsible for adjudicating disputes between citizens and enforcing the 
law of contracts.  Thus, Locke’s state does not require the same level of coercive power 
as Hobbes’ Leviathan.  Furthermore, Locke’s conception of the state allows for 
democratic participation through the election of representatives.  As such, Locke opens a 
space for participation in the public sphere; the individual is no longer confined to the 




further degrade the public realm, in the sense that the public domain becomes less 
necessary as the state itself plays a far more limited role.  Where Hobbes closes off the 
public realm to participation, later liberal theories make participation in the public sphere 
unnecessary. The private realm of accumulation is the preeminent domain of human life.  
So long as individuals can essentially obey the rules of competition and commerce, the 
state need not intervene in society. 
The liberal separation of the public and private sphere, with the consequent 
privileging of the latter over the former, insures that capitalist institutions become 
alienated from the society in which they exist.  What liberal theorists are unable to 
reconcile, according to MacPherson, is political participation, for which each of them 
allows a significant space, and private accumulation.9  If the public realm becomes less 
important, so too does political participation, despite the fact that liberal theorists 
emphasize the role the citizen can play in governance.  If the individual is essentially 
“bought off” by the promise of a possessive individualist society – the ability to 
accumulate without limits – she has little incentive to participate in the public domain.  
Furthermore, the capitalist imaginary’s degradation of the public sphere, where political 
participation is strictly limited to the preservation of established institutions, rather than 
the putting-into-question of the instituted imaginary, is a further disincentive to 
participation.  As a result, despite the possibility for participatory governance, capitalism 
succeeds in convincing citizens to limit themselves to the private realm. 
The development of bureaucratic institutions, which play an increasingly central 
role in advanced capitalist societies, exacerbates the decline of the public sphere.  The 




the transition from the pre-modern, face-to-face community to the modern, complex 
society.  Bureaucracies emerge as power shifts from local communities to national states, 
requiring the development of systems capable of delivering resources to the society in a 
stable, fixed manner.  The dominant goal of any bureaucratic organization, whether it 
exists in the public realm or in civil society, is the rational planning and distribution of 
resources or services to whatever field bureaucratic governance is assigned.   
The organizational framework of the bureaucracy is determined by the central 
task of any bureaucracy: to provide services in an organized and rational manner.  In 
order to insure that bureaucracies fulfill this mandate, the modern bureaucracy is 
organized in a three-fold manner.  First, regular activities required for bureaucratic 
functioning are distributed in a fixed way.  Second, authority to give commands is 
distributed in a stable manner and strictly delimited by rules.  Finally, methodical 
provision is made for the continuous fulfillment of the bureaucracy’s duties.10  These 
requirements are fulfilled by the bureaucracy’s independence from the political process, 
by the development of standard operating procedures governing the distribution of 
bureaucratic resources, and finally through the role of the individual official within the 
bureaucratic organization.     
Modern bureaucracies are independent of the political process in order to insure 
that they continue to rationally distribute the resources or services in the field they are 
tasked to govern, regardless of power shifts in the political system.  The primary purpose 
of any bureaucracy is to serve a purely administrative, distributive function.  When a 
bureaucracy is created to govern a particular field, that bureaucracy is given full authority 




standard operating procedures to efficiently and fairly distribute the particular resource or 
service it has been tasked to distribute.  Bureaucratic independence is crucial for the 
fulfillment of the bureaucratic task, in that it allows the bureaucracy to stand beyond the 
partisan political process.  As a result, the bureaucracy is not beholden to political 
interests.  Government officials are unable to use the bureaucracy to achieve partisan gain 
or to serve narrow domestic interests.  Furthermore, the integrity of the institution is 
maintained through the hiring process.  No political leader can fill the bureaucracy with 
political allies.  Instead, civil service protections are instituted in order to insure that the 
bureaucratic official adheres to the standard operating procedures and to the central 
bureaucratic task of rational planning.  The bureaucratic official views his task as a duty 
rather than simply a job and receives specialized training in order to carry out his 
obligations.11  The bureaucrat is tenured for life, which is intended to insure he will carry 
out his task in an impersonal manner.12  The education, hiring practices, and job security 
provided by the bureaucracy serve to insure that decision-making is carried out rationally, 
removed from any personal, irrational, or emotional appeals.13  The bureaucrat is bound 
by standard operating procedure in every bureaucratic interaction, but accepts this 
constraint as necessary for the continued functioning of the system.  The efficient 
distribution of resources is insured by the fact that in almost every situation, it is 
impossible for a single member of the bureaucracy to impede the functioning of the 
institution through individual action.14
The bureaucracy is self-preserving, self-reproductive, and also self-catalytic, in 
that the higher the degree of bureaucratization already attained, the faster the rate of 




application of bureaucratic expertise to a particular field is both productive and creative.  
When a bureaucracy exerts expert control over a particular field, the nature of that field is 
fundamentally altered.  The particular field can no longer be governed without the 
expertise of the bureaucracy, due to the transformation that occurs when the knowledge 
of the bureaucracy is applied.  The field in question becomes subject to the rational 
control of the bureaucracy, alienating it from the society itself.  For example, a 
government creates a bureaucracy to govern the distribution of medical care.  In 
constructing a bureaucracy, medical services become subject to the rational planning and 
distribution practices of bureaucratic managers.  These managers decide when, where, 
and how medical services are doled out to patients.  The doctors involved are removed 
from the equation and the actual needs of the patients are not taken into account.  Instead, 
bureaucratic methods become the sole determining factor in how medical services are 
distributed.  As a result, the field of medical care is fundamentally transformed from one 
where doctors decide how their patients are treated to one where a bureaucratic manager, 
following the standard operating procedures of the bureaucracy for which he works, 
makes decisions about medical care.   
Bureaucracies reinforce their dominance of a particular field through their 
reliance on secrecy and through the creation of specific methods of language and 
practice.  “Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally 
informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret.  Bureaucratic administration 
always tends to be an administration of ‘secret sessions’: in so far as it can, it hides its 
knowledge and action from criticism.”16  Bureaucratic secrecy is achieved through the 




from existing forms of public discourse.  The bureaucracy relies on a specialized form of 
legein and teukhein that appears arcane and incomprehensible to anyone who is not a 
member of the bureaucratic institution.  Essentially, bureaucracies develop their own 
languages and practices that allow communication within the bureaucracy, but will be 
incomprehensible to the average individual consumer of bureaucratic services.  For 
example, “bureaucratese” as a separate “language” for communication between 
bureaucracies and the creation of standard operating procedures to streamline problem 
solving represent the creative contribution bureaucratic institutions make to the instituted-
modern imaginary.  Bureaucracies rely on the modern ensidic imaginary, basing these 
new forms of legein and teukhein on the already existing language and practice of 
progress and science.  For example, as technology develops, the capacity for greater 
rational control increases.  In the name of progress, a language well understood in 
modern societies, bureaucracies create new methods for exerting rational control over a 
particular field.  As these new methods for rational control develop, the bureaucracy 
creates new languages and practices that increase the bureaucracy’s ability to conduct its 
business in secret, free from any possible criticism by the society in which the 
bureaucracy operates.  This creative capacity of the bureaucracy insures the reproduction 
of bureaucratic institutions.   
By claiming expertise in performing a particular task, bureaucracies are able to 
justify their participation in the political process and their continued growth and 
development as institutions.  Bureaucracies seek to “stand above the fray” of politics in 
order to more efficiently fulfill their tasks.  “Bureaucracy exists solely through 




dominated groups, to participate in a socialized power and to define themselves in 
relation to one another in terms of a hierarchy which guarantees a material status or 
prestige for each of them.”17  The ultimate goal of bureaucratic-capitalist institutions is to 
replace politicians and interest groups with experts who are able to stand above the 
political process and distribute scarce resources rationally and efficiently in order to solve 
social problems and serve the public interest.18  As many politicians who have sought to 
curtail the power of bureaucracy have found, once instituted a bureaucracy is almost 
impossible to dismantle.  Bureaucratic institutions successfully insulate themselves from 
politics, due in part to the fact that bureaucracies are integral to the administrative 
decision-making processes that are central to politics in the modern state.  More 
importantly, the creative role the bureaucracy plays in constructing new forms of 
language and practice insures that this institution can continue to dominate the political 
process.  Though political leaders still retain the power to make decisions, the 
bureaucracy shapes the options available to these leaders and influences the deliberative 
process, thus constraining what political leaders can in fact choose to do.19  The 
bureaucratic imaginary, with its emphasis on governance through expertise, tends to 
curtail policy options, reducing decision-making to what is feasible given the constraints 
of the established system rather than what is desirable for the society as a whole.20  When 
bureaucracies play a key role in politics, “governance becomes less a matter of 
determining the appropriate direction for society than one of adjusting its institutions and 
policies to the flows of economic and technological development.”21  Secrecy, and more 
importantly, bureaucratic legein and teukhein further this goal by disconnecting the 




The impact of the bureaucracy on society is that the method of organization and 
the development of bureaucratic language and practice fosters rule by technocratic 
experts within the bureaucracy itself and, more importantly, in society as a whole.  The 
bureaucratic imaginary reshapes and reconstructs the dominant social imaginary in the 
sense that the bureaucratic drive for rational planning becomes part of the social 
imaginary itself.  As a result, the autonomy of individuals is further degraded as every 
relationship between individuals and between the individual and the institution are 
reduced to utility maximization and the efficient distribution of resources.  As a result, 
the relationship between the bureaucracy and the individual subject exacerbates the 
atomization prevalent in instituted-modern societies.   
The bureaucracy treats every individual with whom it comes into contact as an 
object, a target for bureaucratic services.  No differentiation is made between individuals; 
the operational methodology of the bureaucracy treats all persons identically.  The 
relationship of every individual with the bureaucracy is identical in the sense that the 
bureaucracy reduces each person to a mere object, completely subjected to institutional 
procedures.  A person’s existence as an autonomous, individual subject is irrelevant and 
meaningless.  For example, at the most fundamental level, the bureaucracy “provides” a 
person’s existence as a living human being.  In the eyes of the bureaucratic institution, it 
is only through one’s record with a bureaucracy that one really exists.  The bureaucratic 
apparatus provides a person with a form of identification, such as a driver’s license or a 
social security number.  For the bureaucracy, this collection of data is all a person has to 
prove that he exists.  The apocryphal story of a person who is accidentally declared dead 




individual.  It is then never enough for her to present herself to a bureaucrat and say, “I 
am alive.”  Rather, she must undertake an arduous process in order to “prove” to the 
bureaucracy that she is still a living, breathing individual.   
The bureaucracy must treat the individual in this manner in order to justify its 
institutional legitimacy.  By making no distinctions between individuals, the bureaucracy 
can treat the human subject as a simple a consumer of whatever good or service the 
bureaucracy is tasked to provide.  More importantly, by objectifying every aspect of 
human life with which it comes into contact, the bureaucratic apparatus fulfills its 
primary task, namely to rationally and efficiently perform its institutional task.  Data can 
be quantified, categorized, and organized; human beings cannot.  As such, the 
bureaucracy can only function by reducing the irrational, unquantifiable elements of 
human life to objective data that can be collected and correlated in order to better plan 
and predict.  As a result, anything not reduced to a series of ones and zeros in a computer 
database is, for all intents and purposes, nonexistent.  Anything that lies outside the 
purview of the bureaucracy’s task is unimportant and meaningless.  In this manner, the 
bureaucratic apparatus simply ignores the creative capacity of the individual and 
collective subject, thus insuring the bureaucracy’s ubiquity in advanced modern societies, 
but also reproducing its alienation from the society by positing that whatever is not 
“rational” or subject to “rational organization” is irrelevant.  
Anthony Giddens refers to the relation of individuals with the bureaucracy as a 
“bargain with modernity.”22  In the absence of face-to-face interaction, modern man must 
place his faith in people he has never met.  Individuals trust and respect the technical 




trust, defined as the “confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given 
set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love 
of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles.”23  This trust is incorporated into 
routines of daily life and reinforced by the intrinsic circumstances of daily life, but it is 
based on a tacit acceptance of the bureaucracy in the absence of any alternative.24   
The absence of an alternative allows the bureaucracy to concoct an unshakeable 
justification for its continued existence.  The bureaucracy derives its legitimacy from the 
fact that it is a necessity in a complex society. 
The modern individual has no other choice but to rely on bureaucratic institutions 
to provide the services necessary for the continuous functioning of modern societies.  On 
the one hand, there are benefits to the instauration of bureaucratic institutions.  In the pre-
modern world, the individual turns to the community to fulfill many of the tasks later 
taken over by the bureaucracy.  If the community is unable to provide the necessary 
service, the individual has nowhere else to turn.  Thus, bureaucracy allows the 
construction of complex support systems for modern individuals, such as social security, 
health care, and other “safety net” services that are unavailable in pre-modern societies.  
Furthermore, bureaucracies distribute these services without regard for an individual’s 
social position.  In the pre-modern world, those of a higher social rank received greater 
benefits from existing authoritative institutions.  In modern bureaucratic societies, all 
individuals, regardless of social position, are able to take advantage of the services 
provided by the bureaucracy.  If the bureaucracy is able to provide services in an efficient 
manner, the apparatus fulfills its primary task, thus justifying its own existence.  




legitimizes itself, as it is the only resource for the provision of these services.  The 
bureaucracy exists outside the market system, possessing a monopoly over certain tasks 
essential to existence in modern society.  As the sole distributor of these goods, the 
bureaucracy insures its existence and legitimacy.  The individual is unable to go 
elsewhere to receive its services and is forced to deal with the bureaucracy, whether it is 
effective or ineffective.  No element of society is able to challenge the fundamental 
existence of the bureaucratic system.  By promulgating the imaginary significations of 
the instituted-modern, bureaucracies increase alienation and repression by further 
degrading the possibility of constructing a public sphere where individual citizens can 
participate in the construction of the institutions that will govern them.  
Bureaucratic Capitalism and the Decline of the Public Sphere 
The development of the capitalist system coincides with the emergence of the 
modern state and the bureaucracy.  In advanced capitalist societies, a new institutional 
form is created: the bureaucratic-capitalist institution, encompassing both the capitalist 
imaginary, in terms of the drive to increase production and reduce the participation of the 
worker in the production process, and the bureaucratic imaginary, through the 
implementation of rational planning to the production process.  As such, bureaucracies 
play a critical role in the maintenance of the capitalist system.  Modern capitalist 
economies are not free-markets, but rather are managed through the intervention of 
bureaucratic institutions at the state level.  Given the role bureaucracies play in the 
economic system, Castoriadis accurately describes advanced modern societies as 
bureaucratic-capitalist, differentiating between the form this institution takes in the 




  In the Soviet Union and its satellite states, a total bureaucratic-capitalist economy 
existed, wherein all economic decisions are made by the state in a fully planned 
economy.  By contrast, Western economies are fragmented bureaucratic capitalist 
systems.  In such a system, a market continues to exist, but the state intervenes frequently 
to provide subsidies, tax breaks, and other incentives and assistance to business.  
Business is thus protected from the chaos of a completely free market, but these firms are 
still able to profit from participation in the market.  Essentially, business in a fragmented 
bureaucratic system is allowed to profit from goods it produces, but is protected from 
economic crises by the public at large.26  Furthermore, in a fragmented system, private 
capitalist firms are managed bureaucratically.  The significance of this fact is that the 
capitalist firm adopts the same goal of the bureaucracy: to institute rational planning.  
The same bureaucratic drive to rationalize and maximize efficiency governs the capitalist 
firm, whether the firm is involved in manufacturing or in the service economy. 
The transition to bureaucratic-capitalism represents a social-historical 
transformation, the construction of a completely new institutional apparatus, with 
processes and goals markedly different from pre-bureaucratic forms of capitalism.  As 
such, the relationship between the institutions and the society in which they exist and 
between individuals participating in these institutions follows a different set of processes 
and logics.  For example, Castoriadis argues that the Marxist division between 
bourgeoisie and proletariat no longer applies to bureaucratized capitalism.  The 
distinction between the laborer and the owner of the means of production is no longer 
valid.  The owner of the bureaucratic-capitalist firm plays very little role in the operations 




be made between directors – those who give orders – and executants – those who carry 
out the orders.27  In this manner, Castoriadis accounts for the bureaucratic nature of 
advanced capitalism.  The directors act as bureaucrats, creating standard operating 
procedures for the rational planning of every element of the work process, whether this 
process is in manufacturing or in the service economy.  The directors in a capitalist firm 
are managers, not owners.  Thus, they gain nothing more than a salary from the 
production process.  However, they carry out the tasks of maximizing efficiency.  Every 
worker is expected to adhere to these processes in order to increase the efficiency of the 
firm.  Furthermore, as capitalism becomes more bureaucratized, the distinction between 
the director and the executant is blurred.  The director-executant division is not a two-
level hierarchy, but rather consists of multiple levels, in the sense that, for example, 
middle management takes orders from higher levels, thus serving in an executant 
position, but then performs a directorial role as they pass those orders down the 
hierarchy.28  In this manner, bureaucratic-capitalist firms create a fluid hierarchy, where a 
single individual may perform multiple roles, depending on the situation.  Thus, no single 
worker can be solely categorized as a “director” or an “executant.” 
The construction of this complex hierarchy is intended to serve the bureaucratic-
capitalist firm’s institutional goal, which is to develop procedures to maximize the 
rational planning of the workplace.  According to Castoriadis, bureaucratic-capitalism is 
the first regime to legitimate itself solely through a claim about its own rationality.  All 
other regimes have turned to supra-human sources of authority such as myth or religion 
for their legitimacy.29  In societies where institutional legitimacy is derived from sources 




marginalized.  For example, those who questioned religious institutions in the Middle 
Ages were branded heretics and faced the overwhelming coercive power of the Catholic 
Church.  In such societies, the instituting imaginary is almost completely suppressed, 
driven underground and out of sight.  When it does surge forth, as it inevitably will, the 
established institutions can more easily crush it by force.  With the advent of modernity, 
the use of force to repress the surging forth of the radical imaginary is no longer possible.  
The fact that instituted-modern institutions derive their legitimacy from human 
making/doing creates a multitude of “holes” in the instituted imaginary, each of which 
represents a path through which individuals living in the particular society can question 
the legitimacy of established institutions.  In order to defend itself and insure its 
legitimacy, bureaucratic-capitalism strives to eliminate the creative capacity of the 
individual worker by enmeshing him in a network of rational policies and procedures.  In 
essence, bureaucratic-capitalism seeks to eradicate the radical imaginary, the source of 
human creativity that is the greatest threat to its institutional legitimacy.  If human beings 
are rational and make decisions in the market based on the calculation of utility, then, 
since bureaucratic-capitalism is ultimately grounded in human agency, it is possible to 
apply the same rationality to the production process itself.  Thus, production becomes a 
fully rationalized system based on the calculation of costs and benefits.  Labor forms an 
integral element of the production process and the reproduction of the signification of 
rationality requires that the same methods used to maximize utility in the production 
process are applied to the labor force.  As a result, capitalism seeks to reduce the worker 




standardization of the individual worker’s behavior and labor.  In essence, the capitalist 
imaginary seeks to reduce the worker to another machine in the production process. 
The drive to rationalize the production process is not limited to the economic 
system, but rather it intrudes upon all aspects of human life in instituted-modern 
societies, particularly the public realm.  Bureaucratic-capitalism further reinforces its 
institutional legitimacy by delegitimizing and degrading the public sphere, where 
challenges to institutional legitimacy are the most overt and effective as a result of the 
development of the democratic process.  By reproducing the view that human beings are 
rational utility-maximizers through the socialization of individuals, the bureaucratic-
capitalist system constrains the democratic process itself, making it an ineffective, hollow 
institution that allows for a limited range of decision-making, but cannot seriously 
endanger the established institutional structure.  As a result, though capitalism’s 
legitimacy is derived from human making/doing, by degrading the political the capitalist 
system successfully closes off a potentially effective avenue of questioning its 
institutional legitimacy.  In this manner, bureaucratic-capitalism becomes an alienated 
institution and is able to exert a repressive capacity in society.  In essence, bureaucratic-
capitalism consistently covers over the radical imaginary, preventing meaningful 
participation in political life, by increasing atomization, uncertainty, and anomie as it 
drives individuals into the private realm.  As such, the consistent degradation of the 
possibility of constructing a public sphere is the most significant development in 
advanced modern society, representing the dominance of the instituted-modern imaginary 




The repression that exists in instituted-modern society is not the traditional 
coercion exercised by a powerful state.  Modern repression is unique in that it emerges as 
a possibility through the instituted-modern concept of freedom.  The modern individual 
believes she is free; however, the choices she makes in her everyday life are limited by 
the constraints imposed by the instituted-modern institutional structure.  “Freedom”, 
therefore, is narrowly constructed; the actual questioning of institutions in any significant 
manner is not an option.  As a result, the modern individual is both “free”, in the 
instituted-modern sense, and repressed due to the fact that her freedom cannot be 
expressed in a society where action is limited and where instability and uncertainty is so 
prevalent.  In order to cope with this instability and uncertainty, the individual flees the 
remnants of the public realm in favor of the private sphere. 
 The construction of a public realm where few challenges to the instituted-
imaginary can emerge successfully drives the individual into the private sphere.  While 
the individual acts in the private world, instituted-modern institutions are able to expand 
their domination in a degraded public sphere and increasingly intrude upon the 
individual’s action within the private realm.  The legitimacy of the instituted-modern 
imaginary depends on individuals remaining within the private sphere.  Modern 
institutions socialize individuals to regard the accumulation of goods in the private realm 
as the best expression of freedom.  Under instituted-modern institutions, the public sphere 
must be devalued if the instituted imaginary is to endure.  The emancipatory elements of 
modernity open a space for the questioning of established institutions, a space that did not 




to the instituted imaginary in the modern era because there are multiple avenues through 
which individuals and groups can challenge the instituted imaginary.   
The degradation of the public realm and the bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary’s 
intrusion into the private realm does not successfully eliminate the role of the radical 
imaginary in the construction of institutions.  Though this is the ultimate goal of 
bureaucratic-capitalist institutions, these institutions are only capable of covering over the 
role of the radical imaginary, not eliminating completely.  The radical imaginary still 
poses a threat to the instituted-imaginary.  Despite the fact that bureaucratic-capitalist 
institutions degrade the public realm and attempt to fully rationalize the production 
process, the radical imaginary cannot be completely eliminated and continues to 
challenge the instituted-imaginary.  Thus, while the public sphere is delegitimized and 
degraded, challenges to the bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary continue to surge forth, 
particularly in the capitalist work place. 
At the core of the bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary and its goal to fully rationalize 
the world lays a serious contradiction that threatens the stability of the system and allows 
for the surging forth of the radical imaginary to challenge the established institutional 
apparatus.  This contradiction emerges in the space between the bureaucratic-capitalist 
signification of instrumental rationality and the actual and continuous expression of the 
radical imaginary both by individuals and by groups.  The bureaucratic-capitalist claim 
concerning human rationality is a narrow view of agency and does not account for the 
actual range of human behavior that exists in a bureaucratic-capitalist society.  
Castoriadis argues that, “personne ne fonctionne en essayant constamment de 




ne pourrait le faire.” 31  Choices are made without regard to utility and are instead based 
on a conglomeration of factors existing in a particular society.  Human rationality, even 
when exercised in a given situation, is, at best, limited, given the fact, for example, that 
full information is typically not available in the calculation of utility.  Furthermore, many 
choices are non-rational or irrational, based instead on the myriad of other factors that 
comprise the decision-making process.  However, in order for the capitalist system to 
continue to function, it must promulgate the imaginary signification that human beings 
act only according to a rational calculation of utility.  Since the capitalist system is one of 
the dominant institutions of the modern era, its imaginary has a strong influence on the 
socialization and the psychic development of each individual living in that society.  As 
such, the individual is socialized to believe that she should make decisions based on 
maximizing her utility and will in fact make decisions based on such a calculus.  Despite 
the socialization process, however, human beings will continue to act “irrationally” since 
the radical imaginary can never be completely eliminated.  It is from this space between 
the socialized and the unsocialized self that the contradiction of the bureaucratic-
capitalist system emerges.   
According to Castoriadis, the contradiction of capitalism is that while 
bureaucratic-capitalist institutions seek to eliminate the radical imaginary and the 
creativity of the worker, they rely on this creativity for the continuous functioning of the 
system.  Bureaucratic-capitalism tries “to convert the producer into a mere cog in their 
machinery.  But in so doing they kill in him what they need most, productivity and 
creative ability.”32  If capitalist institutions were to succeed in eliminating the radical 




contradiction at the heart of capitalism will not lead to a crisis or the collapse of the 
system.  Rather, this contradiction sustains the bureaucratic-capitalist system, in the sense 
that the instituted-imaginary is able to respond and adapt to challenges that emerge from 
the instituting-radical imaginary.  Bureaucratic-capitalism is a dynamic system sustained, 
in part, by challenges to its instituted-imaginary.  Thus, the system is able to pursue its 
overarching goal of total rational mastery of the society in which it exists, while making 
particular concessions vis-à-vis any challenges that surge forth from the collective radical 
imaginary.  In essence, bureaucratic-capitalism co-opts worker creativity while it seeks to 
ignore and eliminate the radical imaginary.  If workers have forced a rise in real wages, 
the lowering of unemployment, or other reforms, the bureaucratic system accepts this and 
regards it as necessary for its continued existence, not as a mortal threat.33  It is this 
relationship which has allowed capitalism to develop from an overtly exploitive system, 
where the worker was considered disposable to a more diverse system where exploitation 
still exists, but there are also many worker-owned companies, health care and pension 
plans, overtime pay, and a plethora of other reforms that the system conceded to worker 
resistance.  Though there have been few significant challenges to the bureaucratic-
capitalist system at the level of its instituted-imaginary, this does not imply that worker 
resistance is meaningless.  The dynamism of the bureaucratic-capitalist system and its 
reliance on the creativity of the worker is what allows the possibility of significant 
challenges to emerge that question the legitimacy of the instituted-imaginary.  Such 
challenges occur regularly within bureaucratic-capitalist system and are significant in the 




bureaucratic-capitalist institutions to account for the role that worker creativity plays in 
the maintenance of the system. 
One important example of this tension between the bureaucratic-capitalist 
imaginary and the radical, instituting imaginary is the contestability of time in the work 
place.  Castoriadis argues that the very concept of time becomes a critical ground for the 
struggle between management and labor.34  The bureaucratic-capitalist firm attempts to 
rationally plan each and every minute of the workday in order to maximize production 
efficiency, imposing this time clock on every worker.  The purpose of the rational time 
clock is to plan and account for every action the worker is to perform during a particular 
period of time.  Within one hour, for example, the worker is expected to perform a certain 
number of tasks.  In this manner, the bureaucratic-capitalist firm attempts to exert its 
control over the workplace by seeking to eliminate the initiative and creativity of the 
worker.  Management in any bureaucratic-capitalist firm will seek to regiment the entire 
work day, parsing the hour into discrete minutes of work, in order to assert maximum 
control over what the workers are doing while in the workplace.  Since the worker is 
considered another machine in the production process, every minute of the day should be 
accounted for, and the worker should be working for every minute of the workday.   
The contestability of time is one of Castoriadis’ most significant contributions to 
the critique of bureaucratic-capitalism, a critique that was neglected by Karl Marx.  
Castoriadis argues that not recognizing the contestability of time is one of Marx’s 
greatest mistakes.35  In his labor theory of value, Marx takes for granted the fact that a 
worker can be paid a particular price for a certain “unit” of labor.  Through this line of 




reduced to, and compensated according to, an economic calculation.36  However, 
according to Castoriadis, time is one of the most important points of struggle between 
management and labor, in the sense that it opens a space for the expression of the radical 
imaginary as a challenge to the instituted-imaginary.  More importantly, it exposes the 
absurdity of the bureaucratic-capitalist goal of rational mastery.  The worker fights 
against the bureaucratically regimented schedule, asserting his individuality and 
creativity by refusing to be reduced to another machine in the production process.  The 
absurdity of the bureaucratic-capitalist system is exposed by the fact that if this struggle 
over the time clock did not occur, and if each worker acted solely according to the 
bureaucratic schedule, the system would not function.  Castoriadis points out the 
absurdity of management schedules by arguing that “work to the rule” strikes are some of 
the most effective tactics in the workers’ struggle.37  In such a strike, workers do their 
jobs exactly according to management dictates, with the result of decreasing production 
efficiency in the workplace.   
The efficacy of “work to the rule” tactics points to the second absurdity in the 
bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary.  Castoriadis argues that the workers themselves are 
more knowledgeable about the capitalist production process than the managerial class 
could ever be, given the fact that workers are in closer contact to the process itself.38  The 
directors really know nothing about the production process; the workers themselves are 
the ones who are the most knowledgeable, and they tend to keep this information from 
the managerial stratum.  Because of this fact, the managerial bureaucracy constrains the 
workers and stifles the creativity that keeps the system going, rather than actually 




rational planning is ridiculous, as the dictates of the managerial class more often impede 
the production process rather than streamline it.  Castoriadis illustrates this point through 
an examination of the introduction of new managerial dictates in a machine shop.  In 
order to more “rationally” control the workday in the shop, management promulgated a 
new set of rules regarding the distribution of tools.  Previously, workers had checked out 
tools in advance and left them at their workstation, which allowed each worker to control 
the amount of time he would spend on a particular task.  The easy availability of his tools 
allowed him to switch from task to task as he saw fit.  The managerial bureaucracy, 
however, viewed this as unacceptable, since it amounted to a usurpation of time by the 
workers.  As a result, management created a series of rules, demanding that workers only 
take the tools they needed for the particular task assigned to them by management and 
return those tools once they were finished.  The results of this “rational” planning were 
long lines at the “tool crib”, increased work for the tool managers, and a general 
inefficiency in the production process.  The workers responded by wholly ignoring and 
subverting management directives.40   
The example of the management-worker relationship in the machine shop above 
reveals the critical role the worker plays in supporting and reproducing the very 
institutions that oppress him.  In the case of the machine shop that Castoriadis describes, 
the workers take action in order to be allowed to do their jobs better.  They only revolt 
against the absurd mandates passed down from management, and do not explicitly call 
the bureaucratic-capitalist system into question.  Such situations reveal the repressive 
capacity of the instituted-imaginary and the depth of the system’s influence over the 




society, those living in such a society will tend to defend capitalism as an institution, 
regardless of their position in the hierarchy of the division of labor.  Those in 
management positions, either in capitalist firms or within the bureaucracy, will defend the 
system most vociferously, since they benefit the most from the established institutional 
framework.  The worker, on the other hand, challenges management, but the limited 
forms of resistance serve to sustain and reproduce the bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary.   
Thus, the worker is caught in a bind: his resistance to the system is necessary in order to 
prevent the bureaucratic-capitalist firm from reducing him to an automaton, but this same 
resistance, emerging from his own initiative and creativity, allows the system to continue 
to function.  Thus, despite the fact that capitalism has evolved into a less exploitive 
system as a direct result of worker resistance, the underlying bureaucratic-capitalist goal 
of eliminating the radical imaginary has not changed.  While capitalist firms are no 
longer characterized by low wages and poor working conditions, the bureaucratic 
capitalist project seeks the creation of a totally alienated, planned, hierarchically 
organized, and continuously expanding society wherein the alienation of the worker is 
compensated by a rising standard of living, and where all initiative is taken from the 
workers and given over to the bureaucratic organizers.  This project thwarts the revolt of 
the workers by involving them and harnessing them to the race for rising living 
standards.41  As a result, the worker becomes more compliant in the face of the capitalist 
system’s attempt to reduce her to an automaton.  This only serves to increase the 




The Crisis of Meaning in Advanced Modern Societies 
The real crisis that faces those living in advanced capitalist societies is a crisis of 
meaning.  Capitalism cannot offer a meaning to the world beyond the drive for the 
accumulation of more and more goods.  In the past, values, whether right or wrong, 
provided clear and cohesive answers to social problems.42  This is not the case in 
advanced bureaucratic-capitalist societies.  Individuals must confront the existing 
instituted-modern institutional structure on their own, because this institutional structure 
seeks to break down the community of individuals, both in civil society and in the public 
sphere.  As bureaucratic-capitalist institutions dictate the manner in which society should 
be organized, the public sphere is further degraded, forcing individuals to retreat into the 
one area where they continue to maintain a modicum of control, the private sphere.  
However, as bureaucratic institutions expand, the private sphere itself no longer serves as 
a refuge for the individual.  The public sphere is degraded to such an extent that political 
decision-making is severely constrained; challenges to the instituted-modern imaginary 
are marginalized.  In civil society and in the private sphere, bureaucratic-capitalism 
intrudes to the extent that relationships between individuals become instrumentalized, 
thus exacerbating the problem of atomistic individualism.  Castoriadis argues that 
bureaucratic-capitalist societies are constrained in constructing new imaginary 
significations, leading to a situation where he characterizes late modern societies as 
“dilapidated” or “adrift.”43  
“Human life is paradoxical at its core, while modern reason, penetrating into new 
corners of life, strives to eliminate every paradox it encounters.  This is a dangerous 




rationalization is not confined to capitalist production.  The same logic pervades 
throughout the whole of society, from politics, to culture, to interpersonal relationships.  
All these facets of life are subjected to a calculus of efficiency and maximization of 
utility.  As a result, capitalist societies become dilapidated; those living in such societies 
are less able to create new significations to challenge the existing institutional framework 
or to respond to new challenges faced by the society.  Such societies rely on the same 
scripts of efficiency and rationalization to meet every challenge, regardless of whether 
such scripts are appropriate.  Rationalization and dehumanization go hand in hand; as the 
first moves forward, so does the second.  The rationalization of production requires 
crushing the needs, habits, and desires of the population insofar as they interfere or 
oppose the logic of production efficiency.45  It is in this “flattening out” of the complexity 
of human life that bureaucratic-capitalism exerts its most repressive capabilities. 
As the rationalization of society progresses, existing institutions are less able to 
answer the questions posed to them by those living in society.  Institutions provide 
meaning and certainty for the society in which they exist.  Instituted-modern institutions 
are less able to provide the meaning that individuals living in advanced modern societies 
crave.  Because modern imaginary significations are ultimately centered on human 
beings, there is no way to provide the transcendent certainty that religion supplied in pre-
modern times.  This, however, does not mean that modern institutions do not claim to 
provide the same degree of certainty; the problem is that science and rationality routinely 
fail, creating a constant potential for crisis in modern institutions.  One of the paradoxes 
of modern society is that on the one hand, technology gives human beings tremendous 




sense of impotence and chaos pervading modern society.46  Because the modern 
imaginary posits no authority higher than human beings, all sources of legitimacy and all 
institutions are constructed by the individuals living within a particular society.  Human 
beings, however, are fallible and mortal therefore, the institutional sources of authority 
that exist in instituted-modern society, such as reason and science, are unstable and 
unable to definitively answer the questions posed to them by the collective.  In the pre-
modern world, people were more completely alienated from the social institutions that 
governed them.  These social institutions were completely beyond the control of the 
collective they governed.  However, pre-modern alienation also led to a stronger sense of 
certainty and stability.  Pre-modern institutions were able to create certainty by placing 
everything in the hands of a supra-human heteronomous authority.  The actions of such 
an authority were mysterious and unknowable, but the accepted assumption was that this 
authority had some greater plan for all human beings.  For example, the death of a child 
is more easily understood if a parent accepts that it is God’s will that the child died.  
Science, on the other hand, can tell a parent how that child is dying and the physical 
processes that are occurring within that child’s body that will lead to his death.  However, 
science can never answer the more profound, existential question “why?”  As a result, the 
modern individual is provided with a greater understanding of the world in which he 
exists.  However, he sacrifices the certainty of the heteronomous society in order to 
obtain this knowledge.   
Modern social science has promised certitude and self-knowledge as the result of 
a rationalist quest for meaning.  It has not kept this promise.  Where there is certitude, 




Individuals in instituted-modern societies face a world where science claims to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the world.  Instituted-modern institutions claim that this 
understanding can be translated into meaning for an individual’s life.  However, the 
meaning that science provides serves to reproduce the bureaucratic-capitalist drive 
towards the full rationalization of the society.  Thus, meaning in instituted-modern 
society does not provide self-knowledge, but rather serves the imperatives of the existing 
instituted imaginary.  Instituted-modern science does not seek to increase the individual’s 
ability to know her own self.  Rather, the practice of science is governed by bureaucratic 
organizational methods.  A bureaucracy is imposed over scientific research, leading to 
irrational organization.  Also, it demands efficiency and the rapid production of results.  
Furthermore, a bias is created that favors already existent methods and fields of research 
that have proven efficient.  As a result, potentially fruitful research programs that lie 
outside this scope will be blocked.48  Thus, the individual cannot turn to science for self-
knowledge. 
  Self-knowledge requires self-reflection, both on an individual and on a collective 
level.  Knowing that we create the institutions that govern us leads to the political 
responsibility that we also commit ourselves to reflecting upon these institutions, in order 
to insure that they remain connected to the collective and do not become alienated.  This 
is a difficult state to achieve, and one that is not guaranteed by the emancipatory potential 
of the modern imaginary.  When modern institutions are alienated, uncertainty is a more 
powerful force, in the sense that there is no authority beyond the human being to which 
the modern individual can turn.  As a result, modern individuals make a bargain with the 




imaginary for the certainty of alienation, allowing instituted-modern institutions to 
depoliticize the public realm while the individual confines herself to the private sphere.   
The instituted-modern imaginary responds to the crisis of meaning in advanced 
capitalist societies by offering the ability for each individual to consume without limits.  
Today, the only value in bureaucratic-capitalist society is consumption and it is unable to 
provide any answers to the myriad of social problems affecting Western societies.  
Consumption is an open-ended process that perpetuates and refutes itself, and one can 
never have enough to fulfill this value.49  The individual in modern Western society is 
driven to consume, even though he can never accumulate enough to satisfy this desire.  
Since his life is governed primarily by this drive to consume, other avenues for the 
construction of meaning are closed off to him.  In essence, the individual’s life becomes 
hollow and devoid of any meaning beyond that which he can buy.  Consumption in 
instituted-modern societies is reinforced by the development of a culture industry that 
convinces the individual to construct his identity according to material accumulation. The 
culture industry constructs needs in advanced capitalist societies, which can only be 
fulfilled through consumption.50  These needs become an integral element to the 
instituted-modern imaginary, playing a significant influence in the construction of the 
individual living in advanced capitalist societies.  The culture industry in modern society 
creates needs for the consumer and these needs are strictly delimited.  According to the 
logic of the instituted-modern imaginary, the consumer must be shown that the 
deceptions the culture industry offers leads to satisfaction and also that the consumer 
must accept whatever the industry offers him.51  Furthermore, the development of the 




construction of needs by the culture industry successfully distracts the individual from 
any form of meaningful political participation by convincing him that public action 
consists solely of consuming in the economic market.  “Both the department stores of 
yesteryear and the megastores of today usher individuals into a peculiar version of public 
space, assuming their willingness to receive an illusion of communal experience while 
happily steeping themselves in the commercial whirlwind.”52  Thus, the culture industry 
succeeds in redefining public participation, which in fact serves to push the individual 
further into private life and away from the creative political possibilities that exist within 
modern society.  As a result, the established institutions are able to exert a greater level of 
repression on those living in these particular societies.  The existing institutional 
apparatus can continue to delegitimize the radical imaginary, without resistance from the 
collective over which it governs.  As a result, the feelings of alienation and powerlessness 
become more pervasive among those living in instituted-modern societies, and these 
individuals are less able to create alternatives meanings to the dominant value of 
consumption.  
The dominance of consumption and the depoliticization of the public domain also 
creates a situation where individuals are unable to connect with one another, with the 
world, or with the institutions that govern them.  The fact that modern individuals must 
place their trust in alienated institutions guarantees unrestrained bureaucratic power over 
the individual’s life.  In the absence of any alternative, individuals must place their trust 
in the expertise of bureaucrats, who strive to remain disconnected from society in order to 
insulate themselves questioning and criticism.  As a result, the instituted-modern 




individual, disconnected from other individuals, develops an identity according to the 
dictates of bureaucratic-capitalist organizational methods.  Thus, within the workplace, 
the individual is placed within a specific hierarchy, which shapes his identity.   
Coupled with the deracination that results of the development of modern society, 
every individual living in instituted-modern societies comes into contact with 
bureaucratic-capitalist institutions to which they are unable to connect in any meaningful 
way.  The repressive power of the instituted-modern imaginary emerges from this 
relationship of individual to the institutions.  Individuals in instituted-modern societies 
are socialized into a hierarchical society, which is reinforced on a daily basis in the 
workplace to the extent that each individual constructs his identity around his position 
within this hierarchy.  The concept of hierarchy is so ingrained in the psyche of modern 
man that he is unable to represent himself to himself without reference to his position in 
some hierarchy.  This is the only means by which a person can reaffirm that he is 
someone in a bureaucratic-capitalist society.  All other definitions have been emptied of 
their content.53  For example, national identity once served as a meaningful identity for 
those living in modern societies.  Today, however, national identity is completely 
reactive, serving the needs of the bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary.  On the one hand, 
national identity is tied to the value of consumption.  Thus, it is an individual’s patriotic 
duty to consume in the capitalist marketplace.  After September 11, 2001, for example, 
the Bush administration stated, “the primary responsibility of the average citizen for the 
duration of the emergency remained what it had been in more peaceful times: to be an 
engine of consumption.”54  The other purpose of national identity is to defend the 




imaginary serves the bureaucratic-capitalist apparatus by mobilizing the society around a 
particular conception of the national identity.  For example, the Cold War introduced a 
permanent, militarist mobilization into American nationalism, where confrontation with 
enemies was the driving force behind American national identity.  This was tied to the 
military-industrial complex and academic allies.55  Nationalism is not concerned with 
constructing solidarity or community among the citizenry or providing an identity beyond 
the individual.  Rather, it serves the production process itself and the bureaucratic-
capitalist institutional structure.  Questioning this vision of the national identity becomes 
marginalized; “in the domestic arena, it is extremely difficult to suggest that any aspects 
of the American system are worse than those of other countries, or that America could 
learn from other countries.  To do so would attract charges of lack of national pride and 
of ‘apologizing for America.’”56  In addition, national identity is constructed in Other-
directed terms; “nationalism thrives on irrational hatreds and on the portrayal of other 
nations or ethnoreligious groups as congenitally, irredeemably wicked and hostile.”57  
Thus, for example, the Muslim world is not modern; they hate our freedom and seek to 
destroy our way of life.  What is being threatened is not a commitment to democratic 
values or autonomy, but rather the Other represents an attack on late modern 
bureaucratic-capitalism.  This instituted-modern form of nationalism only serves to 
reproduce the instituted bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary and exacerbates the crisis of 
meaning that exists in late modern societies. 
Ejected from the public sphere and unable to develop forms of identity that are 
independent of the bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary, individuals in the private sphere are 




As a result, the private sphere, once the refuge of the individual from the public domain, 
becomes subject to the same bureaucratic-capitalist rationality that dominates the 
individual’s life in the work place.  Zygmunt Bauman argues that individuals respond to 
this intrusion by retreating from the private sphere into the physical self, the only 
apparent refuge remaining.  However, the physical self as a refuge from the bureaucratic-
capitalist imaginary is illusory.  The individual, socialized by a dilapidated instituted-
modern society, carries the dominant imaginary significations into his relationship with 
his physical body.  Bauman argues, the health craze of the 1980's and 1990's (and which 
continues to this day) is indicative of the privatization of modern life.  The alienation and 
disorientation that people feel living in modern society leads them to assert control over 
the only possible avenue, namely the physical body.  People are able to fully control what 
they eat and how often they work out.  However, even in this situation, alienation is 
rampant.  The mass media creates an image of the perfect body that is impossible to 
attain.  Despite this, individuals continually strive to have the most toned muscles and the 
perfect figure.58  The significance of this privatization of modern life is that individuals 
become concerned solely with the self, allowing the public realm to be dominated by the 
existing bureaucratic institutions.  As such, these institutions are able to endure and 
reproduce themselves without questioning from the collective.  Those living in modern 
society play a significant role in allowing these institutions to persist, as their inactivity 
only reinforces the modern significations that serve as the foundation for the institutions 




Bureaucracy and Totalitarianism 
While fragmented bureaucratic-capitalist systems seek to completely eliminate the 
creativity and independent initiative of the worker, the individual’s radical imaginary can 
never be completely subjected to rational planning.  The radical imaginary always surges 
forth, whether in a revolutionary movement at one extreme, or in the individual’s refusal 
to fully comply with regulations in the workplace, particularly when these regulations 
prevent the individual worker from doing her job.  The goal of rational planning is 
ultimately impossible as the worker always asserts his creativity against the dictates of 
the managerial bureaucracy.  Fragmented bureaucratic-capitalist systems rely on this fact 
in order to continue functioning.  This, however, does not mitigate the problem of 
dilapidation, where new imaginary significations are not created and individuals living in 
these societies are less able to pose new challenges to the existing instituted-imaginary.  
Furthermore, the bureaucratic-capitalist structure continues to attempt the complete 
rationalization of the society.  The bureaucracy will operate as if it can subject the whole 
of human existence to rational planning and control.  What emerges from this 
bureaucratic project and from the instituted-modern imaginary is a totalitarian potential. 
Totalitarianism, therefore, is not a direct product of the modern imaginary in any 
deterministic sense, but a particular creative instauration of aspects of the instituted-
modern.  Totalitarianism does not represent an anti-modern institution or an aberration in 
the modern project.  Rather, it is one possible path that follows the logic of the modern 
imaginary.  The totalitarian project represents the instauration of the most alienating 
elements of instituted-modernity through the creation of an unrestricted bureaucracy.  




Union, where the bureaucracy ascended to the position of the ruling class.59  For 
Castoriadis, the central issue of contemporary capitalism is not who owns the means of 
production, but rather who controls them.     
In fragmented bureaucratic capitalist systems, the economic market is only 
partially managed by the bureaucratic apparatus.  As such, the bureaucracy is unable to 
achieve its task of fully organizing its world under the aegis of rational planning.  Since 
the capitalist relies on the radical imaginary for its continued existence, the bureaucracy 
tolerates expressions of creativity, so long as they are restricted to the reproduction of the 
existing institutions.  In total bureaucratic systems, the means of production are fully 
controlled by the bureaucracy.  There is no economic market to maintain, as production is 
completely managed by the bureaucratic apparatus.  As a result, the bureaucracy is able 
to more fully extend its reach into society in general, creating a situation where every 
aspect of human life falls under the purview of bureaucratic planning.  Worker disconnect 
is suppressed, either through direct repression or the destruction of independent worker 
organizations such as unions.  In essence, totalitarianism represents an attempt by a 
government to completely eradicate the radical imaginary. 
 Recognizing the role of the bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary is Castoriadis’ most 
important contribution to the theory of totalitarianism.  Essentially, Castoriadis agrees 
with the theories of totalitarianism presented by Raymond Aron, Hannah Arendt, and 
Claude Lefort.60  For example, Castoriadis argues that one important contribution that 
Hannah Arendt makes to the theory of totalitarianism is her recognition that in addition to 
creating meaning, human beings can also create the meaningless, represented by the 




he argues that these theorists, by failing to recognize the role the bureaucratic-capitalist 
imaginary, provide an incomplete picture of the totalitarian phenomenon.  Thus, 
Castoriadis’ conception of the totalitarian project fills in an important lacuna present in 
the work of Aron, Arendt, and Lefort.  By examining bureaucratization as a factor, one 
can conclude that totalitarianism does not represent an anti-modern project.  Rather, its 
roots lie within the modern imaginary itself, specifically the instituted-modern 
imaginary’s drive to expand rational mastery of the world without limitation.  This drive 
for complete rational mastery exists within fragmented bureaucratic-capitalist societies, 
but achieves its greatest expression in totalitarian regimes. 
 Totalitarianism does not “emerge” or “evolve” from a set of pre-existing social 
and political conditions, but rather represents the intentional and creative instauration of a 
new political form.  The revolutionary party seeks to completely transform the society 
according to its ideological goals.62  Lefort further argues that one intention of the 
revolutionary party is to “solve” the “problem” of democracy.  Unlike non-democratic 
forms of government, where the king or leader embodies the power of the body politic, in 
a democratic system, the locus of power is empty.63  Democracy, with no permanent 
leader, also has no figure to embody power.  Power in a democracy exists in an empty 
void.  It is exercised, not held by any single individual.64  As such, in democratic 
societies, the citizenry must accept a certain level of uncertainty about the future; they 
cannot rely on the dictates of a person in power to determine the future for them.  They 
are ultimately responsible for the course the society takes.  Totalitarianism as a political 
creation seeks to eliminate the uncertainty present in a democracy by imposing a unified 




In essence, it seeks to create an organic totality in society where previously, under a 
democracy, there had been none.65
Lefort is correct in his conclusion that the unpredictability of democratic power is 
one of the sources of totalitarianism, in the sense that human beings crave certainty and 
predictability in their lives, in response to the dread they face vis-à-vis the radical 
imaginary.  However, the uncertainty that exists in instituted-modern society is less the 
product of democratic institutions and more a result of the bureaucratic-capitalist 
imaginary and its reliance on the persistence of uncertainty to insure its domination.  
Uncertainty is more than a political phenomenon; it is economic, social, cultural, and, at 
the most profound level, an uncertainty about the markers of meaning and certainty in the 
society.  This pervasive uncertainty, created by the bureaucratic-capitalist institutional 
structure, is what totalitarian movements are able to exploit in their rise to power.  
Totalitarianism is the end extreme of the project of pseudo-rational domination that is one 
of the central significations of bureaucracy and capitalism.66  Totalitarian movements 
claim to provide answers for all the problems that emerge in instituted-modern societies, 
providing a plan for the resolution of all uncertainties in a particular society.   
Totalitarian states construct a political domain that absorbs all other non-political 
spheres of human life.  Lefort argues that one of the characteristics of liberal regimes is 
the existence of a rule of law that dictates what one cannot do, rather than what one can 
do.  As such, a great portion of human action is ignored by the law.  This is not the case 
in totalitarian societies; all aspects of life are susceptible to the “rule of law.”67  In 
addition to this expansive concept of “law”, Aron argues that totalitarian societies can be 




institutes laws that allow the state to perform acts that would be considered criminal in 
non-totalitarian regimes. 68  In essence, “law” only exists to dominate the individual, 
destroy any possibility of political participation in the public domain, and expand the 
reach of the state into the private sphere.  Arendt argues that totalitarian government 
destroys the public sphere by isolated human beings from one another and furthermore 
“is new in that it is not content with this isolation and destroys private life as well.”69  
The state’s ability to extend into the private domain is strengthened by the bureaucracy’s 
drive to dominate and subject the whole of society to rational planning.  As a result, in 
totalitarian societies, there is no private domain; the individual is unable to escape the 
reach of the state.  This serves to further atomize the society, making it impossible for 
individuals to resist the totalitarian state through any form of collective action.  The 
individual has a one-sided relationship with the state itself, in the sense that the state 
dictates and determines how each individual will live his life; individuals have no 
significant relationship with other individuals.   
While totalitarian movements claim the ability to provide certainty to individual, 
once in power, the totalitarian imaginary relies on fear and uncertainty to remain in 
power.  Arendt, for example, argues that totalitarian governments are fluid and dynamic, 
where the locus of power shifts from department to department and where no department, 
once deprived of its power, is dissolved.70  The purpose of this fluidity is to exacerbate 
uncertainty in the society.  No individual is able to predict the actions of his government, 
nor is he able to determine which department in the government is an ascendant power.  
As a result, the possibility of questioning the government is eliminated; no one can 




 Totalitarian states also insure uncertainty and fear through the use of terror against 
the population.  Terrorism succeeds in completely atomizing the society; no individual 
can trust another, because any person might be an agent of the state.71  The use of terror 
by the totalitarian regime appears random and arbitrary, directed against “enemies of the 
state”, real, imagined, or manufactured.  As such, an individual living under such a 
regime can never be certain whether the regime will consider her a criminal at some 
future time.  The shifting repertoire of “crimes” that can be committed against the state 
forces the individual to take no action of any kind, to the extent that any independent 
activity by individual could easily be classified as criminal.  Thus, a paralysis endures in 
totalitarian societies, where the individual must carefully insure that he does not commit 
some offense against the system, even if he is uncertain about what type of actions would 
constitute such an offense.  The arbitrary use of terror by the totalitarian regime “negates 
human freedom more efficiently than any tyranny ever could.  One had at least to be an 
enemy of tyranny in order to be punished by it.”72  This is not true under totalitarianism; 
any act can be considered a crime against the state and any individual, regardless of what 
he has or has not done, can be classified an enemy. 
The novelty of the totalitarian imaginary is that it actively seeks to completely 
eradicate the radical imaginary.  This differs from the fragmented bureaucratic-capitalist 
imaginary in the sense in a fragmented capitalist society the radical imaginary is allowed 
to emerge in a limited capacity, so long as it serves to reproduce bureaucratic-capitalist 
institutions.  The totalitarian imaginary, by contrast, engages in a political program to 
eliminate all vestiges of human creativity.  As such, totalitarian regimes represent the 




mastery over the world.  “Men insofar as they are more than animal reaction and 
fulfillment of function are entirely superfluous to totalitarian regimes.”73  The totalitarian 
system actively seeks to reduce the individual to an automaton, not only in the workplace, 
as in fragmented bureaucratic-systems, but in society as a whole.  The expansive goal of 
the totalitarian system in this regard marks it as a unique social-historical creation.  The 
ideological agenda of the totalitarian party can only be achieved in a technologically 
advanced, modern society.  As such, totalitarianism represents a “perfect” bureaucratic-
capitalist system, where the spontaneous creativity of the individual can be completely 
destroyed, insuring that those living under totalitarian regimes will serve the state without 
challenge.  However, totalitarian regimes are ultimately incapable of achieving this goal 
over a sustained period of time. 
 Like Hannah Arendt, who argues for a very limited definition of totalitarianism, 
applying it only to the Soviet Union under Stalin and Hitler’s Germany, Castoriadis 
considers the death of Stalin as the end of the Soviet version of “pure” totalitarianism.  
The Third Reich could not survive World War II and the Soviet totalitarian system could 
not survive beyond the death of Stalin.  However, after Stalin’s death, a new political 
form was created that represented the continuation of an institutional apparatus based on 
the total bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary.  When the system began to stagnate after the 
death of Stalin, the goals of the totalitarian apparatus changed.  The regime, for example, 
no longer sought to pursue delirious aims, abandoned the total disregard for efficiency in 
the production process, and the party ideology decomposed into incoherence.74  
Furthermore, instead of seeking to actually transform the populace, the later Soviet 




challenge the system, one was safe.75  The late Soviet system is described by Castoriadis 
as a “stratocracy.”  Essentially, two economic systems exist within the society.  The first 
is the military economy, which receives the majority of resources from the state, and, 
according to Castoriadis, was competitive with Western military production.76  The 
second system, the civilian economy, is neglected and allowed to stagnate and fall into 
crisis.  Few resources are devoted to producing consumer goods, and whatever is 
produced is poor quality.77  This sector of the economy is concerned solely with feeding a 
workforce that can service the primary tier of the economy.  So long as the workers keep 
producing in the military factories, this “soft” totalitarian system can continue to 
function.  In essence, the late Soviet model “solved” the problem of human creativity by 
simply disregarding the existence of its population.  However, the construction of this 
two-tiered economy guaranteed the eventual collapse of the Soviet system.  Once the 
active eradication of the radical imaginary was abandoned as a political goal, a space 
opened within the Soviet economy for worker resistance.  Through malingering on the 
job, for example, the Soviet worker was more able to resist the dictates of the managerial 
bureaucracy, eventually leading to situation where the Soviet system became 
unreformable, leading the Soviet Union to eventually collapse under its own weight. 
 In the end totalitarian systems are unsustainable.  Despite its best efforts, the 
bureaucracy can never completely eliminate the radical imaginary from the individual or 
from the collective.  A totalitarian dictatorship can stifle and suppress dissent, but it can 
never stop workers from realizing the misery of their own situation and cannot prevent 
sabotage in the form of refusal to cooperate in the system of production on the part of the 




transform the world according to its ideology.  When it inevitably fails to accomplish this 
task, the regime lashes out against the population, destroying whatever it cannot 
transform.  In Castoriadian terms, violence is a political tool employed by the totalitarian 
regime in its attempt to fully socialize and eradicate the radical imaginary.  The radical 
imaginary exists as a persistent challenge to any institutional apparatus.  The fragmented 
bureaucratic-capitalist system can absorb, to some extent, the product of spontaneous 
creativity and adapt to the demands of the population.  The total bureaucratic-capitalist 
system cannot do this, because its ideology demands complete rationalization and a total 
mastery of the world.  As such, it must eradicate the radical imaginary in order to exist.  
Since this is impossible, the regime turns to violence, destroying everything that cannot 
be controlled.  This is where the social imperative lies for the society to resist any move 
towards totalitarianism.  If a society does not resist this move, it will descend into 
barbarism. 
While the situation in instituted-modern societies appears hopeless, Castoriadis 
argues that resistance to the established capitalist system still exists and is necessary.  The 
dominance of consumption as a value, and the co-optation of the worker, whether 
industrial or service sector, does not delegitimize the importance of resistance to the 
fundamental drive of the capitalist system, nor does it delegitimize resistance in society in 
general.  Castoriadis argues, “le capitalisme a pu fonctionner non pas malgré les luttes 
ouvriéres, mais grâce B celles-ci.  Mais, on ne peut pas s’arrLter B cette constatation; sans 
ces luttes, nous ne vivrions pas dans la société ou nous vivons, mais dans une société 
fondée sur le travail d’esclaves industriels.”79  Without resistance, the situation can 




the capitalist drive to eliminate creativity and the radical imaginary.  If no one were to 
resist the established institutional order, the given society would degenerate into a more 
repressive system than currently exists.  In Castoriadis’ estimation, it is the struggle 
against the instituted imaginary itself that matters first and foremost, though it is a 
difficult task to convince the average individual of the importance of this struggle.  
Because human beings are socialized by the institutions of the society in which they are 
born, they believe that these institutions are good for themselves and for those around 
them.  At worst, they may view these institutions as oppressive, but are resigned to the 
fact that there is little they can do to change them.  The question, therefore, is not whether 
to resist and question existing institutions.  The questioning of institutions is a product of 
the fact that every individual retains an unsocialized and unsocializable radical 
imaginary.  As such, people will always resist existing institutions to some degree, 
though this type of resistance may be individualized and politically ineffective.  The real 
question is how this resistance should be expressed collectively and what goal the society 
should attempt to achieve.  
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Democracy on the Edge of the Abyss 
Democratic theory must develop some limitation to democratic participation in 
order to insure that the democratic system itself is not destroyed by the emerging of 
political ideas hostile to the system itself.  However, the imposition of absolute restraints 
on participation, while it may protect the individual, does not adequately address the 
dangers of the democratic system.  Anti-democratic doctrines must be engaged in some 
manner, if only to refute and discredit them.  Theories of democratic discourse, which 
emphasize more robust participation, are more successful in constructing the limitations 
necessary to prevent the self-destruction of democratic systems. 
Jeffrey Isaac argues that one of the central problems of democratic theory today is 
that it has too narrow a vision, and is unable to conceive of anything beyond a strict 
model of liberal, representative democracy.1  Democratic theory today posits a model of 
democracy that ignores civil society, promotes representative forms of government, 
provides for election of officials through universal suffrage, possesses a liberal 
conception of rights, and creates a competitive system wherein officials are forced to 
appeal to the public.2  The emphasis that democratic theory places on individual rights 
and the procedural elements of democracy neglects the role that the collective of citizens, 
through the radical imaginary, plays in the construction of meaning in any particular 
society.  Every society must construct an institutional framework through which it comes 
to understand the world around it and the society’s place in that world.  Furthermore, 
each existing institution is constantly challenged by the collective and individual radical 




structure, demanding that the instituted imaginary provide meaning for new social-
historical circumstances.  The relationship of the individual to the radical imaginary is a 
confrontation with an inexplicable and irreducible Abyss, leading the individual to feel a 
sense of dread when faced with the potentially dark desires that emerge from the radical 
imaginary.  As a result, individuals seek to create meaning for the world around them that 
will provide a stable anchor for themselves and for the societies in which they live.  
Institutions must be able to address and provide meaning for new social-historical 
circumstances in order to continue to provide this stable anchor for the individual and for 
groups in the society.  When existing institutions cannot provide this meaning, the 
individuals in a particular society seek to construct new institutions that are better able to 
give meaning to the world. 
Modern democratic institutions are particularly susceptible to challenges that 
emerge from the collective radical imaginary.  The possibility of broad political 
participation opens the door for individuals and groups to pose a myriad of challenges to 
the existing institutional structure.  It is this possibility for political participation that 
makes democracy a potentially dangerous system of government, in the sense that 
without some limit on the content and form of public discourse, the democratic system 
itself can be threatened by new significations that emerge from the collective radical 
imaginary.  Claude Lefort recognizes this danger in his discussion of the emergence of 
totalitarianism, arguing that in democratic systems, the locus of power is empty.3  The 
potential for totalitarianism emerges when groups seek to definitively and permanently 
occupy the locus of power, turning the state towards the fulfillment of the group’s 




of power always remains the focal point for competition between groups in the 
democratic society.  When a democratic society exists without limits to participation, the 
potential arises for the emergence of ideologies and ideas that are inimical to the 
democratic system itself.  These ideologies seek to occupy the empty locus of power and 
turn the power of the state towards the fulfillment of ideological goals, even at the 
expense of the democratic system itself.  Given the fact that the radical imaginary plays a 
constitutive role in the development of these ideologies, the possibility arises for the 
occupation of the empty locus of democratic power by doctrines that are destructive to 
other groups in the society.  Democracy without limits allows for the most destructive 
human impulses and instincts to play out in the political domain.  As a result, in a 
democratic system without limits, democratic rights and values can easily be eroded or 
destroyed.  Carl Schmitt’s vision of agonistic competition between political doctrines 
defined in terms of friend and enemy illustrates the destructive possibilities of democratic 
participation.  Schmitt argues that politics and war are essentially synonymous, in the 
sense that all political doctrines must be defined in terms of friend and enemy and the 
conflict between these two factions.  Schmitt argues that “the friend, enemy, and combat 
concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of 
physical killing.”4  While Schmitt argues that the “the enemy in the political sense need 
not be hated personally”5, he conceives of no limitation to the definition of political 
doctrines, arguing that such doctrines can draw their energy from various human 
endeavors, including religion, economics, and morality.6  The individual adherent to a 
political doctrine must be willing to die, and to kill, in the furtherance of his beliefs.  




sovereign power of the state is exercised by defining who is a friend of the state and who 
constitutes an enemy, and then demanding that the citizen be willing to kill and die for 
this “us” versus “them” dichotomy.7  Schmitt’s conception of the political represents the 
destructive possibilities of democratic participation.  In essence, Schmitt advocates the 
unrestrained and unlimited intrusion of the Abyss of the radical imaginary into the 
political sphere, with no realm of mediation or limitation.  The worst human desires and 
instincts can become political, occupy the empty locus of power, and then turn the power 
of the state against its enemies, whether these enemies are present in the international 
sphere or internally.  As a result, a particular instituted imaginary can be imposed, in the 
name of democracy, through brute force or some other method of coercion.  As such, the 
Schmittian conception of political conflict is precisely what must be avoided within a 
democratic system.  Democratic theory must posit some form of limits in order to insure 
that political conflict does not lead to the degeneration or destruction of the democratic 
system.       
The crisis of meaning in instituted-modern societies and the dilapidation of the 
Western imaginary exacerbate the danger of political conflict leading to attacks on the 
democratic process itself.  Instituted-modern institutions attribute their legitimacy to 
human subjectivity and autonomy.  However, the public sphere in instituted-modern 
societies is degraded to the extent that individual turn to the private sphere for meaning 
and for the construction of their personal and collective identities.  In ancient Greece, 
according to Hannah Arendt, the household was the realm of necessity and servility.  
Slaves and women were confined to the private sphere, unable to participate in public 




realm, because only through public life could a man achieve excellence in the eyes of his 
peers.  The public realm was where an individual’s deeds could be observed and judged 
by others.  Other individuals were necessary for the Greek concept of excellence; only 
through one’s public deeds throughout one’s life could one be considered a good citizen 
and an excellent man.8  However, with the advent of industrial capitalism, the average 
person was forced to concern himself primarily with provided the bare necessities of life 
for himself and his dependents.9  As such, what Arendt describes as the realm of work 
took on a new importance, as the individual had to attempt to find some measure of 
certainty, specifically, insuring that he and his family could eat and have a roof over their 
heads in an increasingly uncertain economic, social, and political world. 
Hannah Arendt argues that freedom, the citizens’ ability to publicly participate in 
politics, and necessity, the dictates of bare life, are incompatible.  The modern era 
introduces the social question, the question of poverty, want, and deprivation, into the 
public sphere to the detriment of the political domain.  Arendt argues that beginning with 
the French Revolution, revolutionaries have sought to solve the social question.  As a 
result, freedom and political change, the goal of revolution, becomes subordinate to the 
material happiness of the people.10  According to Arendt, the introduction of the social 
question to the public domain is the doom of political revolution11 and poisonous to the 
public sphere.  Arendt argues that the social question, the question of providing the 
necessities of life, has no place in the public realm.  These concerns should be restricted 
to private life, lest they degrade and corrupt the public sphere.  The social question 
concerns immutable and incontestable necessities that only serve to degrade and 




questions.  When society is too concerned with solely addressing private concerns, 
democratic decision-making is impossible.  One cannot make compromises regarding the 
social question.  As such, it has no place in political decision-making, and must remain 
restricted to the private realm. 
By distinguishing between political issues and the social question, Arendt creates 
a possibility for instaurating the political.  She is correct in arguing that there are some 
issues that should remain restricted to the private sphere.  Castoriadis agrees with this 
position, stating, “’Everything is political’ either means nothing, or it means: everything 
ought to be political, ought to flow from an explicit decision of the sovereign.”12  The 
latter position eliminates the possibility of democratic decision-making; in such a 
situation, all aspects of life fall under the administrative power of politics.  However, 
Arendt does not conceive of a method through which a society can choose which issues 
should be raised in the public sphere.  Her demarcation of the political and the social is 
too rigid, in the sense that many of the concerns of the so-called “social question” are 
central issues of late modern societies.  Castoriadis argues that Arendt fails to recognize 
the social-historical context of the French Revolution, wherein the social question was 
inextricably intertwined with the political order. 13  The ancien regime in France was a 
total social structure; as such, it was not possible for the revolutionaries to impose a 
political order over an existing inegalitarian social structure.  According to Castoriadis, 
the social question in such a social-historical context is always a political one; one must 
attack the social order to rebuild the political domain.14  Furthermore, the problem Arendt 
faces is that she does not take into account the social-historical context of late modernity, 




banish work and labor issues to the private sphere in order to construct a political domain 
that emphasizes action.  Therefore, what Arendt’s political theory lacks is a process 
through which questions of the public versus the private can be contested politically and 
democratically. 
When private concerns and personal, non-political identities dominate in a 
democratic society, the possible emergence of threats to the democratic regime itself 
increases.  Seeking to make sense of the world around them, citizens carry these private 
issues into a degraded public sphere, demanding that the government and existing 
institutions respond to these personal interests, which have very little relevance to 
political matters.  As a result, the personal becomes political.  In and of itself, this does 
not necessarily represent a threat to democratic regimes, though it does degrade public 
discourse and creates a situation where the public sphere becomes a domain of 
competing, incommensurable claims.  When no limits are placed on these competing 
claims, the democratic system itself can be threatened; nothing prevents the expression of 
the basest instincts that might emerge from the individual or collective radical imaginary, 
even those that actively seek to destroy democratic institutions.  The rise of Nazism and 
the popular support it found in a Germany reeling from effects of the World War I is 
example of how democratic systems can be destroyed through the participation of the 
citizenry.   
The tendency for the emergence of destructive political imaginaries leads liberals 
to emphasize the protection of individual rights, both in terms of preventing abuses by the 
state and also to prevent other individuals from infringing the rights of each human 




to achieve this guarantee of individual rights.  In order to guard against the intrusion of 
repressive and destructive social imaginary significations into the public realm, liberals 
limit political participation by means of their emphasis on the private sphere as the 
primacy domain of individual activity.  However, this limitation is insufficient, 
particularly given the intrusiveness of bureaucratic-capitalist institutions into the private 
sphere.  What is required instead is a democratic theory that can incorporate the liberal 
concern for individual rights, but also create the possibility for robust participation by a 
community of citizens who are actively engaged in the construction of the institutions 
that govern them.  Such a democratic theory requires the recognition of the role the 
radical imaginary plays in the construction of social and political institutions.  Second, 
democracy must be considered comprehensively, in the sense that democratic governance 
is not simply a matter of procedure, but that it entails a social regime that includes the 
democratic political process, but also a conception of democratic culture and democratic 
identity.  Finally, democracy can only be legitimized through the active making/doing of 
the collective through participation in the political domain.  This requires recognition of 
the fact that democracy can be dangerous, as it institutes uncertainty in favor of the 
possibility of collective and individual self-reflection and autonomy.  
Liberalism: The Defense of Individual Rights 
In order to protect against the tyranny of the majority or the abuse of power by the 
state itself, liberals emphasize a set of individual rights.  These rights protect the 
individual both from other individuals in the society and from the power of the state 
itself.  However, what the liberal focus on individual rights does not guard against are the 




liberal conception of individual rights has sufficiently protected the individual from 
abuses by government.  In most Western, democratic societies, the individual citizen can 
safely presume that the government will not egregiously violate her political and civil 
rights.  However, the more significant powers in Western societies are those of 
bureaucratic-capitalist institutions, with which each individual must come into contact on 
a daily basis, primarily in the workplace.  These instituted-modern institutions erode the 
autonomy of the individual through a constant effort to eliminate her creativity and 
spontaneity, in order to insure that each individual can be a reliable part of the capitalist 
production process.  This is where the liberal defense of democracy is unable to 
adequately defend the rights of the individual. 
Liberal democracy is closely linked to the bureaucratic-capitalist institutional 
structure that dominates instituted-modern society.  As such, liberal democratic 
institutions reproduce and legitimize the dominant significations of the instituted-modern 
imaginary.  “Liberal democracy in both its visionary and practical versions is an attempt 
to keep the political state effective in its role as the guardian of peace and the mediator 
between group or individual interests, while keeping the groups free to form and the 
individuals free to assert themselves and to choose the form of life they wish to pursue.”15  
In order to insure the rights of the individual, liberalism demands a sharp separation 
between the public and private spheres, where the individual is able to participate in 
political activity in the public realm if she chooses, but is protected from both the 
intrusive power of government institutions and other individuals in the private sphere.  
However, this liberal conception of the public and private worlds reinforces the atomistic 




possibility of instaurating the political is covered over; political participation in a liberal 
democracy is limited to participation in politics.  Politics in instituted-modern society is 
constructed according to the dictates of the bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary, in the sense 
that the public realm is constructed along the lines of the private marketplace.  Political 
participation arises as a necessity in capitalist society in order to guarantee property 
rights.  The public realm exists as an appendage of the private, rather than a separate, 
independent domain.  Because the public realm exists to serve the needs of bureaucratic-
capitalist institutions, decision-making can never rise above politics, that is to say, 
playing an administrative role in the defense of the instituted-imaginary.  As such, 
democratic participation is limited to the selection of representatives who will carry out 
the administrative tasks of governance.  With these constraints in place, whether or not to 
participate in politics becomes a choice for the individual citizen.  The same rational 
calculus that underlies the bureaucratic-capitalist system governs politics; democratic 
participation is subjected to economic rationality.  For example, the choice between 
candidates in any election becomes a choice between which candidate can better serve 
the interests of the voting individual within the constraints of the existing institutional 
apparatus.  Choices in the political sphere are reduced to a rational ordering of 
preferences, where individual utility is the primary motivation in decision-making.  A 
candidate who questions the instituted-imaginary is quickly marginalized, while those 
who provide the greatest utility to the greatest number are elected.  As such, the choice 
between two candidates becomes very similar to the choice between Coke and Pepsi.  
Superficial differences are emphasized, but each candidate fully accepts the existing 




this manner insures that the typical individual will have very little interest in participating 
in the public realm, thus guaranteeing that the instituted-imaginary cannot be challenged 
effectively.  Thus, “the best-case scenario for liberal democracy is a continuation of what 
the ancient Greeks called stasis, a persistent and noxious immobilism characterized by 
insecurity, meanness, and a deterioration of anything remotely resembling a genuinely 
democratic political culture or civic equality.”16  Liberal democracy reproduces this 
constrained vision of political participation, accepting the limitations of politics as a 
trade-off for the supposed protection of the rights of the individual and the restrictions on 
those in power.  In this manner, liberal democracy contributes to the dominance of the 
instituted-modern as the prevalent imaginary in the Western world.  As such, it 
contributes to the reproduction of the existing institutional apparatus of bureaucratic-
capitalism, and therefore the reproduction of institutional forms that are alienated from 
those living in advanced modern societies.  The paradox of democracy today is that 
freedom of thought is at its highest point, but there is little use for this freedom and there 
is little chance at reforging freedom from constraint into freedom to act.17
In A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, John Rawls presents the strongest 
contemporary defense of liberal democracy, correcting many of the problems that are 
present in classical liberalism.  Rawls seeks to expand the possibility of political 
participation in democratic societies by constructing a conception of justice that can limit 
the intrusion of the destructive aspects of the radical imaginary while at the same time 
allowing a dynamic interplay of ideas.  Rawls’ conception of justice both protects the 
individual from the intrusion of government institutions and other individual and allows 




and friendship.  However, the limitations of liberal democracy and the way in which it 
reproduces the dominant significations of the instituted-modern are also evident Rawls’ 
work.  As such, Rawls does little to address the problems of contemporary instituted-
modern society and the prevalence and predominance of the bureaucratic-capitalist 
imaginary and this imaginary’s impact on the societies in which it dominates.   
Rawls’ defense of liberal democracy can be summed up in his dictum “justice as 
fairness.”  “In justice as fairness, one does not take men’s propensities and inclinations as 
given, whatever they are, and then seek the best way to fulfill them.  Rather, their desires 
and aspirations are restricted from the outset by the principles of justice which specify the 
boundaries that men’s systems of ends must respect.”18  As such, liberal democracy does 
not simply respond to human nature and construct institutions accordingly, but rather 
liberalism sets forth principles according to which individuals should develop their life 
plans and adhere in their interactions with others.  According to Rawls, justice as fairness 
is comprised of two foundational principles.  First, “each person is to have an equal right 
to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”19  This 
first principle corresponds to the traditional liberal concern for the rights of the 
individual.  By asserting this principle, Rawls seeks to insure that the rights of every 
individual are protected from abuses by governmental power and against intrusions by 
others individuals living in the society.  The protections afforded by the first principle 
further insure that each rational individual is able to develop their own conception of the 
good and live his life according to the plan he develops to further the pursuit of this good.  
As such, Rawls seeks to maximize each individual’s capacity to live according to his own 




interfere with the liberty of other individuals.  The second principle states: “social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to 
be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.”20  
Rawls in no way advocates the equal distribution of wealth throughout society; he is not 
interested in insuring equality of outcome.  Inequality is acceptable only insofar as 
existing inequality benefits those who are the lowest in the economic hierarchy.  The 
poorest in the society must benefit from the unequal distribution of economic wealth.21  
Thus, for example, if the total wealth of the society, unequally distributed, allows the 
possibility of a social safety net that benefits the least advantaged, inequality is 
acceptable.  Furthermore, if the least advantaged are not permanently bound to their 
current social status and have an equal opportunity to better their status, existing 
inequality is acceptable.22  This aspect of Rawls’ theory of justice is important because it 
recognizes the problem that a capitalist economic system poses for the protection of the 
rights of the individual.  By including the second principle of equality, Rawls seeks to 
insure that the rights of the individual are not trampled by the drive for material 
accumulation.  As such, Rawls asserts that a defense of individual rights must be coupled 
with some basic defense of equality in order to insure that each individual is actually 
capable of defending his rights against others and against economic institutions.  
Furthermore, Rawls’ conception of liberty and equality insures that the individual can 
actually exercise his rights by guaranteeing that no individual will find himself a position 
of servility vis-à-vis others in the society.  However, it is important to recognize that the 
two principle Rawls envisions are not equal principles.  For Rawls, the first principle of 




second principle of equality.  Therefore, no individual’s liberty can be impinged upon in 
the name of insuring a greater level of equality in the society.   
These two principles form the cornerstone of the political conception of justice.  
According to Rawls, a well-ordered, pluralistic society where multiple comprehensive 
moral doctrines exist requires an independent, freestanding ideal of justice that every 
citizen in the society can accept.23  In the private sphere, individuals define themselves 
according to comprehensive moral doctrines, which, in most cases, are religious or 
cultural.  What characterizes each of these moral doctrines is its incompatibility with 
other moral doctrines that exist within the society.24  For example, the tenets of one moral 
doctrine might reject beliefs or behavior espoused by another doctrine.  In democratic 
societies, the problem that emerges is this: if there are no restrictions on what is 
considered “political”, citizens will carry these incompatible comprehensive moral 
doctrines into the political arena and make political decisions based on these beliefs.  
This can easily lead to the infringement of the political rights of those who adhere to less 
politically powerful moral doctrines by a dominant group.  In order for incompatible 
doctrines to coexist within a society, and in order to insure that the principles of justice as 
fairness are respected, an overlapping consensus concerning the political conception of 
justice must exist.  The presence of the overlapping consensus means that every citizen, 
regardless of the comprehensive moral beliefs he holds, will agree upon the basic 
principles of justice as fairness and adhere to these principles in his interactions with 
others in the society, regardless of the moral beliefs that these other individuals hold.25  
The political conception of justice is independent of all other comprehensive moral 




democratic society.  Accepting the overlapping consensus is not an act of altruism, but 
rather relies on reciprocity.  Each individual will accept the political conception of justice 
so long as all others in the society accept it as well and treat the individual citizen 
accordingly.26  However, according to Rawls, the political conception of justice does not 
rely on instrumental rationality; rather, each citizen will in fact adhere to this conception 
of justice even at the cost of his own interests, provided that others in the society do so as 
well.27  When such an overlapping consensus exists, democracy in a pluralistic society, 
even when comprehensive doctrines are in competition with one another, can exist, if 
each citizen accepts a basic set of foundational principles and tolerates the difference of 
the other.   
The adherence to the political conception of justice is the means through which a 
democratic society can legitimately limit the participation of individuals in the public 
domain.  According to Rawls, an ideal of public reason, based on the overlapping 
consensus, must govern political participation.  When questions concerning governmental 
structure are introduced for deliberation by a democratic citizenry, “reasons given 
explicitly in terms of comprehensive doctrines are never to be introduced into public 
reason.”28  The only possible exception to this rule is if a reason founded in a 
comprehensive moral doctrine in fact strengthens the idea of public reason and the limits 
of the political conception of justice.29  As a result, political claims founded in religious 
or cultural doctrines, which could result in the infringement on the rights of others in the 
society, are excluded from the public decision-making process.  All political decisions 
within a society guided by the overlapping consensus will be limited according to the 




The overlapping consensus is the means through which Rawls accounts for the 
dangerous possibilities of democratic participation.  In essence, comprehensive moral 
doctrines emerge from the radical imaginary as the means through which individuals 
come to understand the world around them and their relationship to other individuals in 
the society.  These moral doctrines can be unlimited and unrestrained in terms of the 
development of their doctrinal content.  While these doctrines develop within the social-
historical and institutional context of a democratic society, which will shape the manner 
in which they are constructed and the content of the doctrine, the creative role of the 
radical imaginary allows the possibility for the development of beliefs that oppose or 
wholly reject the existing instituted imaginary.  In order to prevent such comprehensive 
doctrines from destroying the democratic system, Rawls argues that participation in the 
public sphere must be limited to those doctrines that are willing to accept the political 
conception of justice and extend the protections of “justice as fairness” to all other 
persons in the society, regardless of the moral beliefs these other individuals hold.30  
However, Rawls’ definition and justification of the overlapping consensus is problematic, 
leading to a conception of political participation that is too restrictive and neglects to 
address the social-historical context of instituted-modern society.         
While the limitations set forth by the overlapping consensus protect the individual 
both from the power of the state and from other individuals within the society, a problem 
emerges in terms of the nature of the comprehensive moral doctrines that exist within a 
democratic society.  The conditions of the well-ordered pluralistic society that Rawls 
develops in Political Liberalism are, in Rawls own terms, ideal, in the sense that the 




argument is that comprehensive moral doctrines are in fact reasonable, defined as the 
capacity for the individual to extend fair terms of cooperation to all others in the society, 
regardless of the moral beliefs to which these others adhere, with the expectation that 
others will also abide by these terms.32  What Rawls does not account for is the role the 
radical imaginary plays in the development of these comprehensive moral doctrines, 
which leads to the possibility that comprehensive moral doctrines will be unreasonable 
and reject the idea of extending fair terms of cooperation to others.  The incompatibility 
of moral doctrines, rather than the possibility of an overlapping consensus concerning a 
political conception of justice, is the far more relevant issue.  Habermas argues that one 
cannot separate the political conception of justice from comprehensive moral doctrines in 
the manner that Rawls advocates.33  There is a strong connection between moral doctrines 
and the possibility of the overlapping consensus; a comprehensive moral doctrine must 
develop in a particular manner in order to lead to the acceptance of the political 
conception of justice.  Comprehensive moral doctrines are embedded in the prevailing 
social-historical circumstances in a particular society and are influenced by the 
predominant instituted-imaginary, to the extent that in the construction of meaning, a 
comprehensive moral doctrine will account for the existing conditions within a particular 
society.  Thus, a moral doctrine will embed itself in a relationship with the instituted 
imaginary, defining, for example, the existing institutional structure as legitimate or 
illegitimate.  Furthermore, moral doctrines, as sets of social imaginary significations, are 
dynamic belief systems, changing and altering over time.  Rogers Smith, for example, 
describes the changing “stories of personhood” that define communities according to 




association.  “I define a group as a political people or community when it is a potential 
adversary of other forms of human association, because its proponents are generally 
understood to assert that its obligations legitimately trump many of the demands made on 
its members in the name of other associations.”34  In certain cases, such associations 
based on political peoplehood can claim to override all other associations, including the 
political conception of justice.35  Furthermore, an oppressed group, for example, will 
develop a very different set of moral beliefs than a group in power, to the extent that the 
moral doctrines are completely incommensurable and the possibility of compromising on 
a political conception of justice becomes impossible.     
In addition to the construction of comprehensive moral doctrines that reject the 
political conception of justice, existing moral doctrines can change according to new 
social-historical conditions, particularly in relation to increasing or decreasing power.  
Rawls seeks to create a system wherein the power differentials between comprehensive 
doctrines will not affect the relationship between these doctrines, arguing that competing 
moral doctrines will accept the political conception of justice in order to insure that the 
democratic society remains a well-ordered, pluralistic one.  What Rawls expects is that 
the adherents to a particular moral doctrine will not abuse an increase in power, basing 
this on the foresight of these individuals.36  In essence, adherents to an ascendant moral 
doctrine will recognize that they will not be in a position of power forever and will 
therefore respect the overlapping consensus.  Rogers Smith illustrates the potential effect 
of power differentials on the construction of group identity by arguing that the 
construction of peoplehood as a political project.  Identities are forms of imagined 




about political peoplehood.  Rather, such stories emerge through the interactions of 
persons living in a society and as an explicit project by those in positions of power who 
seek to mobilize a population.  It is therefore the result of asymmetric power relationships 
in any given society.37  The rise of Christian fundamentalism in the United States 
illustrates Smith’s point concerning asymmetric power relationships and the construction 
of comprehensive moral doctrines.  The rising power of the Christian right in American 
politics coincides with the increasing tendency for the religious right to reject the political 
conception of justice by casting political issues in explicitly religious terms, violating 
Rawls’ rules concerning public reason.  On the extremes of the religious right, Christian 
dispensationalists, dominionists, and reconstructionists, overtly reject democratic 
institutions, calling for the institution of a legal and political system founded on a literal 
reading of the Bible, rejecting the democratic idea that laws are founded in the will and 
participation of the people.  Pat Robertson, for example, has declared that government 
must be run by “godly men”, guided by Biblical law.38  On the extremes of the religious 
right, activists call for the murder of homosexuals, while the position of more mainstream 
politicians, such as Gary Bauer, take a more “moderate” position calling for the 
imprisonment of gays.39  In addition, Christian fundamentalists seek to deny rights to 
religious minorities through the erosion of the first amendment separation of church and 
state in favor of overt and distinctly evangelical expressions of Christian belief within the 
public sphere.  One cannot dismiss these ideas as those of the lunatic fringe.  A study in 
2003 found that upwards of forty percent of Americans believe in Biblical end-times 
prophecies40, one of the important motivating doctrines of the ascendant religious Right.  




political domain is a degradation of the democratic system into a Schmittian conflict 
between friend and enemy.  The religious right and right-wing Republicans in general, 
particularly after September 11, 2001, speak in terms of a war between “us” (a narrowly 
defined vision of Christian Republicanism) and “them” (all those who oppose this vision, 
both internationally and domestically).  As a result, the political pronouncements of the 
American right express an ominous, eliminationist tone, where “liberals” are “traitors”, 
those who oppose Christian fundamentalism are evil and undeserving of civil protections 
or rights, and the rest of the world seeks to undermine the United States.   
Rawls’ vision of the political conception of justice cannot adequately address the 
problem of a comprehensive moral doctrine that actively seeks to actively violate the 
rules of public reason and participate in the political system in order to undermine and 
destroy the idea of “justice as fairness”.  This intrusion of comprehensive moral doctrines 
into the public sphere in opposition to the political conception of justice is, in part, the 
product of the crisis of meaning that pervades instituted-modern societies.  Political 
Liberalism is incapable of adequately addressing this problem due to the fact that the 
construction of “justice as fairness” draws from a particular social-historical experience 
of liberal democracy and capitalism.  The principles of “justice as fairness”, particularly 
the second principle, which seeks to insure equality of opportunity, contribute to the 
reproduction of the bureaucratic-capitalist instituted-imaginary.  In practical terms, this 
principle defends the capitalist economic system, under the assumption that the general 
welfare of the least advantaged is higher than it would be if the productive capacity of the 
capitalist system were hindered in some manner.  Rawls argues that any injustice that 




that they are tied to one another through bonds of love, trust, and friendship.41  However, 
Rawls does not present any consistent criteria for what constitutes such an infringement.  
Clearly, those living in society will correct the most egregious violations of the first or 
second principle.  However, these are the easy questions; Rawls does not address the real 
problems that exist in instituted-modern society, such as the fact that instituted-modern 
societies are unable to provide any meaning beyond the consumption of material goods.  
In response to the dilapidation of instituted-modern societies, individuals turn to other 
sources, comprehensive moral doctrines, to create personal, individualized meaning for 
the world around them.  What Rawls does not recognize is that these meanings will 
inevitably be carried into the public sphere.   
 In addition to the practical inadequacy of creating an overlapping consensus to 
limit the intrusion of destructive ideas into the democratic public sphere, the weakness of 
the overlapping consensus and the political conception of justice presented in Political 
Liberalism is a result of the fact that Rawls bases the validity of these two concepts on 
the idea of the “original position” that he constructs in A Theory of Justice.  In the 
original position, Rawls argues, the individual, choosing principles from behind a veil of 
ignorance whereby each individual is unaware of the social, economic, and political 
conditions of the society and is also unaware of his own attributes or position in the 
society, will choose the principles of “justice as fairness” in order to maximize his own 
opportunity and potential in the society.42  Habermas argues that the first flaw with the 
original position is that it focuses on the individual, rather than on a discursive 
community.  The original position, according to Habermas, is inadequate as a foundation 




address the intersubjective relationships that exist within a community.43  These 
intersubjective relationships are significant in that they are the source of political claims 
that individuals present in the public sphere.  In addition, Rawls argues that the original 
position represents a non-historical point; it is an abstract, analytical foundation for the 
legitimacy and validity of the principles at the heart of the political conception of justice.  
However, what Rawls’ reliance on the original position to provide “fall-back” validity for 
the political conception of justice reveals is Rawls’ lack of faith in his own vision of the 
overlapping consensus.  When reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines exist within a 
pluralistic society, they can come to an agreement on the political conception of justice. 
What this reveals, according to Habermas, is that the public justification of the political 
conception of justice requires that individuals already accept this conception of justice 
and participate in the overlapping consensus.44  What happens, however, when 
unreasonable comprehensive moral doctrines that reject “justice as fairness” seek to 
assert power in the public sphere?  Habermas answers this question by arguing that the 
overlapping consensus can only exist practically when it is imposed by the state to insure 
the protection of minorities.45  This represents Rawls’ “fall-back” position when the 
overlapping consensus, as he describes it, fails.  In this situation, the overlapping 
consensus must be enforced through the imposition of sharp constitutional restrictions on 
political participation.  In order to preserve the political conception of justice, only those 
who agree to the overlapping consensus, and to the principle of justice as fairness, can 
participate in democratic decision-making.  All other “unreasonable” moral doctrines 
must be excluded from the democratic process.  As such, any group that seeks to deny 




and heteronomous; only groups and individuals that promise to “behave” can be allowed 
to participate.  The problem, however, is this: such doctrines do not simply disappear as a 
result of their exclusion from the political process.  They still exist at the margins of the 
society and will often turn to extra-political and extra-judicial means to advance their 
moral and political beliefs.  Furthermore, as illustrated by the rise of the religious right in 
the United States, an “unreasonable” moral doctrine can feign adherence to the political 
conception of justice and once in a position of power, act to undermine it.  In essence, 
Rawls restricts political participation to those who already agree with liberal capitalist 
democracy. 
Constructing Limits through Discourse  
The construction of the instituted-modern imaginary and its corresponding 
institutional apparatus results in a degradation of the public realm and a retreat to the 
private sphere by individuals living in instituted-modern society.  Theories of discursive 
democracy seek to address this problem by constructing a public sphere wherein citizens 
can actively participate in political governance.  These theorists understand that the 
distinction between public and private worlds is a blurred one; individuals can and do 
carry private issues into the political world, particularly in instituted-modern societies 
where the construction of meaning occurs primarily in the private sphere, given the fact 
that the public domain has become bureaucratized and alienated.  As such, discourse 
democracy seeks to construct a framework for political action that allows for a 
multiplicity of interests and claims to be advanced in the public sphere by a wide 
diversity of individuals and groups, thus allowing for robust participation by the citizens 




construction of limits with regard to the types of claims that can be advanced in the 
public domain.  These limits seek to account for the emergence of political claims that 
seek to erode or destroy the democratic decision-making process itself.  However, unlike 
Rawls’ concept of the overlapping consensus, the limits in the public domain are 
malleable and dynamic, subject to discursive analysis and critique by the participants in 
the democratic process.  The task that theorists such as Jurgen Habermas, Chantal 
Mouffe, and Cornelius Castoriadis posit is the construction of a theoretical institutional 
framework that allows for the critique of the existing instituted-imaginary, but also sets 
discursive boundaries to account for the Abyss of the radical imaginary and the potential 
danger it poses for the democratic process. 
Jurgen Habermas conceives of the public sphere as occupying a space between 
the state as a mechanism of power and domination and the private domain of the life-
world.  The solution to the degradation of the public sphere in instituted-modern societies 
is to recover the emancipatory possibilities of modernity through the reconstruction of a 
public sphere based on communicative rationality, a form of objective reason that allows 
the possibility for constructing the political.46  Communicative rationality is a particular 
form of rationality through which human subjects publicly assert normative claims and 
construct a discursive method for judging the validity of each other’s claims.  According 
to Habermas, in everyday life, people assert moral claims vis-à-vis others in the society, 
demanding certain behaviors from others and also for ourselves.  At this first level of 
moral utterances, individuals discursively construct moral obligations “that lay down for 
a community in a convincing manner what actors are obliged to do and what they can 




that it asserts limits to public and private behavior, but it does not rely on a heteronomous 
source of authority, in the form of an “original position”.  The limits are constructed 
discursively through the intersubjective communication between participants.  The 
construction of such boundaries allows individuals to draw upon these intersubjectively 
constructed norms in conflict resolution, eliminating the necessity of resorting to force.48  
Habermas argues that individuals are capable of expressing their needs rationally within 
an intersubjective context, wherein the rationality of each individual can be judged based 
on whether the individual is able to provide reasons for their linguistic expressions.49  “In 
contexts of communicative action, we call someone rational not only if he is able to put 
forward an assertion and, when criticized, to provide grounds for it by pointing to 
appropriate evidence, but also if he is following an established norm and is able, when 
criticized, to justify his action by explicating the given situation in light of legitimate 
expectations.”50  Therefore, according to Habermas, the construction of the public sphere 
requires the discursive development of a rational framework through which others can 
evaluate the normative claims put forward by each individual.  As such, no claim can be 
based on pure self-interest; rather, each individual must be able to assert her normative 
claim in such a way that others in the society will accept it as valid in accordance with the 
existing framework of the public sphere.  “Every social interaction that comes about 
without the exercise of manifest violence can be understood as a solution to the problem 
of how the action plans of several actors can be coordinated with each other in such a 
way that one party’s actions ‘link up’ with those of others.”51  The general purpose of 
public discourse, therefore, is to allow each individual an equal opportunity to present her 




other participants, according to a mutually agreed upon framework for evaluating such 
claims.  
Habermas presents a vision of the public sphere that allows broad and meaningful 
participation in political decision-making.  The advantage of this concept of the public 
sphere is that it constructs limits to the types of moral and political claims that can be 
advanced in the public domain, without relying on a universal, a priori standard for the 
types of claims that can be introduced.  Participants in the public sphere are capable of 
constructing their own rational limits on public claims, while simultaneously retaining the 
capacity for questioning and altering these limits through discourse.  The rational limits 
are conceived in broad terms such that “the equal respect for everyone else demanded by 
a moral universalism sensitive to difference … takes the form of a nonleveling and 
nonappropriating inclusion of the other in his otherness.”52  As such, an individual need 
not agree to a specific set of limits before entering the public sphere, thus insuring the 
possibility of expressing difference in the public realm, while constructing limits to 
protect the democratic procedure itself.  By constructing rational limits that account for 
difference, Habermas constructs a public sphere that encourages political participation 
but is not fully dependent on a collectively active citizenry.  What is most important for 
Habermas is the institutionalization of procedures through which individuals can 
participate within rationally agreed-upon limits.53  For Habermas, democratic will-
formation through the public sphere serves as “the most important sluices for the 
discursive rationalization of the decisions of a government and an administration bound 
by law and statute.”54  Habermas’ public sphere allows citizens to actively question the 




discourse between diverse constituents.  As such, institutional legitimacy depends on the 
making/doing of individuals living with a particular society, rather than on a 
preconceived, heteronomous source of authority.   
This vision of the public sphere closely approximates Castoriadis’ conception of 
the project of autonomy.  However, Habermas and Castoriadis disagree on several 
fundamental points, to the extent that while their general ends are similar, the means 
through which a discursive participatory public can be constructed differ significantly.  
The main point of disagreement between Castoriadis and Habermas centers on 
Habermas’ idea of discursively constructed rational limits governing participation in the 
public sphere.  Habermas argues that the possibility of discursive constructed rational 
limits depends upon the nature of language, asserting that language is an inherent human 
capability.55  As such, speech precedes any particular social context in which the 
individual subject speaks.  The potential for communicative rationality exists within 
every society; the question, therefore, becomes within which institutional framework can 
individual subjects exercise this form of speech?  Communication, in one form or 
another, occurs in all domains of human life.  Autonomous public spheres rely on the 
human capacity to speak and communicate needs to one another, as these public spheres 
draw their strength from communicative structures that exist within the life-world.56  
Through their participation in particular life-worlds, individuals are able to develop 
modes of communicating with other individuals, which leads to the possibility of making 
rational claims regarding normative values in an intersubjective context. 
The capacity to speak and articulate and advance normative claims combines with 




communication.  Modernity introduces rational inquiry by individual human subjects, 
which allows the individual to examine and evaluate the world around him.  This mode of 
inquiry can be applied to the examination and evaluation of intersubjective relationships 
and to the relationships between individuals and institutions.  As a result, individuals are 
able to develop rational modes of communication in order to interact with one another 
and debate the validity of normative claims within a public domain governed by 
consensually constructed rules.  The purpose of public discourse is to create legitimate 
social norms that will structure intersubjective relationships in the society.  “Valid norms 
must be capable in principle of meeting with the rationally motivated approval of 
everyone affected under conditions that neutralize all motives except that of 
cooperatively seeking the truth.”57  For Habermas, the normative justification of 
democratic institutions emerges through public discourse, where the central question is, 
“which institutions would individuals engaged in discourse accept as legitimate?”58  
Within this discourse model, each individual must have an equal chance to initiate and 
participate in dialogue and be able to thematize power relations that in an ordinary 
context would act as a constraint.59  Furthermore, norms within agreed upon through 
public discourse do not represent final principles for the society.  All rationally agreed 
upon norms remain criticizable and contestable within the public sphere.60   
Castoriadis rejects the a priori of language and, as a result, the intersubjective 
nature of relationships between individuals.  In contrast to Habermas, Castoriadis argues 
that a theory of discourse democracy must account for the a priori of the radical 
imaginary and the constructed nature of subjectivity.61  Castoriadis does not dispute the 




socialization process.  The infant learns to speak through its interaction with its parents, 
and, more importantly, learns a particular language that reflects the dominant instituted 
imaginary of the society into which the infant is born.62  The language used within a 
particular society will reflect the meaning that society has constructed in order to 
understand the world and the society’s place in that world.  By positing that language is a 
priori, Habermas neglects the particularities of speaking in favor of the universality of 
speech.  His position reflects a commitment to an Enlightenment concept of reason and 
progress, but this position ultimately weakens his argument in favor of a public sphere of 
discursive deliberation.  Habermas essentially asserts that communicative rationality is 
universal, given the fact that language is a priori, and that this form of speech can be a 
reliable ground on which to found the public sphere.  What Habermas neglects, and what 
Castoriadis reveals through his claim concerning the a priori of the radical imaginary, is 
that communicative rationality is in fact a particular mode of discourse that is constructed 
within a particular social-historical context and is only possible within a particular 
instituted-imaginary, namely, the modern imaginary.  Rational communication can only 
occur in a society where rationality as a social imaginary signification exists.  Habermas 
takes for granted that human beings will “know” how to communicate and achieve a 
rational consensus.   
The dispute over the nature of language leads to the second major point of 
contention between Castoriadis and Habermas.  According to Habermas, an 
intersubjective discourse occurs within the public sphere, where individual subjects 
advance normative claims and defend them vis-à-vis other subjects participating in the 




public sphere as discrete, independent subjects.  Dick Howard criticizes this position, 
arguing that Habermas is too attached to individualism, which limits the possibilities of 
communicative rationality.  If discourse occurs between individuals, social change can 
only emerge through face-to-face interactions between individuals.63  Late modern 
societies can be characterized by the decline of face-to-face interaction, particularly as a 
result of the development of communications technologies.  Constructing a public realm 
around a concept of face-to-face intersubjectivity serves to limit the possibility for 
freedom, rather than expand it, which is Habermas’ intention.  Castoriadis criticizes 
Habermas on this point as well.64  In addition, Castoriadis attacks the very concept of 
intersubjectivity, arguing that discourse is not intersubjective, but rather occurs between 
malleable and dynamic subjects whose subjectivity is influenced by the discursive 
practices themselves.  According to Castoriadis, since subjectivity is partially constructed 
by the existing instituted imaginary, discourse in the public sphere plays a constitutive 
and productive role vis-à-vis the individual subjects.  Habermas fails to recognize that 
subjects are not fully independent of one another.  Castoriadis’ objection to 
intersubjectivity is linked to his challenge that discourse does not occur between rational 
beings.  The radical imaginary plays a critical role in the relationship between individuals 
living in a particular society.  As such, while individuals might act rationally toward one 
another, it is a mistake to ground the public sphere in this specific definition of 
rationality.  In doing so, Habermas neglects the possibilities of non-rational discourse and 
covers over the radical, instituting imaginary.  
The final point of contention between Habermas and Castoriadis is Habermas’ 




The construction of these rational limits leads Habermas to assert the possibility of 
developing the ideal-speech situations.  According to Habermas,  “progress in social 
rationality could be achieved through ‘undistorted communication’ based on a 
willingness to engage in rational discourse on topics of controversy, to allow free and 
equal access to all participants, to attempt to understand the issues and arguments, to 
yield to the force of the better argument, and to accept a rational consensus.”65 The ideal-
speech situation posits the possibility of achieving a rational consensus among the 
individuals participating.  Such a rational consensus represents “undistorted 
communication”, opposed to “distorted communication”, where coercive force is used by 
some institutions to impose a “consensus” on the participants.66  Habermas argues that 
participants in the public sphere are capable, as rational beings, to construct a consensus 
concerning the rational limits of discourse.  According to Habermas,  
We can say that actions regulated by norms, expressive self-presentations, and 
also evaluative expressions, supplement constative speech acts in constituting a 
communicative practice which, against the background of a lifeworld is oriented 
to achieving, sustaining, and renewing consensus – and indeed a consensus that 
rests of the intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims.67   
Castoriadis, in Habermas’ estimation, provides no foundation for the public sphere, 
relying solely on the will of those living in society for its existence.68  For Habermas, this 
is insufficient; a public sphere that is based solely on the subjective will of the individual 
living in a society will collapse under the weight of private claims that will inevitably 
intrude upon, and erode, the public domain.69  As such, Habermas argues that some 




insure the continued existence of a democratic public sphere.  However, Habermas 
mischaracterizes Castoriadis’ position.  While Castoriadis does assert that subjective will 
plays a role the construction of the political, this is not his only defense of the public 
sphere.  This dispute over the possibility of grounding the public sphere reveals a 
fundamental incommensurability between Habermas and Castoriadis.  Habermas is 
concerned with what makes a particular social order possible, leading him to answer this 
question with his theory of discursive democracy.  Castoriadis, on the other hand, 
examines the origins of order and the conditions under which such an order can emerge, 
leading him to the conclusion that order emerges through the competition between 
collectivities for form-giving power.70  What Habermas neglects in his vision of 
undistorted communication is precisely this element of competition for power that exists 
within democratic societies.  Habermas assumes that through the construction of 
consensus regarding the rational limits of the public domain, power differentials between 
groups can be nullified through communicative rationality.  
Habermas’ argument that the ideal-speech situation is the result of the 
communicative achievement of a rational consensus among the members of the society is 
highly problematic, in the sense that it restricts the possibilities of public discourse.  
Agnes Heller, for example, argues that Habermas confuses sociopolitical norms with 
moral norms.  The former can and should, according to Heller, be rationally grounded.  
These sociopolitical norms concern the discursive relationship between individuals, such 
as the rights to free and equal participation in the discourse process.  Moral norms, 
however, need not be grounded rationally.  According to Heller, the moral universe is 




These ungrounded and unjustified moral norms can coexist with rationally agreed upon 
sociopolitical norms without endangering rational discourse.  No individual can claim 
universality for his moral norms.  He has no basis to do so, and claiming such 
universality can be dangerous.72  Furthermore, the idea that a society can arrive at such a 
consensus rationally fails to address normative claims that challenge the framework of 
the ideal-speech situation itself.  Habermas argues that such claims can be simply 
excluded from communicative discourse.  However, excluding such discourses presents a 
serious problem for democratic societies.  If such claims cannot be legitimately advanced 
in the public sphere, they will be advanced elsewhere, undermining the democratic 
system itself.  As a result, Habermas’ idea that a rational consensus can be achieved is 
highly problematic.  Habermas essentially grounds the legitimacy of the ideal-speech 
situation is communicative rationality.  As such, it represents an alienated source of 
legitimacy that is partially removed from the making/doing of the collective.  While the 
ideal-speech situation is constructed by the society itself, Habermas asserts that the 
framework it establishes for the introduction and contestation of normative claims is the 
starting point for political action within the public sphere.  Thus, communicative actors 
will take the ideal-speech situation as a given and advance their claims with this fact in 
mind.  As a result, the institutional structure of the ideal-speech situation becomes 
disconnected from the making/doing of the collective; it would not be rational to question 
the structure of the ideal-speech situation because this would represent an attack on the 
very institutional structure that makes public action possible.  However, the ideal-speech 
situation serves to constrain public action and discourse, by the very fact that its 




non-rational discourses will be excluded from the public sphere, where they will fester 
outside the system and threaten the existence of democracy itself.  
According to Chantal Mouffe, the political sphere is not about reaching consensus 
or compromise between competing claims, but rather exists and thrives as a result of 
agonistic competition.  Mouffe concurs with Castoriadis distinction between the political 
and politics, stating that, “by ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of antagonism which I 
take to be constitutive of human societies, while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices 
and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the 
context of conflictuality provided by the political.”73  The task of democratic theorists is 
not to construct impartial procedures through which consensus can be achieved, but 
rather to construct an “agonistic” sphere of contention.74  Mouffe argues that the agonistic 
competition within the political sphere must be framed according to definitions of friends 
and enemies.  In this manner, Mouffe attempts to reintroduce the work of Carl Schmitt 
and apply it to contemporary democratic theory.  The friend/enemy dichotomy guarantees 
agonistic competition between competing political positions.  Such a conception of the 
political sphere asserts that there cannot be a rational solution to political conflict, as 
Habermas envisions.  Political competition, according to Mouffe, concerns hegemony; 
each political claim within the public sphere seeks to assert its hegemonic power over the 
society as a whole.  Agonistic competition is a hegemonic struggle between conflicting 
viewpoints where the stakes are the configuration of power relations within a particular 
society.75  Because of this, compromise and negotiation are not possible within the 
political.  Each political actor, seeking to assert hegemonic power over the society, must 




goals.  No political claim, according to Mouffe, will settle for less than hegemonic power 
over the society.  When the stakes involve hegemonic power, it is impossible to negotiate 
or compromise with one’s opponents.  However, the hegemonic aspirations of political 
claims insure that the political will remain an active and contested domain of 
competition.   
While Mouffe is correct in recognizing the competitive nature of the political 
sphere, she is mistaken in attempting to apply Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction, with its 
undertones of violence and absolutism, to her conception of agonistic democracy.  
Mouffe argues that in order to insure that the political remains agonistic, the 
friend/enemy distinction must be a limited one in the sense that the goal of political 
competition is not to eradicate the enemy.  The limited distinction between friend and 
enemy allows the recognition of one’s opponent as a legitimate participant in agonistic 
competition.76  In order to guarantee the legitimacy of each participant in the political 
sphere, it becomes necessary to limit the terms of political discourse in order to insure the 
continued existence of democratic institutions.  Mouffe argues that in order to prevent 
such a situation, certain demands must be excluded from the political sphere.  Any claims 
that oppose or threaten the democratic system itself must be excluded from the political 
sphere.  Such positions are unacceptable because they reject the limitations of agonistic 
competition and seek power solely in order to overthrow the system itself.77   
Mouffe, however, does not construct any criteria according to which political 
claims can be excluded from the public sphere and her reliance on Schmitt’s 
friend/enemy distinction to define her agonistic public sphere exacerbates this problem.  




the sense that politics need not be about the eradication of one’s enemies.  If the 
friend/enemy distinction allows for the eradication of one’s opponent, the political 
association itself will be threatened.  In such a situation, agonistic competition becomes a 
fight to the death, which will threaten the very existence of democratic institutions, since 
the participants will stop at nothing to insure victory.  Mouffe argues that hegemonic 
power, the ability to shape the power relations that exist within a society, are the spoils of 
agonistic competition.  These are life or death stakes in many social-historical 
circumstances.  The fact that the participants will stop at nothing to insure hegemony in 
an often life or death struggle is precisely the type of conflict that Schmitt envisions.  
Schmitt argues that the “enemy” is constructed by a sovereign power seeking to assert 
hegemony through the manipulation of peoples’ fears and anxieties.78  Bernstein argues 
that there is a deep contradiction in Schmitt’s thought.  On the one hand, Schmitt 
condemns a universalistic morality that seeks to eliminate or annihilate the “foe”, but on 
the other hand, he relies on the manipulation of fear and anxiety for the construction of 
the political “enemy”.79  Thus, while Mouffe seeks to criticize Habermas’ ideal-speech 
situation, she ends up constructing an ideal agonistic situation.  Some political claims 
obviously seek to overthrow democracy.  Fascism is one such example, but this is an easy 
case.  The harder questions are the ones that are the main concerns of everyday politics.  
Does the debate over abortion threaten the political association?  What about anti-
capitalism?  What about a vision of democracy different from the existing agonistic 
conception?  Mouffe provides no basis for addressing the validity of such political 
claims.  Furthermore, what Mouffe does not recognize is that politics in instituted-




uncertainty and anomie engendered by bureaucratic-capitalism drives individuals to 
identify with stark moral positions in the limited political sphere that exists within 
instituted-modern societies.  This social-historical context of advanced modern societies 
cannot be disregarded in favor of a political sphere that suddenly removes all such 
political positions from consideration.  Mouffe provides no vision of how an agonistic 
political sphere that does not include such moral demands can be constructed.  Given the 
social-historical circumstances that exist in instituted-modern societies, Mouffe’s use of 
the friend/enemy distinction will inevitably lead to eliminationist competition, rather than 
“civil” agonism.      
In order to insure the competitiveness of public, democratic discourse, and to 
create the possibility of excluding private claims from the public sphere, a third sphere, a 
public-private domain is necessary.  According to Castoriadis, democracy requires this 
public-private sphere that lies between the private realm of the household and the 
political domain of decision-making.  Under conditions of instituted-modernity, the 
private and public spheres have been increasingly separated.  In late modernity, the 
bridges between the two do not exist and the skills needed to translate private concerns 
into public action are no longer practiced.80  In order to address this problem, a public-
private sphere, which Castoriadis calls the agora is necessary.  The agora, like the 
marketplace of the Athenian polis is a space wherein private troubles meet and from 
which ideas about a common good can arise.81  The agora is meeting place for citizens 
who gather, discuss ideas, and exchange goods.82  Furthermore, it represents a sphere of 
discourse where private concerns can be discussed and debated and where decisions can 




fact that new social imaginary significations must find points of support with the 
individual’s psyche in order to allow such significations to become part of the social 
imaginary rather than individual fantasy, the existence of the agora permits the 
discussion of such new significations.  New ideas that serve only the private self-interest 
of an individual can be restricted to the private sphere.  Possible challenges to the existing 
instituted imaginary can be discussed and debated within the agora.  Furthermore, 
citizens who participate in this public-private sphere develop habits of democratic 
participation, which reinforce the democratic imaginary in the particular society.  
Furthermore, through the construction of the agora, Castoriadis accounts for changing 
social-historical circumstances in a particular society.  It is critical to recognize that what 
was once a “private” concern can become a “public” one given a certain set of social-
historical circumstances.  One cannot prescribe once and for all what constitutes political 
and private issues.  In order to insure that democratic institutions remain autonomous, in 
that they are subjected to the constant and continuous questioning of the collective, a 
public-private sphere is required.  As such, Castoriadis rejects the possibility of 
grounding the social order, arguing that Habermas’ concept of rational limits ultimately 
undermining a democratic system’s indeterminate, open-ended, and uncertain nature.83  
For Castoriadis, therefore, “the question is not which politics is legitimated by a certain 
epistemology, but which epistemology is legitimated by a certain democratic politics.”84   
The Project of Autonomy: Reconciling Democracy and the Radical Imaginary 
  Theories of discourse democracy propose the necessity of constructing limits to 
political participation in order to insure that the democratic system itself is not torn apart 




democracy also seek to provide for the most inclusive form of political participation.  
Castoriadis agrees with the fundamental goal of discourse democratic theory, in the sense 
that the construction of limits to participation is crucial to guard against destructive 
doctrines that can emerge from the radical imaginary.  What must also be addressed, 
according to Castoriadis, is the concept of democracy as a political, social, and economic 
regime.  An emphasis on the procedural aspects of democratic discourse is insufficient, 
because it requires some form of relatively stable grounding.  Habermas’ solution is to 
ground the limits on public participation in communicatively rationality.  Castoriadis’ 
proposal emphasizes the construction of social and economic institutions that can buttress 
the democratic political regime.  As such, in addition to a democratic public sphere, 
Castoriadis espouses the need to construct an egalitarian economic regime and social 
institutions that socialize individuals into a democratic culture and a democratic identity 
that emphasize self-limitation.  In this manner, new significations can be constructed 
through the collective radical imaginary that challenge the existing instituted imaginary, 
preventing its alienation from the collective, while at the same time constructing limits on 
political claims that seek to completely destroy democracy. 
According to Castoriadis, the project of autonomy emerges from the advent of the 
modern imaginary and its great break with the heteronomy of the medieval period.  
Though the instituted-modern imaginary, and its alienated sources of legitimacy, 
represents the dominant social imaginary in late modern societies, the project of 
autonomy has existed as an undercurrent throughout Western history since the advent of 
the modern imaginary.  Autonomy has manifested itself in two ways.  First, the project of 




situations throughout modern history such as the Paris Commune, the February 
revolution in Russia, and the student strikes in Paris in 1968.  These brief upsurges have 
quickly been suppressed.  Second, the everyday resistance of individuals confronting the 
bureaucratic-capitalist apparatus represents the real possibility for constructing an 
autonomous society.  This everyday resistance, and the impact it has on the existing 
instituted-imaginary, illustrates the role the radical imaginary plays in the continuous 
construction and alteration of established institutions.  What is required, according to 
Castoriadis, is a democratic theory that begins with the recognition of the radical 
imaginary and the role it plays in the construction of social institutions.  In every society, 
the radical imaginary plays a crucial role in the construction and alteration of social 
institution.  However, throughout most of human history, the role of the radical imaginary 
has been covered over, ignored, or suppressed by the instituted-imaginary.   
 The sporadic surging forth of the project of autonomy throughout modern history 
resembles Sheldon Wolin’s vision of “fugitive democracy.”  Wolin argues that the 
administrative efficiency of the modern state is hindered by democratic participation.  As 
such, one of the primary functions of the state is to impose restrictions on the possibility 
of participation in order to guarantee that the state apparatus can fulfill its functions 
without restriction.  For example, Wolin argues that constitutions represent the 
construction of boundaries to democracy, arguing that “constitutional democracy is 
democracy fitted to a constitution.  It is not democratic or democratized constitutionalism 
because it is democracy without the demos as actor.”85  Constitutions seek to regularize 
politics, guarding against the power of the demos in favor of protecting the interests of 




his focus would emphasize the bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary.  In order to reproduce 
the instituted-modern imaginary and insure the functioning of bureaucratic-capitalism, 
human spontaneity and creativity, the source of demands for autonomy, must be 
eliminated.  The state participates in the suppression of autonomy through the 
construction of a restricted public sphere.  However, Wolin argues that periodically a 
society will assert its democratic will against the state and force a change in the system.  
In essence, demotic power overflows the boundaries imposed by the constitution and the 
existing institutional apparatus.87  From this perspective, democracy is an act of 
revolutionary transgression against existing institutions.  In American history, examples 
such as the abolitionist movement and the civil rights movement illustrate Wolin’s point 
concerning the democratic moment as a transgressive act against the existing system.  
Neither of these issues could have been resolved within the existing system, but required 
the democratic intervention of the people in order to force a change in the instituted-
imaginary.  As such, Wolin conceives of democracy as a moment and a movement, rather 
than as a form of government.  Once demotic power overflows the boundaries imposed 
on it, the system begins to construct new boundaries.  Thus, while the intervention of 
democracy fundamentally alters the system, a new set of boundaries are constructed to 
contain the demos.88  This is where Castoriadis partially disagrees with Wolin.  In 
alienated societies, the surging forth of the project of autonomy can effect change in the 
existing instituted imaginary.  On a smaller scale, the factory floor, for example, the daily 
resistance of the worker alters the relationship between the management bureaucracy and 
the workers.  These are changes in the existing institutional apparatus that do not threaten 




the periodic resistance of the worker, and the subsequent alteration of the bureaucratic-
capitalist system, to continue functioning.  In essence, the surging forth of the project of 
autonomy and the changes it can create in the instituted imaginary parallels Wolin’s 
conception of demotic power overflowing boundaries to effect change, which then leads 
to the inscription of new boundaries.  However, Castoriadis disagrees with Wolin’s 
assessment that democracy is limited to intermittent expressions of demotic power.  
While instituted-modern societies suppress and cover over the project of autonomy, one 
need not accept the fact that democracy can only emerge as an intermittent challenge to 
the instituted-imaginary.  Particularly in modern societies, the possibility always exists 
for the surging forth of the project of autonomy.  Castoriadis’ model of the democratic 
regime seeks to sustain “fugitive democracy” and instaurate institutions that rely on the 
continuous participation of citizens in challenging the instituted imaginary.  Such a 
society must always be open to the questioning of the collective, but Castoriadis argues 
that it is in fact possible to conceive of democracy as a regime, rather than simply as a 
sporadic moment of resistance.  
Many critics have argued that Castoriadis’ vision of the autonomous society is a 
utopian one.  Castoriadis’ broad vision of an autonomous society includes direct 
democratic institutions, the possibility of a stateless society, and the active participation 
of citizens in the questioning and construction of social institutions in the political sphere.  
For example, Castoriadis rejects the idea of representative democracy, arguing that 
representatives are given an irrevocable mandate by the electorate and then, once in 
office, the representative behaves in such a way as to insure his re-election.89  In 




majority of society, thus constructing a private domain of elite decision-making.90  
Furthermore, Castoriadis characterizes representative elections as an exercise in magic, 
where the collective will of the people is liquefied, placed drop by drop in a ballot box, 
and then reformed to provide a “mandate.”91  According to Castoriadis, representatives 
are too easily bought off by special interests and political parties simply mirror the 
bureaucratic apparatus that exists within bureaucratic-capitalist society.92  As such, 
Castoriadis argues that representative democracy does not represent the collective will.  
Furthermore, no representative system can address the real problems of advanced 
capitalist society, such as the ubiquity of bureaucratic-capitalist institutions and the crisis 
of meaning and the subsequent dilapidation of late modernity. To some degree, however, 
Castoriadis’ critics are correct, in the sense that direct democratic institutions in modern 
world are impractical, given the large scale institutional structure that would be required.  
As such, Castoriadis’ specific vision for a democratic society, particularly his rejection of 
representative democracy, is a less significant contribution to democratic theory, for the 
simple reason that it is impractical.     
Despite the criticisms leveled against him over the issue of direct democracy, 
Castoriadis insists that the project of autonomy is not “utopian”, arguing that this term 
indicates impossibility, a dream that can never be fulfilled, and a hope for a future that we 
can strive towards but will never actually come.93  According to Castoriadis, the 
realization of the project of autonomy is possible.  “Sa realization ne depend que de 
l’activité lucide des individus et des peoples, de leur comprehension, de leur volonté, de 
leur imagination.”94  As such, Castoriadis criticizes the work of Habermas, who 




dreams are not practical, and allow us to be irresponsible.  If utopia will never come, why 
bother to try to achieve it?  Here Castoriadis reveals his continuing commitment to the 
emancipatory potential of the Marxian revolutionary project.  Though Castoriadis 
rejected the theoretical implications of Marxism, he never abandoned the hope for 
political and social change that Marx advocated.  For Castoriadis, the struggle for 
democracy against existing bureaucratic-capitalist institutions is always significant, in the 
sense that abandoning this struggle would result in a system of total servility.  
Furthermore, Castoriadis rejects the term “utopian” because it represents an end point, a 
telos.  For Castoriadis, democracy is not a telos, but rather it is a constant process of 
contestation and decision-making that never ends.  In order to be autonomous, the 
process, the democratic regime, and the democratic institutions must always be subject to 
questioning and alteration.  In autonomous society, one never says, “we have achieved 
the highest political point possible.”  Instead, citizens ask, “what can we do to improve 
these institutions, given the changing social-historical conditions in our society?”  The 
continuous asking of this type of question is a real possibility, even in a representative 
democracy.  As such, subjecting the existing instituted-imaginary to consistent and 
continuous criticism represents the real potential of Castoriadis’ vision of democracy.   
The instauration of an autonomous society is a difficult task, to say the least.  
Furthermore, even if one accepts that it is impossible to achieve the direct democratic 
institutional structure that Castoriadis advocates, incorporating the radical imaginary into 
democratic theory and democratic decision-making represents an equally daunting task.  
The construction of an open-ended democratic decision-making process that recognizes 




imaginary.96  The persistence of heteronomy in human societies is the result of the fact 
that people want to ignore the radical imaginary and completely cover over the Abyss 
with which it confronts us.  Individuals seeking certainty will sacrifice their autonomy in 
favor of heteronomy and alienation. This is particularly problematic in instituted-modern 
societies, where individuals sacrifice their autonomy in favor of an institutional structure 
that does not provide the certainty that human beings crave.  As a result, in instituted-
modern societies, individuals pay a high price for the illusory certainty of alienation and 
gain very little in return.  For Castoriadis, this situation makes the instauration of an 
autonomous society a very real possibility.  The contemporary individual is aware of her 
contingency, but is unhappy in this awareness.  A person aware of her contingency can 
try to transform this into her destiny.  This is a path that remains open in the modern 
era.97  Castoriadis’s concern with psychoanalysis is based on the necessity of constructing 
a new relationship between the individual and the radical imaginary, where the human 
subject is capable of recognizing that he is the source of norms and values.98  The radical 
imaginary will always be an Abyss from whence our dark desires emerge.  However, it is 
also the source of our creativity.  The political purpose of psychoanalysis, therefore, is to 
help the individual become autonomous, and therefore more active and responsible in 
society.99  In Castoriadis’s estimation, human beings can posit a new relationship with the 
radical imaginary where we accept both these elements of our psyches and account for, 
and become capable of guarding against, the Abyss.  As a society, we can be aware of 
human desire and counteract it through democratic processes.  In such a society, the 
fantasy of one man can be counteracted by the discursive practices of the whole society.  




However, at the same time, there are no guarantees that such safeguards will work.  
Castoriadis’s conception of autonomy requires an acceptance of persistent uncertainty 
and self-limitation, which is clearly a difficult task to accomplish.100  A wager is built 
into an autonomous society, namely a wager on an uncertain future.  Making such a 
wager, and accepting an uncertain future, allows the individual to live freely and 
furthermore allows the society to construct its future.  “An individual has transformed his 
or her contingency into his or her destiny if this person has arrived at the consciousness 
of having made the best out of his or her practically infinite possibilities.  A society has 
transformed its contingency into its destiny if the members of this society arrive at the 
awareness that they would prefer to live at no other place and at not other time than the 
here and now.”101  In autonomous society, uncertainty is a way of life, as the radical 
imaginary provides no guarantees of success.  However, this form of uncertainty is more 
acceptable because it is on the collective’s terms.  The community wagers on a future of 
its own making, and, as such, is more able to deal with the consequences of uncertainty. 
Because an autonomous society requires the acceptance of uncertainty, 
democratic institutions require the active and lucid participation of citizens in the political 
sphere.  “The political is the way in which a society and its members come to understand 
themselves as this society rather than an accidental coexistence of random particular 
movements that have temporarily congealed under the pressure of outside and accidental 
forces.”102  A democratic citizenry must be actively engaged in the construction of the 
institutions that govern it and furthermore must be willing to question and criticize the 
existing institutional structure.  No institution can be conceived in final terms.  




existence qua autonomous institutions.  Such institutions must remain open, subject to 
questioning by the people, and furthermore, subject to alteration.  If these conditions do 
not exist, the institution becomes alienated from the people who created it, and thus relies 
on a heteronomous justification for its continued existence.  For example, the new social, 
political, and economic institutions created during the modern era derived their 
legitimacy from human subjects and therefore had the potential to remain autonomous, 
had they justified themselves on the continuous participation of, and interrogation by, 
those who had created them. With the construction of the instituted-modern imaginary, 
however, this possibility was covered over and alienation ensued.   
In addition to the active participation of citizens in the questioning of the 
instituted-imaginary, democracy must be self-limiting.  “Democratic society is instituted 
as a society without a body, as a society which undermines the representation of an 
organic totality.”103  Democracy is an affirmative response to the problematization of 
final markers.  Unlike totalitarianism, democracy responds to the disappearance of final 
markers as a condition for freedom and self-formation.104  In such a society, people 
experience indeterminacy as to the basis of power, law, and knowledge and as to the 
basis of the relationship between the self and the Other.  Furthermore, in a democracy, 
the process of questioning is central to social life, where no answers are permanent or 
certain.105  It is in this uncertainty where the temptation of totalitarianism resides.  As 
such, a democratic citizenry must accept that there are limited possibilities to what the 
democratic system can accomplish.  These limits are imposed by the need for consistent, 
active, and lucid participation.106  Thus, for example, a self-limiting democratic system 




Such an institutional structure would represent hubris, in the sense that the contemporary 
democratic citizenry is convinced that its existing instituted-imaginary transcends the 
social-historical and can be valid now and for all time.  In autonomous society, such 
imaginaries must be rejected in favor of the insuring that the political remains as a space 
for the active participation of democratic citizens.  The construction of a self-limiting 
democracy, according to Castoriadis, requires a transformation of the way in which 
individuals living in instituted-modern societies view the world around them.  The 
bureaucratic-capitalist imaginary posits the possibility of the total rational mastery of 
both the natural and the social worlds.  If an autonomous democratic society is to exist, 
this signification must be rejected in favor of auto-limitation.  “Nous devons denouncer 
l’hubris en nous et autour de nous, accéder à un éthos d’autolimitation et de prudence, 
accepter cette mortalité radicale pour devenir enfin, tant que faire se peut, libres.”107  
In order to construct a self-limiting democratic system and to resist the temptation 
to construct alienated institutions, a democratic system must be conceived as a regime, 
rather than as a simple set of procedures.  Democracy is a form of society, not merely a 
set of institutions.  Where in a monarchy, power is condensed in the person of the king, in 
a democracy the locus of power is an empty place.  This prevents the government from 
fully appropriating power for its own ends and insures that the exercise of power is the 
result of a controlled contest with permanent rules.108  The distinction between the 
political and politics creates a space in which democracy can flourish, but which also 
requires a democratic culture, a daunting task in itself.  There is a constant temptation to 
reduce the political to politics or to overcome this distinction by an appeal to a higher 




to reduce democracy to these procedural structures, leading to a situation where only the 
sporadic participation of the citizenry is required.  Procedural democracy can be reduced 
to politics; the political as a separate domain of active participation and decision-making 
is unnecessary, as the citizens are able to cede authority to elected representatives and 
need not question the existing instituted-imaginary.  Castoriadis argues that the 
procedural aspect is only one part of a democratic regime.  What is also required is that 
these procedures be democratic in spirit and be part of an active democratic educational 
process that cultivates a democratic culture and identity.109     
Connected to the concept of democracy as a regime, Castoriadis argues that an 
autonomous democratic society must also construct a democratic culture and a 
democratic identity.  With the construction of democratic social institutions, the 
democratic regime is reinforced by the fact these institutions will play a significant role in 
the socialization process.  Democratic habits will be instilled in the individual from the 
moment he is born, strengthening that individual’s ability to participate in the democratic 
process and also serving as a guard against the development of destructive doctrines that 
reject the democratic process.  According to Castoriadis, it is through the development of 
democratic culture and identity that individual rights can be defended.  Castoriadis argues 
that individual rights are laudable, universal values.110  However, he argues that the 
majority of states in the world do not respect these rights, and the liberal idea that they 
will spread spontaneously is untenable.111  According to Castoriadis, rights cannot be 
founded in any extra-social or pre-social source of authority.  Thus, for example, Rawls’ 
concept of the overlapping consensus and the original position as the legitimating force 




conditions.  One must recognize that regimes that abuse the rights of the individual are 
constructed by human beings.  The function of a discourse concerning the “rights of 
man” is to flee from historical and political responsibility.  Any defense of individual 
rights must be founded on the construction of institutions, specifically a democratic 
culture and identity, wherein we assert that we reject the abuse of individual rights, both 
at home and abroad.112  As such the defense of individual rights must be conceived in 
terms of a principle of autonomy, whereby the collective of citizens asserts that each 
individual should be treated as an independent autonomous being.  These rights must be 
asserted and defended publicly.  Finally, individual rights cannot be conceived as 
absolute injunctions; they are a political institution, subject to questioning and criticism 
by the collective of citizens.  However, when a democratic culture and identity exist as 
social institutions, even when questioned, these rights, as an institution, can reproduce 
themselves through the fact that they are asserted, defended, and practiced on a daily 
basis.  Of course, the socialization process is never complete, in that social institutions do 
not create democratic automata who will automatically participate in the public sphere.  
The radical imaginary always remains as the Abyss confronting each individual.  
However, these institutions will habituate the individual into a democratic language and 
practice, a set of rules the prescribe norms of conduct in seeking self-chosen satisfactions 
and in performing self-chosen actions.  Such a language creates a political identity 
between people otherwise engaged in diverse enterprises.113  In this way citizenship is 
more than a legal status and becomes a political identity.114   
The role of the agora is particularly important in the construction of a democratic 




on a daily basis, allowing them to cultivate the habits of responsible, democratic 
participation.  Furthermore, the existence of the agora promotes a democratic educational 
process, where citizens are steeped in a pedagogical experience throughout their life.  
Castoriadis’ advocacy of such institutions and processes reflects his argument that the 
individual is constructed by the instituted-imaginary of the society in which he lives.  If 
institutions are autonomous and are subject to the questioning of the individuals living in 
that society, citizens will be socialized to participate in democratic decision-making and 
to question the existing instituted-imaginary.  As such, democratic education becomes 
crucial in an autonomous society.  In order to insure that the democratic regime continues 
to exist, it is imperative that citizens be educated in such a way as to socialize them into 
the system of participatory democracy. 
 Furthermore, the construction of a democratic culture that will successfully tie 
citizens to participation in the political domain requires some method of economic 
equality, in order to insure that each citizen has the ability to participate in the public 
realm free of dependency on other citizens.  “A significant reduction in economic 
inequality is surely crucial to a robust democracy.  But such a project must be pursued in 
ways that do not undermine either existing cultural pluralism or future possibilities of 
democratic pluralization: equality must be viewed not simply as an end in itself but also 
as a condition of democratic pluralization”115  Connolly elaborates two goals that should 
be incorporated into any future model of a participatory democracy.  First, to establish a 
floor beneath which no citizen is allowed to fall, thus allowing every individual the 
means to participate in politics if they so desire.  Second, a glass ceiling that is difficult to 




completely from political life, a situation that would allow the wealthy to escape the 
collective conditions affecting the rest of society.116  Castoriadis agrees with Connolly’s 
advocacy of economic equality, arguing that an individual cannot be autonomous unless 
he is fully enabled to participate in the public sphere.117  Economic inequality as it exists 
in bureaucratic-capitalists societies thwarts the ability of each individual to equally 
participate in the public sphere.  The worker, for example, is dependent upon his 
employer for his economic well-being, reducing the worker’s capacity to participate in 
democratic decision-making.  In such a situation, the worker is beholden to his employer, 
who can easily influence the workers’ decision through intimidation and coercion.  As 
such, an autonomous democratic society must instaurate some form of income 
redistribution in order to guarantee that each individual is able to participate freely in the 
democratic process.   
What then becomes the content of the revolutionary project?  Obviously, it can be 
neither the absurdity of a society without institutions nor one of good institutions 
given once and for all, since every set of institutions, once established, necessarily 
tends to become autonomous and to enslave society anew to its underlying 
imaginary significations.  The content of the revolutionary project can only be the 
aim of a society that has become capable of perpetual renewal of its institutions.  
Post-revolutionary society will not be simply a self-managed society; it will be a 
society that self-institutes itself explicitly, not once and for all, but 
continuously.118
Benjamin Barber argues that “strong democracy requires unmediated self-government by 




neighborhood and the national level in common talk, common decision-making and 
political judgment, and common action.”119  Pursuant to this goal, Barber outlines a series 
of reforms that would be necessary to achieve this type of democratic system.  Some of 
these reforms include, for example, a national system of neighborhood assemblies, the 
use of telecommunications technology to enable the dissemination of information and 
participatory voting, public support for workplace democracy, and an initiative and 
referendum procedure that would allow more direct popular participation.120  These are 
the types of institutions that would be necessary to construct the democratic regime that 
Castoriadis advocates.  Such reforms would enable the construction of a democratic 
culture and identity and allow the active participation of individuals in democratic 
decision-making.  In addition to these institutional reforms, Castoriadis would insist that 
these institutions remain open to the questioning of the collective itself, allowing the 
citizenry to alter these institutions depending on the emergence of new social-historical 
conditions.     
The instauration of a democratic regime requires an act of will on the part of 
individuals and the collective of citizens and a wager on an uncertain future.  The 
fundamentalist Christian, for example, can resign himself to the notion that everything is 
the result of a divine plan and live happily in the certainty that he is not in control of the 
world around him, nor is he in control of the future.  Thus, he lives a life of blissful 
alienation to the total heteronomy of an externally-imposed authority.  However, this also 
requires a rejection of the modern imaginary; one cannot believe that God has authored a 
plan for the world and also accept the humanist notion that we control our own destiny 




retreat into private life and a rejection of the world around us.  If we accept the 
emancipatory potential of the modern imaginary, we must also choose to accept the 
uncertainty of the radical imaginary and the dangers it presents both to our psyches and to 
our society.  The wager an autonomous society makes on an uncertain future is not a 
wager against impossible odds.  The democratic regime, as the totality of political, 
economic, and social institutions, reinforces the capacity for reconciliation between the 
rights of the individual and an expansive vision of public participation.  It is imperative 
that a democratic citizen actively participate in the questioning of institutions and the 
construction of meaning in the world around us.  The alternative is the dilapidated society 
of the advanced capitalist world.  Such a world is worse than heteronomy where the 
source of authority is external to us.  In dilapidated late modern societies, we have 
created the institutions that repress us, and we are complicit in our own repression.  Thus, 
we can live in this state, or seek to change it through our own act of will.  This is the 
source of the project of autonomy.  If we seek to live in real freedom, we must choose to 
do so and act politically and responsibly in a democratic government. 
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